









An SEC-registered Investment Advisor



GFC2: The Bowl's Empty

(Eurodollar University)













Federal Reserve: Liabilities & Capital





Federal Reserve: Liabilities & Capital







MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION

A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee was held in the offices of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington, D.C., on Monday and Tuesday, December 16-17, 1974, beginning at 4:00 p.m. on Monday.

PRESENT: Mr. Burns, Chairman

Mr. Hayes, Vice Chairman Mr. Black

Mr. Bucher

Mr. Clay Mr. Coldwell

Mr. Holland Mr. Kimbrel Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Sheehan Mr. Wallich Mr. Winn

Messrs. Baughman, MacLaury, Mayo, and Morris, Alternate Members of the Federal Open Market Committee

Messrs. Eastburn, Francis, and Balles, Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco, respectively

Mr. Broida, Secretary Mr. Altmann, Deputy Secretary

Mr. O'Connell, General Counsel Mr. Partee, Senior Economist

Mr. Axilrod, Economist (Domestic Finance)

Mr. Solomon, Economist (International Finance)

In reply, Mr. Coombs said an effort could be made to develop such a measure, but he doubted that it would be successful. The volume of funds which might be shifted back and forth between the of the monetary statistics arose in connection with Euro-dollars; he suspected that at least some part of the Euro-dollar-based money supply should be included in the U.S. money supply. More generally, he thought M1 was becoming increasingly obsolete as a monetary indicator. The Committee should be focusing more on M2, and it should be moving toward some new version of M3--especially because of the participation of nonbank thrift institutions in money transfer activities.

FOMC Memorandum of Discussion December 1974







Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?

Todd Keister and James J. McAndrews

The buildup of reserves in the U.S. banking system during the financial crisis has fueled concerns that the Federal Reserve's policies may have failed to stress that the Federal Reserve's policies may have failed to strimulate the flow of credit in the centumy; banks, it alposts are amassing funds rather than leading them out. However, a careful examination of the balance sheet effects of central bank actions shows that the high level of reserves is simply a by product of the Fed3 new lending facilities and asset purchase programs. The total quantity of reserves in the banking system reflects the scale of the Fed3 policy initiatives, but conveys no information about the initiatives' effects on bank lending on on the common year broads.

Some commentatives see the using in caces reserves as a trumbling development—evidence that has a relocating final trather than its mediag development—evidence that has a relocating final that that has its mediage on the boundard, firms, and other branks. Editi and plattic (1990), p. 3.1 for example, desting the high level of caces reserves as the "problem Peduch the conting credit creams—on." If not the problem, one bedone supposes "Other otherwise and the problem of the problem, one bedone supposes "Other otherwise the Federal Reserve during the critis has been destined; the first of extensing the flow of credit to forms and boundards, they argue, the money the Fed. has feet to banks and other floating intermediation into Feyenbert 2018 is stilled.

These views have led to proposals aimed at discouraging banks from holding excess reserves. The proposals include placing a tax on excess reserves (Summer 2009) or setting a cap on the amount of excess reserves each bank is allowed to hold (Dasgupta 2009). Mankiw (2009) notes that economies in earlier eras also criticized the stockpiling of money during times of financial stress and favored at tax on mome holdings to encourase dending Relation before and stissues to the First, we showed that the liquidity facilities and other credit programs introduced by the Federal Reserve in response to the crisis have created, as a by-product, a large quantity of reserves in the banking system. Second, we showed that while the lending decisions and other activities of banks may result in small changes in the level of required reserves, the vast majority of the newly created reserves will end up being held as excess reserves. The dramatic buildup of excess reserves reflects the large scale of the Federal Reserve's policy initiatives; it conveys no information about the effects of these initiatives on bank lending or on the level of economic activity.

Todd Keister and James J. McAndrews
Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?
FRBNY Current Issues
Volume 15, Number 8; December 2009





This is how you should view the Fed's balance sheet from the most charitable point of view. The central bank isn't adding more money to a static system already filled with it; like our engine analogy, Jay Powell is frantically trying to replace what has already leaked out. The more he puts in, the more the balance sheet is expanded, the more you know must've gone missing.




It's a warning, not a solution.

Alhambra Investments
The Global Engine Is Still Leaking
April 13, 2020




TIPS Yields & Breaks






TIPS Yields & Breaks











TED Spread










TED Spread







June 24–25, 2008 1 of 253

Meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on June 24–25, 2008

A joint meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was held in the offices of the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, June 24, 2008, at 2:00 p.m., and continued on Wednesday, June 25, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. Those present were the following:

- Mr. Bernanke, Chairman
- Mr. Geithner, Vice Chairman Mr. Fisher
- Mr. Kohn
- Mr. Kroszner
- Mr. Mishkin Ms. Pianalto
- Mr. Plosser
- Mr. Stern Mr. Warsh


Ms. Cumming, Messrs. Evans, Lacker, and Lockhart, and Ms. Yellen, Alternate Members of the Federal Open Market Committee

Messrs. Bullard, Hoenig, and Rosengren, Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis, Kansas City, and Boston, respectively

- Mr. Madigan, Secretary and Economist
- Ms. Danker, Deputy Secretary
- Mr. Skidmore, Assistant Secretary
- Ms. Smith, Assistant Secretary
- Mr. Alvarez, General Counsel
- Mr. Baxter, Deputy General Counsel


MR. BULLARD. There is, to be sure, still some potential for additional upheaval, depending in part on the managerial agility among key financial firms. However, the U.S. economy is now much better positioned to handle financial market turmoil than it was six months ago. This is due to the lending facilities now in place and to the environment of low interest rates that has been created. Renewed financial market turmoil, should it occur during the summer or fall, would not now be as worrisome from a systemic risk perspective.

FOMC Meeting Transcript






TED Spread





Nikkei 225 Stock Index








Image courtesy of DavidParkins.com



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