Erik: Joining me now is New York Times bestselling author and Bear Traps founder Larry McDonald. Larry has prepared a slide deck as he usually does for us. Registered users will find the link in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, macrovoices.com.
Look for the red button above Larry's picture that says Looking for the Downloads. Larry, it's great to get you back on the show. It's been way too long. I wanna start with what is it exactly that started last Friday? 'Cause it certainly seems to be the beginning of something significant in the markets.
Is this the market finally waking up to the Iran conflict, or is it a reaction to the jobs reports and maybe expectations of rate cuts being harder to come by, or is it something else? And by all means, refer to the slide deck as we dive in.
Larry: Sure, yeah. It's definitely a fourth quarter 2021 redux where Everybody's kinda been in a transitory trance.
Inflation is transitory again, which we were in, in the fourth quarter of two thousand twenty-one. And if you recall, the moment it appeared that inflation was not transitory, equities lost about thirty-five, forty percent pretty quickly between two thousand twenty-one and twenty-two. The Nasdaq lost about seven trillions-- seven, eight trillion dollars evaluation.
And so you have a decent economy, but the Strait of Hormuz closed for 100 days, all this AI CapEx, and it's really just crushing the little guy as inflation is just so sticky. And it-- you could see here on, on slide two. One of the things, Eric, I wanna make very clear, there's no I in team. So as part of the Bear Trap report, we host a conversation every day with the biggest hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds in the world.
And what I'm gonna do today is kinda share the insights, the valuable insights that I'm getting from the top institutions around the world and triangulating that information. And that's why I love this platform, because I wanna democratize the information. I want, your phenomenal audience to, to really have a front-row seat as to what the in-- top institutions are talking about.
The biggest thing in recent weeks is the consumer oil inflation. And you could see here on slide two, junk bonds. The high-yield market as a whole is okay, but the tertiary parts, and these are the, typically the leading indicators. The tertiary part of the high-yield bond market, which is CCCs, as you could see there, really kinda blowing out.
The last time stocks were all at all-time highs, CCCs were much lower in yields, and I think that's, really telling you a lot about the consumer.
Erik: You mentioned the big IPOs. It seems to me like that's a key part of this story as well. So I'm trying to sorta sort out, okay, we got on Friday, the jobs report kinda led to a lot of people thinking that rate cuts are less likely than they were on Thursday for whatever reason.
We've also got these big looming IPOs, and I'm not sure if the market's finally woken up to how big of a deal the Hormuz crisis is. What are the experts in your fund community telling you in terms of how they're perceiving what the most important drivers are? It feels like Hormuz is probably not it.
Larry: And it's indigestion, really. So if you go to slide sixteen, if you think about it, it was-- you're talking about an IPO that's six percent of US GDP. If you think of Facebook 2012, that was an enormous IPO at the time, $100 billion, and it was less than 1% of GDP. The SpaceX IPO would be 6% of GDP.
And always remember that The biggest IPO ever was Saudi Aramco at 25 billion. So if you do the math, if you take the secondary offering from Google last week of shares, 80 billion plus the SpaceX, you get $150 billion. 150 billion. And so net-net, a lot of people have to sell stocks in the market to make room for these, two absolute beasts that have come out.
Erik: If you take SpaceX, as you said, it's a $2 trillion valuation. The actual raise, which is the money that, that we need to come up with someplace to, to pay for the shares being offered, is 80 billion. Okay. Add that 80 billion, Google's And add to that Anthropic is coming up. We're gonna have OpenAI coming up.
There's about 200, 250 billion of immediate raise, but here's the thing that I'm actually focusing more on, Larry, is six to 12 months after that, all the insiders and the VCs and the early investors in those companies, it's not 200 billion, it's like 3 trillion of capital that gets unlocked as those restricted shares become unrestricted somewhere between six and 12 months after the IPO.
It seems to me that's the point where, how do we absorb all of that equity into the market?
Larry: If you look at the SpaceX program in terms of the lockup and unlock, it's much more aggressive than previous IPOs. And so for investors listening to us right now, it's extremely important.
If you remember the Facebook IPO in 2012 once again, once the lockup started coming out and the shares, like you just nailed it, in that first year, you had a 40, 50% drawdown in s- in Facebook. And I think what's happening is the VCs were... think about capitalism in America. These companies are coming public
think of Tesla, came public at a 2 billion valuation, right? Facebook at 100 billion valuation, and now here SpaceX two-- almost 2 trillion valuation. So it's it's e- essentially 11, 12 times the size of Facebook. So these companies are coming public much far later in the maturity cycle, which means that the IPOs are very unattractive and you're much better off waiting.
If you have to, buy a little bit of the IPO, but you're gonna probably be able to buy, SpaceX IPO 50% off sometime in the first year
Erik: Yeah, obviously a lot of people think SpaceX is, going to be a huge thing and it's the future. It feels to me like these IPOs are very reminiscent of 2000 or so when, y- frankly the smartest tech leaders w- had the wits to say, "Let me sell my equity to retail bag holders and let them ride out what happens in 2000."
So it feels like 1999 to me.
Larry: And to look at chart number 15, this shows you a lot because it's the S&P versus the equal weight. And if you think about it, the biggest, most liquid stocks are the easiest to sell, right? So lo and behold Huge underperformance in the last 10 days of the S&P versus the equal weight.
You can see that on the chart number 15. And what that's telling you is that people are selling the Mag Seven, which is essentially unched to a little bit negative since October now. They're selling the big Mag Seven equities, which are very liquid, and they're raising capital for all these IPOs. That's inter- like you said the Time Warner deal in 1999, 2000, it's just too much coming into the market at the same time.
Plus, we have a lot of private equity deals coming out in recent months. There's just too many sellers. And the last thing, remember, in the '90s, I founded convertbond.com. And for investors listening to us right now, always remember, the smartest sellers in the world are chief financial officers. And guess what, Eric?
The amount of convertible bonds that have been coming to the market in the last couple of weeks, from, say, three, four weeks, is up a lot over last year. It's up on, to... And the same thing happened in 2021 in the third, fourth quarter. And so what's happening is, as the stock market rips, CFOs see, "Oh, my stock's up a lot," and they're coming to the market with convertible bonds.
Inside those convertible bonds, there's lots of equity. And so right now, chief financial officers are selling their equity in the convertible bond market at a very fast rate of change speed, which is similar to 2021 in that third, fourth quarter. And never forget what happened in '22, 30, 40% drawdown. So I think the CFOs smell something and they're coming to market, and they're also dumping.
So you have Elon's dumping stock with the SpaceX crowd. You got Google dumping stock, and you got CFOs across all these different companies, Irin I could... There's seven or eight companies. They're also dumping a lot of stock at the same time.
Erik: So if I look at what's happened in the last few days, it feels oh, we're down a lot.
But really, if I just go back to the late March low when the market initially started to freak out about the Iran conflict, we got down to, what was it? Around 60, just about 6,400, a little bit below 6,400 on the S&P. If I look at the, since Friday, the down move as of Wednesday afternoon, we're really only looking at, I don't know it's nowhere close to a 38%.
It's about 25% has been retraced at most. How far are we going? Is this just the beginning of something really big, or are we just looking at a blip here? W- what do you think is coming?
Larry: Great question, and the perfect chart is number 13 for this. So 41 trillion in the Nasdaq 100 last week before the drawdown started.
41 trillion. And to your point in March, which was just forty-seven or maybe fifty, fifty trading days ago, in late March, there was thirty trillion in the Nasdaq one hundred. So the Nasdaq one hundred went from thirty trillion of value to forty-one trillion in less than fifty trading days. Nothing like that's ever happened in the history of markets
But let's go back to two thousand and twenty-one, twenty-two, the last time we had the inflation shock. Look at what ha-- And the last time the convertible bond market was on fire too. A lot of CFOs selling stock. So two thousand and twenty-one, twenty-two, we were up near nineteen trillion of value in late 'twenty-one, and we went down to twelve trillion in literally four quarters.
That's an example of what's about to happen, I think. So that kinda drawdown. And think about it, so we went from nineteen trillion in the fourth quarter of two thousand and twenty-one to twelve trillion in the fourth quarter of 'twenty-two, and then that all the way up to forty-one trillion. And that's why I think as money rotates out of financial assets, which are bonds and tech stocks, when you see this kind of value, the rotations can be amazing.
If you look back to two thousand and twenty-two, what were the big winners? Energy stocks were up a lot, I think well over a hundred percent. Also materials. I think the same thing's gonna play out this time around again, and it's a repeat two point zero.
Erik: And so does that give you any targets or expectations in terms of valuation levels that we're headed towards?
Larry: That's what's amazing about the market now. The free cash flow yields in the energy space are so cheap, natural gas equities, energy equities materials. So you've got one part of the market that's really cheap, but the Nasdaq one hundred valuations are really all-time high CAPE ratios, PE ratios.
So there's two different markets. One part of the market, technology is really at the highest valuations almost ever. And then, but in the energy space in, in the material space, you've got beautiful free cash flow yields, which are probably the cheapest part of the market.
Erik: Larry, I apologize for jumping out of order a little bit there.
You've got so many different fascinating topics I wanna come back to. I got you a little jumping around the slide deck. Why don't we go back to the beginning around page three? Tell us about this S&P versus restaurants chart.
Larry: Sure. So th-that's kinda the main point, is that the bottom the bottom sixty-five percent of consumers are really only ten, fifteen percent of consumption now because the wealthy have so much money in money market funds, and money market fund yields are up a lot But the bottom 60% of consumers are in a lot of pain, and that's why you're seeing these wacky divergences, restaurants, getting really hammered this year.
Same thing on the next chart with Home Depot. Home Depot almost 30% off. Think of these brands, Lowe's, Home Depot McDonald's. All these stocks are essentially close to 20... fif- n- 19 to 20% off. Home Depot almost 30% off. And so it's, once again it's two different consumers. One, one part of the market's in a lot of pain, and the other part of the market, technology and semiconductors, are partying like it's 1999.
Erik: Larry, I see you've got Agnico on the next page. L- let's talk about the big picture of gold and gold miners even before we get into the specific stock. We're taught to think of gold as something you want in your portfolio as a hedge against big geopolitical events. If something like the Iran conflict happens, gold's gonna go up, except for it went straight down.
What gives, first of all, with that? Is that about inflation expectations? Is it gonna continue? And why don't we transition from there into the slides and what in terms of the gold miners?
Larry: Sure. Eric, so we just talked about the consumer and how weak the consumer is. You could see this in a lot of the conference calls.
You could see it in the restaurants, you could see it in Home Depot. You can see it in so many different parts of the market. So it's very tough for the Fed to hike rates. But the market gold miners are really having this kind of what I call recency bias. So in 2021, '22, we had that big inflation spike, and the gold miners now have really sold off for a bunch of different reasons.
One, one important one, is we've gone from three rate cuts to potentially one rate hike in terms of the SOFR futures or the expectations market of the Fed funds. So when you go from like rate cuts, three rate cuts to one hike, that knocks a lot of steam out of the gold miners. But the best trades in the world, Eric, the best trades of our careers are what I call the hot money flush.
And so I love a sector that just had what we call a hot money flush. Think of a poker table A lot of weak hands at the poker table, and that's the gold miners. So in the third, fourth quarter and the first quarter of last year, so many tourists, Eric, so many tourists came into the gold miners. Think of the heavyset guy, the Hawaiian shirt, and the glasses and the camera, right?
That's the type of investor, weak hands, tourists getting off the bus, buying the gold miners with both hands in the third, fourth quarter. Next thing they get hit over the head with central banks, with this shock, with the Middle East. Think of Turkey, all these emerging markets, central banks, co- There's a lot of countries in the emerging market space that don't have a lot of access to energy.
And so when you have an energy shock, they have to sell something to raise cash flow. Emerging market central banks have been dumping gold the last couple of months. And so you had the kind of the problem with the rate hikes and inflation and then the b- oh, never forget the one year Treasury 12 m- is up about forty basis points.
So think of like on a million bucks, you're getting close to forty grand a year. Forty grand a year of interest on a one-year Treasury versus say maybe thirty grand a year, six month, six, nine months ago. I'm exaggerating a little bit to b- trying to make it simple. So the bottom line is, the gold miners have been hammered.
Look at Agnico here. It's trading at forty percent off, right? Five point nine enterprise to EBITDA. And we can go back twenty, 30 years. That's one of the cheapest valuations. They've got six to seven billion of free cash flow, Eric. Six to seven billion of free cash flow. They're buying back two billion dollars worth of stock.
When I sat down with David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital, the famous hedge fund manager in my new book, he said, "Larry, I love to buy Companies that are producing beautiful free cash flow and buying back the stock when the stock's down thirty, forty percent. Because it's not a floor under the stock, but when you're already down forty percent, it's pricing in a lot of pain.
But your valuation is the cheapest of all time, and the company is buying back two billion dollars worth of stock. So to me, your risk reward of buying Agnico here is probably ten, fifteen percent down and two hundred percent up. Because this time next year, with that wounded conser- consumer, the Fed really can't hike that much.
You go into a slow growth economy with high inflation, gold should be sixty-five hundred an ounce this time next year, which would put Agnico Eagle up much higher, potentially a hundred percent higher a year from now.
Erik: Larry, I could not possibly agree more with your basic thesis here, which is that flush of the hot money, it's clearly come out of gold since the Iran conflict started.
Was around March 2nd that gold the-- there was just an inversion of the usual correlation between geopolitical events and gold. I think it's because of those rate cut expectations, exactly as you said. But here's the thing. I agree with you completely that for a long-term trade in gold, it's gonna be just an incredible buy, and it's gonna pay off in spades.
But is there a chance that it's still too early? And the reason I say that is it seems like it's pretty darn clear that it's the Iran conflict and the Hormuz closure and probably some of those central banks in the Middle East selling their gold is playing into this. I don't think this Hormuz thing is over yet.
I don't think it's close to over. I think it's got a long way to go. If you have that view, is it time to buy gold now, or is it time to sit in the sidelines a little longer?
Larry: Yeah, I'm with you. I think it does have a ways to go. I think that the strait's been closed a hundred days. Trump's really annoyed with Iran.
Iran's pushing back hard, and you saw it this week, right? So it's a standoff. So that's why in our trade alerts, we've got over two thousand financial advisors and family offices and high net worth individuals that do our trade alerts. We're buying only like one-thirds and one-quarters in the gold miners.
We did a nice exit in the first quarter in the gold, in the GDX. But as you can see here in chart number six, you have to be very careful on entry. But net-net, I do Buying gold miners like Agnico down 40%. Okay, are they gonna drop 50%? Possibly. But if you look back to 2021, '22, when we had that big inflation shock, front-end Treasuries went up a lot in yield.
And I know it's, for people listening to us right now, over time, gold's a great inflation hedge. But let's make something very clear. When front-end yields on T-bills go up a lot, it sucks money out of gold, because if you can get 40 grand a year in a one-year T-bill instead of 30 or 20, people just naturally will buy that.
But, so that's what creates the buying opportunity. So yes, probably a little early here. Buying, we're buying in thirds and quarters, and we're looking to add on further weakness.
Erik: Okay. So you do see the further weakness coming, but it's time to start scaling in is basically where you're at now.
Larry: Yeah. The, the old theory, o- only monkeys pick bottoms, right?
So what I try to do is we have a capitulation model that measures the tourist flush, and you wanna start just e- buying in one-thirds or quarters into s- into something like that.
Erik: You've got on page seven the twos, 30s spread the yield spread. What's going on this chart, and why does this come up?
Larry: So this is a, this is an example of another flush where, everyone thought with the Trump economy, growth, capital investment in artificial intelligence, big deficits, the steepener was a really popular trade for much of the last year. You can see that. All the money came into it '24 when Trump was elected, '25.
And now we've had a real flush as people are concerned about longer term growth with the consumer, like I said, the McDonald's, the Home Depots, the Harley-Davidsons are all off 20%. In some case, it's more. And and that, if you look at the Home Depot suppliers I went through on Bloomberg, there's probably 50% of Home Depot suppliers are down 20, 30, 40%.
And so that means the growth expectations are coming down. But at the same time, you've got this shock in the Middle East where the Fed might have to hike and a muscle memory of, okay, inflation, the Fed has to hike. This is, to me, a facade. The Fed really can't hike. Never forget, Interest on the debt today is at tw- two, 1.1 trillion over the next 12 months.
1.1 trillion. When the last time they started the hiking cycle in '21, '22, it was 300 billion, right? So the muscle memory in the market thinks the Fed's gonna hike. That's causing this flattening of the curve in two 30s. But to me, it's a facade. It's a, o- it's a mirage. They really can't hike that much, and that means the curves are gonna steepen a lot over the next year.
Erik: So you like the twos, 30 steepener, long the two-year and short the 30-year?
Larry: Yes. And one way to play that is the IVOL ETF, which has been battered. I, the famous IVOL ETF founded by Nancy Davis, I-V-O-L.
Erik: Okay. Let's move on now to page eight, which is year-over-year inflation in the Bloomberg Commodities Index, BCOM.
What's this comparison telling us?
Larry: This is a blood-curdling chart. For the love of God. You've got all this data center spending two, 2 trillion bucks and another 5.4 trillion over the next four or five years. That's what the street's expecting. 5.4 trillion up from three and a half trillion 18 months ago.
And so you got big deficits in Washington, $1.9 trillion deficits. You have the Strait of Hormuz closed for 100 days, and all the supply chain risk that comes with that. There's a lot of inflation coming at us. So this chart basically tells us that inflation's going back to five, six percent.
And today, Eric, super core CPIs, the super core, which you can't fake super core. It's of all the big macro people look at it If you annualize the last three months of the super core inflation that came out, you're coming out to five point two percent by year-end of super core inflation. That's, that means core inflation or inflation headline's gonna be five, six, something more like six, seven, eight percent a year from now.
And listeners, you'll see the super core chart is on page ten of the slide deck. Go ahead, Larry. It's very hard to fake super core. And I think the some of the best macro traders in the bond market look at super core inflation. The thing that's the real eye-opener for me, and this gets back to the core thesis of our book, How to Listen When Markets Speak, is when you go into an elevated inflation regime in a multipolar world.
Think about multipolar global conflicts, higher interest rates, higher inflation, stubborn oil prices in a war. What that does is it creates a rotation. And if you look at super core, we're at three point seven percent. Look at that lost world, that previous decade, your high was three percent. So you're in a whole new regime, which is creating a colossal migration from what we call financial assets, which are bonds and stocks and a lot of tech stocks.
You can see the software's names are really being sold. There's other parts of the market that are being sold, and people are moving into hard assets and companies that control hard assets and not paper certificates. So we're, that's where it's really what we call in the book, the great migration is coming at us.
Erik: Larry, your book has gotta be the best title for a finance book ever How to Listen When Markets Speak, because it's about the market. It's not about what you think the market should be thinking. It's figuring out what the market's thinking. Let's apply that now and talk about some rotations that are going on in the market, moving onto page eleven in the deck.
Larry: Okay. So think about this, Eric. You go from a ten-year disinflation regime When in a unipolar world with less glob-global conflicts and you rotate into a multipolar world with more global conflicts, higher interest rates, higher inflation, that means your portfolio construction needs to have a totally different view.
Companies that control hard assets and also value. So look at here. Growth versus value has failed here a lot since two thousand and nineteen. Big move over the last week. Big move. And I think this is the beginning of a colossal move over toward value. 'Cause if you think of value companies, like if you look at Buffett.
Buffett, Berkshire, big outperformance the last week or so from Berkshire. But they own a lot of companies that control hard assets, the Occidentals, Petroleums of the world, right? So value companies, many of them today, control oil and gas, natural gas, materials, and so that's a really colossal under-owned part of the market.
And so if you have forty-one trillion on the Nasdaq one hundred, which is a lot of that's growth stocks, and you got this big IPOs and like a massive overdose in the market on technology, when this rotation comes, you're gonna see a big move out of growth into value. It's... You can see it's really started this week, and I see a lot more ahead And then on slide 12, if you look at right there, big move out of the S&P 500, which is a lot of tech stocks, over toward the Russell 2000.
And you gotta-- you're breaking that down wedge there, which I think is pretty powerful move. So if you go into a period where there's too many IPOs that are coming in, there's too much money being sucked out of the market with new offerings and bond deals you'll see a great migration out of the S&P back over toward the Russell 2000.
And so that's an important part of this trade. The next one is oil services on slide number fourteen. Big outperformance this year. A lot of value names in there, the Weatherfords of the world, the Schlumbergers. They control a lot of valuable assets. The artificial intelligence potential of Schlumberger or SLB is literally the one of the most exciting trades or investments I can think of in the market today.
Everyone's in the chips. People have to start thinking of other parts of the market that are gonna benefit from artificial intelligence. The oil services is a big one, and you can see their big outperformance versus the S&P.
Erik: Larry, let's stay on that AI theme. What other parts of the market are beneficiaries of artificial intelligence?
Larry: Eric, number 18 slide. This is the mind blower, right? So over the last thirty years, we've been lectured and lectured, especially the last ten years, that the baby boomers are turning eighty years old. The average boomer is probably seventy, seventy years old. They control seventy-nine trillion of wealth.
Wall Street's been lecturing us, "You have to be long healthcare. You have..." Every analyst has been preaching this for the last fifteen, twenty years. And lo and behold, healthcare, as a percentage of the S&P 500, has gone from sixteen percent to eight percent with all of these baby boomers. One of the reasons why it's accelerating is people are selling healthcare stocks to make room for tech stocks, right?
To make room for the Space Xs of the world. So the cheapness of healthcare relative to tech is extremely attractive, and it goes back to the year 2000, like you said, with that AOL Time Warner deal. You kinda had a big break, and healthcare and staples really destroyed technology from 2000 to 2002. But at the end of the day, healthcare today is such a cheap part of the market, and you've had...
In the last two months, you've had a, not only people selling healthcare to make room for tech stocks, but you've had a lot of quantitative momentum players in the market. And guess what they're doing They've been going long momentum, which is what we call high momentum stocks like semiconductors, and they've been short low momentum, staples and healthcare.
So it's like a perfect storm. You've got a lot of quants playing this game that are... they're really creating incredible cheapness in the healthcare space. But at the same time, you have a lot of asset managers that are selling down healthcare to make room for all these big tech IPOs.
To me, this creates a colossal opportunity, an incredible opportunity looking forward for the next five years. You wanna be selling down your exposure to technology and increasing your to healthcare. Look at slide number twenty, Eric. Look at this factor momentum factor. It's way out of whack relative to the previous regimes.
And so once again, momentum, you see there, everyone's long aggressive momentum, which is the semiconductors. Everyone's short healthcare. And as you can see here, we're at very rare territory. And I think with quarter and month end coming up at the end of the month into the second half of the year, the probability that we have a huge turn here, I think is a very high probability of a move out of high momentum into low momentum.
So out of the semiconductors and aggressive growth over toward healthcare, I think it's gonna be a big winner the second half of the year.
Erik: Larry, everything you're saying is really resonating for me, but it's from a different angle I wanna run past you, which is, so many tourists are looking at this saying, but AI, the computers are so smart now."
And my reaction is, wait a minute. The humans who invented artificial intelligence are pretty darn smart too. And what they all seem to be doing, the very smartest of them, ones who truly invented this stuff, is they're selling their equity to bag holders as fast as they can. There's a race on right now between Anthropic and OpenAI and SpaceX.
All of these big technology private unicorn companies are either going public or in the case of Google, doing secondaries. Seems like everybody's trying to sell stock to retail at the same time. Am I interpreting that correctly as reinforcing what you just said about this transfer from momentum to value?
Larry: Yes. Jack Bogle, r- God rest his soul, is rolling over in his grave. The S&P 500 was constructed and invented with the best of intentions, and passive investors have crushed it. The S&P 500, the Nasdaq, these are passive indexes. In the old days, active managers that run money had more capital than these indexes.
Today, I have a theory that we laid out in our book, Eric, is that once you get near 60%, 65% passive versus active, and all that means is so much capital is in indexes that are not thinking, they're just owning things. And When that happens, the indexes become, can become more and more gameable. And you're seeing this on S&P 500 inclusion.
Stocks like Lululemon come into the S&P 500. Everybody, the, the in the know crowd knows this and they buy it up ahead of time. It's so the same thing with these IPOs. The billionaire investors on the West Coast, the venture capital people, they have-- think of SpaceX, right?
$30 billion valuation in 2019, 30 billion to now 1.8 trillion when it comes public. And so when they come public and they are accelerating these I- IPOs into the indexes like you saw with the Nasdaq, the S&P, it's gonna be over the next year. So passive investors are the bag holders up against really, billionaire investors that have been in these IPOs for d- a decade now and maturing.
In the old days, Microsoft came public at less than a billion dollars, right? Facebook came public at 100 billion, right? And now companies are coming public at 1.8 trillion. It's a colossal failure of common sense. They're gonna destroy indexing, okay? Because there should be rules against this, but the rules are being bent in favor of letting the billionaires dump stock in the hands of retail.
Erik: That sure feels like what's going on. Let's move on to page 21. What's Intuitive Surgical?
Larry: So last week, Eric, we hosted a private call with a billionaire family office, and what I try to do is I do these cage matches where I get a good bull and a good bear in the room, in a Zoom room, and I call them the cage matches.
And guess what? They fight to the death. It's absolutely hilarious, but you learn so much. And think about healthcare, everything we talked about five minutes ago with everyone's long momentum been selling down healthcare. Look at Intuitive Surgical. And then when you talk to people in the family office space that are in artificial intelligence medical sector, right?
So billionaire family office, they've got the-- They're on the front row seat. The intelligence that they have relative to most investors in that sector is off the charts. And they made the point to me that they love the Surgicals of the world, the Baxters, because guess what? Just think of Intuitive.
They have the best data. The best data. It's-- Think of Tesla ten, twenty years ago or t-ten years ago, what they've done with the data on the road. It's every road system in the world now, all that data is in the hands of Tesla, right? Same thing with Intuitive Surgical. Doctors today with robotics can operate on patients in other countries.
And the data in the future of artificial intelligence, the big beneficiaries are companies like Intuitive that have that incredibly valuable data. I think, and I'm hearing this from the, like I said, the top family offices in the AI medical field, these stocks are unloved, underowned, everyone's in the chips.
And if you buy Intuitive Surgical now on the two hundred week moving average, to us that's a really screaming buy because over the next ten years, five years, the data and the artificial intelligence that's gonna take that data, it's gonna turn Intuitive Surgical into a absolute profit beast.
Erik: What's tourmaline oil on page twenty-two?
Larry: Okay, that's our last idea. So another family office that we spoke to last week... we have a Bloomberg chat with hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds, and we do these ideas dinners in New York. Next week we're gonna be in Toronto and Montreal. And so the last ten days we got some of these big oil hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds in a room and we had a about trapped gas.
This is the next artificial intelligence play. So think about this. There's supposed to be 800 to 1,000 data centers built over the next five years in and around the world. Five trillion of spending, right? Some of those data centers are in the wrong places, what we call NIMBY, not my backyard, right?
And so you're seeing some political pushback around the country for data centers that are in the wrong places. Guess what? There are companies like Tourmaline in Canada that have gas. It's trapped. It's difficult to get to. Over the next five, ten years, all of this trapped gas in Canada, and especially in Texas, is gonna be harnessed and extremely valuable because you're gonna be able to take those data centers and move them in and create a, like a private turbine near that natural gas and really harness that cheap, relatively worthless natural gas because it's trapped.
And so you're taking trapped gas, and you're making it available to data centers. And Tourmaline's in discussion with hyperscalers right now. I think this is one of the best trades over the next five, ten years. Plus the political backdrop. Carney in Canada relative to is far less hostile to this investment philosophy.
And The last thing is with the war, the-- one of the points that the big hedge funds have been making to us in the chat, this war in Iraq and the Strait of Hormuz and LNG, what it's doing is it's making US natural gas and Canadian natural gas much more valuable. Because if you're a global buyer of L-LNG and your g- and your gas has been trapped in the Middle East, you're burnt, you're not happy.
And it's almost like America, attacked Iran, but what they've actually done is they've increased the value of US and Canadian gas assets. I don't know if that was intentional, but think about the buyers of natural gas globally, of LNG, the-- it's gonna benefit Tourmaline and US natural gas exporters dramatically over the next five, 10 years.
I think you're... I think Tourmaline, your downside's 15, 20%, your upside's 200%.
Erik: I wanna move on now to your final slide in the deck, slide 23, which is the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust. I'm gonna ask you to expand this topic a little bit more to also include the uranium miners, if we could talk about that as well, 'cause I've gotta tell you, I need some help listening when markets speak, and I-I'll tell you exactly why.
I couldn't possibly be more long-term bullish on uranium and uranium miners because I think the nuclear news flow couldn't possibly be better. Even before you consider all these SMRs and advanced reactors and all that stuff, we already had a uranium deficit on the horizon that just to run the reactors that are already in place that haven't been built yet.
So I just can't think of any reason not to be bullish long term, except for one thing, which is this is a famously high retail participation, high volatility sector. Not so much the Sprott Uranium Trust, but the miners are a really high volatility, high retail participation sector. And if what we just talked about a few minutes ago about the momentum stocks maybe being right on the precipice of a big sell-off, if we get a broad market risk event, if this Iran war gets worse and it, leads to a bunch of negative events in the market I can't imagine the uranium miners not getting slammed by that.
What do you do in a situation like that? I could be s-super bullish on one hand, but I'm really concerned about what could happen in the market next.
Larry: So what I've been thinking about, at The Bear Trap Report, we go back and forth between the uranium commodity And the companies, the Camecos of the world, the NexGens the Denison Mines.
And what I try to do is when the market-- when I don't like the market short term in terms of Strait of Hormuz, in terms of all kinds of things coming at us with inflation, like you said, Eric, high beta sectors get hammered much more than the commodity or in general. So it's-- Uranium, gold miners, they're a very high beta sector.
But what's interesting with uranium now, the SRUUF, it's down 5% year to date, almost 6, but Cameco's up 4% still. So the underperformance of the commodity gets me excited right now, and I think I wanna buy the URNM or the NUKZ, which is the ETFs that own these companies. I wanna buy them on a little bit more pain like we had last April, May of 2025 with the trade war.
You look at the drawdowns, like you s- just like you nailed it, Eric. These companies really are susceptible to market volatility. And so you wanna be in the commodity if you expect volatility ahead, and then you wanna rotate into the miners during that big kind of huge drawdown in the market. So we hosted a call two weeks ago with a famous family office in the uranium space, and he made a couple great points.
First of all, he completely agrees with you around the 2027, '28 deficits. And but I think the sexiest part of his story is supply and demand. And it's p- the point that he made to me, and I'm hearing this from some of the most sophisticated investors in the world, and that is on the supply side, the NexGens, the Camecos, the Denisons, they tend to overpromise on production.
And so For example, that NexGen mine that's supposed to come on in later this decade. A lot of the people, a lot of the family offices that are close to the uranium space think that they're probably exaggerating by a year or two. And so you have a supply problem because of, bec-because of the kind of over-exaggeration of production in the years to come.
So that-that's where the supply s- problem is. On the demand side, it's so obvious with what we're doing in the United States, we need the, we need to build... the United States, this is a real s- this is a real national security problem, and so we're gonna really ramp up nuclear power the next two, three years in terms of nuclear power plants.
It's gonna take a while, right? And around the world, countries are more friendly now. The Germanys of the world, the Japans of the world. So you have this increase of demand that's coming at us. You got a shortness of supply, the amount, the about of time that it's gonna take NexGen to get that facility up and running, and then you have the big brain drain.
So if you think of brain drain, think of Saskatchewan, and think of like uranium assets around the world. They're hard to get to. There's environmental regulations, and a lot of the talent has moved into Bitcoin mining, for example. Like a lot of times what happens in bear markets is that the bear markets over five or 10 years that are really grueling, nasty bear markets, they actually, you see the best engineers, the best intelligence, the best brainpower, kinda leaves the sector for other hot parts of the markets around the world, whether it be artificial intelligence or whether it be Bitcoin mining.
And so to me, that's a really sexy part of the story. And so that's once again, that's a supply issue. So we're looking at two thousand and twenty-seven, twenty-eight, twenty-nine with a massive supply-demand problem. So SRUUF, we sold some in our trade alerts in the first quarter on that kind of move up.
We're buying, we've been buying down here and, I really see a beautiful outlook over the next two, three years. And guess what? The most important part of this story It's the contract buyers. The contract buyers, the major utilities, they've been sitting on their hands the last decade because once again, the bear market conditioned them to really not panic buy on uranium.
But when you talk to people on the front lines, the big family offices that are close and really on the front lines, boots on the ground type people, they see the contract buyers really starting to get nervous behind the scenes. You're gonna see the ramp up in purchases. In other words, uranium's not a spot market like in the commodity market.
There's no futures. So these contract buyers are really gonna have to step up the next 12 to 18 months because they see the supply and demand problem. So the risk reward in uranium now is absolutely one of the most attractive entry points for the commodity that I've ever seen.
Erik: But your take on it is invest in the commodity now, rotate into the miners only after the pain that hasn't quite happened yet.
Larry: And that's what we saw last year with the trade war. It was just absolutely ridiculous. The sector was viciously for sale. Same thing in the summer of 2024 with the Japanese yen crisis, the carry trade blowup.
In both instances the commodity, I'm sorry I should say the producers on the uranium side were down like 30, 40%, 45% in a short, very short order. 'Cause once again, like you said, retail tourists, some weak hands at the table, and all that means is m- imagine you're playing a poker game.
Somebody does a big raise, and that's like the same thing as a big shock in the market. A shock in the market knocks a lot of the tourists back on the bus, and they leave and go home. They take their ball and go home.
Erik: Larry, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview. Before I let you go, let's just touch on what you do at The Bear Traps Report for our institutional audience.
You're also a bestselling author of a- what I think is the best title for a finance book ever conceived, which is How to Listen When Markets Speak.
Larry: I'm really proud of Eric. I can't believe that we have a two books with now about a million copies sold, over a million copies with The Colossal Failure of Common Sense and How to Listen When Markets Speak.
I'm so grateful to you and all of our supporters around the world. It's This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.. What we do for Macro Voices audience is we give people discounts because once again, it's an institutional platform where we share information, democratize information, but we wanna make it affordable for the smaller investor as well.
Erik: And that's at beartrapsreport.com. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com.
Erik: Joining me now is New York Times bestselling author and Bear Traps founder Larry McDonald. Larry has prepared a slide deck as he usually does for us. Registered users will find the link in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, macrovoices.com.
Look for the red button above Larry's picture that says Looking for the Downloads. Larry, it's great to get you back on the show. It's been way too long. I wanna start with what is it exactly that started last Friday? 'Cause it certainly seems to be the beginning of something significant in the markets.
Is this the market finally waking up to the Iran conflict, or is it a reaction to the jobs reports and maybe expectations of rate cuts being harder to come by, or is it something else? And by all means, refer to the slide deck as we dive in.
Larry: Sure, yeah. It's definitely a fourth quarter 2021 redux where Everybody's kinda been in a transitory trance.
Inflation is transitory again, which we were in, in the fourth quarter of two thousand twenty-one. And if you recall, the moment it appeared that inflation was not transitory, equities lost about thirty-five, forty percent pretty quickly between two thousand twenty-one and twenty-two. The Nasdaq lost about seven trillions-- seven, eight trillion dollars evaluation.
And so you have a decent economy, but the Strait of Hormuz closed for 100 days, all this AI CapEx, and it's really just crushing the little guy as inflation is just so sticky. And it-- you could see here on, on slide two. One of the things, Eric, I wanna make very clear, there's no I in team. So as part of the Bear Trap report, we host a conversation every day with the biggest hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds in the world.
And what I'm gonna do today is kinda share the insights, the valuable insights that I'm getting from the top institutions around the world and triangulating that information. And that's why I love this platform, because I wanna democratize the information. I want, your phenomenal audience to, to really have a front-row seat as to what the in-- top institutions are talking about.
The biggest thing in recent weeks is the consumer oil inflation. And you could see here on slide two, junk bonds. The high-yield market as a whole is okay, but the tertiary parts, and these are the, typically the leading indicators. The tertiary part of the high-yield bond market, which is CCCs, as you could see there, really kinda blowing out.
The last time stocks were all at all-time highs, CCCs were much lower in yields, and I think that's, really telling you a lot about the consumer.
Erik: You mentioned the big IPOs. It seems to me like that's a key part of this story as well. So I'm trying to sorta sort out, okay, we got on Friday, the jobs report kinda led to a lot of people thinking that rate cuts are less likely than they were on Thursday for whatever reason.
We've also got these big looming IPOs, and I'm not sure if the market's finally woken up to how big of a deal the Hormuz crisis is. What are the experts in your fund community telling you in terms of how they're perceiving what the most important drivers are? It feels like Hormuz is probably not it.
Larry: And it's indigestion, really. So if you go to slide sixteen, if you think about it, it was-- you're talking about an IPO that's six percent of US GDP. If you think of Facebook 2012, that was an enormous IPO at the time, $100 billion, and it was less than 1% of GDP. The SpaceX IPO would be 6% of GDP.
And always remember that The biggest IPO ever was Saudi Aramco at 25 billion. So if you do the math, if you take the secondary offering from Google last week of shares, 80 billion plus the SpaceX, you get $150 billion. 150 billion. And so net-net, a lot of people have to sell stocks in the market to make room for these, two absolute beasts that have come out.
Erik: If you take SpaceX, as you said, it's a $2 trillion valuation. The actual raise, which is the money that, that we need to come up with someplace to, to pay for the shares being offered, is 80 billion. Okay. Add that 80 billion, Google's And add to that Anthropic is coming up. We're gonna have OpenAI coming up.
There's about 200, 250 billion of immediate raise, but here's the thing that I'm actually focusing more on, Larry, is six to 12 months after that, all the insiders and the VCs and the early investors in those companies, it's not 200 billion, it's like 3 trillion of capital that gets unlocked as those restricted shares become unrestricted somewhere between six and 12 months after the IPO.
It seems to me that's the point where, how do we absorb all of that equity into the market?
Larry: If you look at the SpaceX program in terms of the lockup and unlock, it's much more aggressive than previous IPOs. And so for investors listening to us right now, it's extremely important.
If you remember the Facebook IPO in 2012 once again, once the lockup started coming out and the shares, like you just nailed it, in that first year, you had a 40, 50% drawdown in s- in Facebook. And I think what's happening is the VCs were... think about capitalism in America. These companies are coming public
think of Tesla, came public at a 2 billion valuation, right? Facebook at 100 billion valuation, and now here SpaceX two-- almost 2 trillion valuation. So it's it's e- essentially 11, 12 times the size of Facebook. So these companies are coming public much far later in the maturity cycle, which means that the IPOs are very unattractive and you're much better off waiting.
If you have to, buy a little bit of the IPO, but you're gonna probably be able to buy, SpaceX IPO 50% off sometime in the first year
Erik: Yeah, obviously a lot of people think SpaceX is, going to be a huge thing and it's the future. It feels to me like these IPOs are very reminiscent of 2000 or so when, y- frankly the smartest tech leaders w- had the wits to say, "Let me sell my equity to retail bag holders and let them ride out what happens in 2000."
So it feels like 1999 to me.
Larry: And to look at chart number 15, this shows you a lot because it's the S&P versus the equal weight. And if you think about it, the biggest, most liquid stocks are the easiest to sell, right? So lo and behold Huge underperformance in the last 10 days of the S&P versus the equal weight.
You can see that on the chart number 15. And what that's telling you is that people are selling the Mag Seven, which is essentially unched to a little bit negative since October now. They're selling the big Mag Seven equities, which are very liquid, and they're raising capital for all these IPOs. That's inter- like you said the Time Warner deal in 1999, 2000, it's just too much coming into the market at the same time.
Plus, we have a lot of private equity deals coming out in recent months. There's just too many sellers. And the last thing, remember, in the '90s, I founded convertbond.com. And for investors listening to us right now, always remember, the smartest sellers in the world are chief financial officers. And guess what, Eric?
The amount of convertible bonds that have been coming to the market in the last couple of weeks, from, say, three, four weeks, is up a lot over last year. It's up on, to... And the same thing happened in 2021 in the third, fourth quarter. And so what's happening is, as the stock market rips, CFOs see, "Oh, my stock's up a lot," and they're coming to the market with convertible bonds.
Inside those convertible bonds, there's lots of equity. And so right now, chief financial officers are selling their equity in the convertible bond market at a very fast rate of change speed, which is similar to 2021 in that third, fourth quarter. And never forget what happened in '22, 30, 40% drawdown. So I think the CFOs smell something and they're coming to market, and they're also dumping.
So you have Elon's dumping stock with the SpaceX crowd. You got Google dumping stock, and you got CFOs across all these different companies, Irin I could... There's seven or eight companies. They're also dumping a lot of stock at the same time.
Erik: So if I look at what's happened in the last few days, it feels oh, we're down a lot.
But really, if I just go back to the late March low when the market initially started to freak out about the Iran conflict, we got down to, what was it? Around 60, just about 6,400, a little bit below 6,400 on the S&P. If I look at the, since Friday, the down move as of Wednesday afternoon, we're really only looking at, I don't know it's nowhere close to a 38%.
It's about 25% has been retraced at most. How far are we going? Is this just the beginning of something really big, or are we just looking at a blip here? W- what do you think is coming?
Larry: Great question, and the perfect chart is number 13 for this. So 41 trillion in the Nasdaq 100 last week before the drawdown started.
41 trillion. And to your point in March, which was just forty-seven or maybe fifty, fifty trading days ago, in late March, there was thirty trillion in the Nasdaq one hundred. So the Nasdaq one hundred went from thirty trillion of value to forty-one trillion in less than fifty trading days. Nothing like that's ever happened in the history of markets
But let's go back to two thousand and twenty-one, twenty-two, the last time we had the inflation shock. Look at what ha-- And the last time the convertible bond market was on fire too. A lot of CFOs selling stock. So two thousand and twenty-one, twenty-two, we were up near nineteen trillion of value in late 'twenty-one, and we went down to twelve trillion in literally four quarters.
That's an example of what's about to happen, I think. So that kinda drawdown. And think about it, so we went from nineteen trillion in the fourth quarter of two thousand and twenty-one to twelve trillion in the fourth quarter of 'twenty-two, and then that all the way up to forty-one trillion. And that's why I think as money rotates out of financial assets, which are bonds and tech stocks, when you see this kind of value, the rotations can be amazing.
If you look back to two thousand and twenty-two, what were the big winners? Energy stocks were up a lot, I think well over a hundred percent. Also materials. I think the same thing's gonna play out this time around again, and it's a repeat two point zero.
Erik: And so does that give you any targets or expectations in terms of valuation levels that we're headed towards?
Larry: That's what's amazing about the market now. The free cash flow yields in the energy space are so cheap, natural gas equities, energy equities materials. So you've got one part of the market that's really cheap, but the Nasdaq one hundred valuations are really all-time high CAPE ratios, PE ratios.
So there's two different markets. One part of the market, technology is really at the highest valuations almost ever. And then, but in the energy space in, in the material space, you've got beautiful free cash flow yields, which are probably the cheapest part of the market.
Erik: Larry, I apologize for jumping out of order a little bit there.
You've got so many different fascinating topics I wanna come back to. I got you a little jumping around the slide deck. Why don't we go back to the beginning around page three? Tell us about this S&P versus restaurants chart.
Larry: Sure. So th-that's kinda the main point, is that the bottom the bottom sixty-five percent of consumers are really only ten, fifteen percent of consumption now because the wealthy have so much money in money market funds, and money market fund yields are up a lot But the bottom 60% of consumers are in a lot of pain, and that's why you're seeing these wacky divergences, restaurants, getting really hammered this year.
Same thing on the next chart with Home Depot. Home Depot almost 30% off. Think of these brands, Lowe's, Home Depot McDonald's. All these stocks are essentially close to 20... fif- n- 19 to 20% off. Home Depot almost 30% off. And so it's, once again it's two different consumers. One, one part of the market's in a lot of pain, and the other part of the market, technology and semiconductors, are partying like it's 1999.
Erik: Larry, I see you've got Agnico on the next page. L- let's talk about the big picture of gold and gold miners even before we get into the specific stock. We're taught to think of gold as something you want in your portfolio as a hedge against big geopolitical events. If something like the Iran conflict happens, gold's gonna go up, except for it went straight down.
What gives, first of all, with that? Is that about inflation expectations? Is it gonna continue? And why don't we transition from there into the slides and what in terms of the gold miners?
Larry: Sure. Eric, so we just talked about the consumer and how weak the consumer is. You could see this in a lot of the conference calls.
You could see it in the restaurants, you could see it in Home Depot. You can see it in so many different parts of the market. So it's very tough for the Fed to hike rates. But the market gold miners are really having this kind of what I call recency bias. So in 2021, '22, we had that big inflation spike, and the gold miners now have really sold off for a bunch of different reasons.
One, one important one, is we've gone from three rate cuts to potentially one rate hike in terms of the SOFR futures or the expectations market of the Fed funds. So when you go from like rate cuts, three rate cuts to one hike, that knocks a lot of steam out of the gold miners. But the best trades in the world, Eric, the best trades of our careers are what I call the hot money flush.
And so I love a sector that just had what we call a hot money flush. Think of a poker table A lot of weak hands at the poker table, and that's the gold miners. So in the third, fourth quarter and the first quarter of last year, so many tourists, Eric, so many tourists came into the gold miners. Think of the heavyset guy, the Hawaiian shirt, and the glasses and the camera, right?
That's the type of investor, weak hands, tourists getting off the bus, buying the gold miners with both hands in the third, fourth quarter. Next thing they get hit over the head with central banks, with this shock, with the Middle East. Think of Turkey, all these emerging markets, central banks, co- There's a lot of countries in the emerging market space that don't have a lot of access to energy.
And so when you have an energy shock, they have to sell something to raise cash flow. Emerging market central banks have been dumping gold the last couple of months. And so you had the kind of the problem with the rate hikes and inflation and then the b- oh, never forget the one year Treasury 12 m- is up about forty basis points.
So think of like on a million bucks, you're getting close to forty grand a year. Forty grand a year of interest on a one-year Treasury versus say maybe thirty grand a year, six month, six, nine months ago. I'm exaggerating a little bit to b- trying to make it simple. So the bottom line is, the gold miners have been hammered.
Look at Agnico here. It's trading at forty percent off, right? Five point nine enterprise to EBITDA. And we can go back twenty, 30 years. That's one of the cheapest valuations. They've got six to seven billion of free cash flow, Eric. Six to seven billion of free cash flow. They're buying back two billion dollars worth of stock.
When I sat down with David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital, the famous hedge fund manager in my new book, he said, "Larry, I love to buy Companies that are producing beautiful free cash flow and buying back the stock when the stock's down thirty, forty percent. Because it's not a floor under the stock, but when you're already down forty percent, it's pricing in a lot of pain.
But your valuation is the cheapest of all time, and the company is buying back two billion dollars worth of stock. So to me, your risk reward of buying Agnico here is probably ten, fifteen percent down and two hundred percent up. Because this time next year, with that wounded conser- consumer, the Fed really can't hike that much.
You go into a slow growth economy with high inflation, gold should be sixty-five hundred an ounce this time next year, which would put Agnico Eagle up much higher, potentially a hundred percent higher a year from now.
Erik: Larry, I could not possibly agree more with your basic thesis here, which is that flush of the hot money, it's clearly come out of gold since the Iran conflict started.
Was around March 2nd that gold the-- there was just an inversion of the usual correlation between geopolitical events and gold. I think it's because of those rate cut expectations, exactly as you said. But here's the thing. I agree with you completely that for a long-term trade in gold, it's gonna be just an incredible buy, and it's gonna pay off in spades.
But is there a chance that it's still too early? And the reason I say that is it seems like it's pretty darn clear that it's the Iran conflict and the Hormuz closure and probably some of those central banks in the Middle East selling their gold is playing into this. I don't think this Hormuz thing is over yet.
I don't think it's close to over. I think it's got a long way to go. If you have that view, is it time to buy gold now, or is it time to sit in the sidelines a little longer?
Larry: Yeah, I'm with you. I think it does have a ways to go. I think that the strait's been closed a hundred days. Trump's really annoyed with Iran.
Iran's pushing back hard, and you saw it this week, right? So it's a standoff. So that's why in our trade alerts, we've got over two thousand financial advisors and family offices and high net worth individuals that do our trade alerts. We're buying only like one-thirds and one-quarters in the gold miners.
We did a nice exit in the first quarter in the gold, in the GDX. But as you can see here in chart number six, you have to be very careful on entry. But net-net, I do Buying gold miners like Agnico down 40%. Okay, are they gonna drop 50%? Possibly. But if you look back to 2021, '22, when we had that big inflation shock, front-end Treasuries went up a lot in yield.
And I know it's, for people listening to us right now, over time, gold's a great inflation hedge. But let's make something very clear. When front-end yields on T-bills go up a lot, it sucks money out of gold, because if you can get 40 grand a year in a one-year T-bill instead of 30 or 20, people just naturally will buy that.
But, so that's what creates the buying opportunity. So yes, probably a little early here. Buying, we're buying in thirds and quarters, and we're looking to add on further weakness.
Erik: Okay. So you do see the further weakness coming, but it's time to start scaling in is basically where you're at now.
Larry: Yeah. The, the old theory, o- only monkeys pick bottoms, right?
So what I try to do is we have a capitulation model that measures the tourist flush, and you wanna start just e- buying in one-thirds or quarters into s- into something like that.
Erik: You've got on page seven the twos, 30s spread the yield spread. What's going on this chart, and why does this come up?
Larry: So this is a, this is an example of another flush where, everyone thought with the Trump economy, growth, capital investment in artificial intelligence, big deficits, the steepener was a really popular trade for much of the last year. You can see that. All the money came into it '24 when Trump was elected, '25.
And now we've had a real flush as people are concerned about longer term growth with the consumer, like I said, the McDonald's, the Home Depots, the Harley-Davidsons are all off 20%. In some case, it's more. And and that, if you look at the Home Depot suppliers I went through on Bloomberg, there's probably 50% of Home Depot suppliers are down 20, 30, 40%.
And so that means the growth expectations are coming down. But at the same time, you've got this shock in the Middle East where the Fed might have to hike and a muscle memory of, okay, inflation, the Fed has to hike. This is, to me, a facade. The Fed really can't hike. Never forget, Interest on the debt today is at tw- two, 1.1 trillion over the next 12 months.
1.1 trillion. When the last time they started the hiking cycle in '21, '22, it was 300 billion, right? So the muscle memory in the market thinks the Fed's gonna hike. That's causing this flattening of the curve in two 30s. But to me, it's a facade. It's a, o- it's a mirage. They really can't hike that much, and that means the curves are gonna steepen a lot over the next year.
Erik: So you like the twos, 30 steepener, long the two-year and short the 30-year?
Larry: Yes. And one way to play that is the IVOL ETF, which has been battered. I, the famous IVOL ETF founded by Nancy Davis, I-V-O-L.
Erik: Okay. Let's move on now to page eight, which is year-over-year inflation in the Bloomberg Commodities Index, BCOM.
What's this comparison telling us?
Larry: This is a blood-curdling chart. For the love of God. You've got all this data center spending two, 2 trillion bucks and another 5.4 trillion over the next four or five years. That's what the street's expecting. 5.4 trillion up from three and a half trillion 18 months ago.
And so you got big deficits in Washington, $1.9 trillion deficits. You have the Strait of Hormuz closed for 100 days, and all the supply chain risk that comes with that. There's a lot of inflation coming at us. So this chart basically tells us that inflation's going back to five, six percent.
And today, Eric, super core CPIs, the super core, which you can't fake super core. It's of all the big macro people look at it If you annualize the last three months of the super core inflation that came out, you're coming out to five point two percent by year-end of super core inflation. That's, that means core inflation or inflation headline's gonna be five, six, something more like six, seven, eight percent a year from now.
And listeners, you'll see the super core chart is on page ten of the slide deck. Go ahead, Larry. It's very hard to fake super core. And I think the some of the best macro traders in the bond market look at super core inflation. The thing that's the real eye-opener for me, and this gets back to the core thesis of our book, How to Listen When Markets Speak, is when you go into an elevated inflation regime in a multipolar world.
Think about multipolar global conflicts, higher interest rates, higher inflation, stubborn oil prices in a war. What that does is it creates a rotation. And if you look at super core, we're at three point seven percent. Look at that lost world, that previous decade, your high was three percent. So you're in a whole new regime, which is creating a colossal migration from what we call financial assets, which are bonds and stocks and a lot of tech stocks.
You can see the software's names are really being sold. There's other parts of the market that are being sold, and people are moving into hard assets and companies that control hard assets and not paper certificates. So we're, that's where it's really what we call in the book, the great migration is coming at us.
Erik: Larry, your book has gotta be the best title for a finance book ever How to Listen When Markets Speak, because it's about the market. It's not about what you think the market should be thinking. It's figuring out what the market's thinking. Let's apply that now and talk about some rotations that are going on in the market, moving onto page eleven in the deck.
Larry: Okay. So think about this, Eric. You go from a ten-year disinflation regime When in a unipolar world with less glob-global conflicts and you rotate into a multipolar world with more global conflicts, higher interest rates, higher inflation, that means your portfolio construction needs to have a totally different view.
Companies that control hard assets and also value. So look at here. Growth versus value has failed here a lot since two thousand and nineteen. Big move over the last week. Big move. And I think this is the beginning of a colossal move over toward value. 'Cause if you think of value companies, like if you look at Buffett.
Buffett, Berkshire, big outperformance the last week or so from Berkshire. But they own a lot of companies that control hard assets, the Occidentals, Petroleums of the world, right? So value companies, many of them today, control oil and gas, natural gas, materials, and so that's a really colossal under-owned part of the market.
And so if you have forty-one trillion on the Nasdaq one hundred, which is a lot of that's growth stocks, and you got this big IPOs and like a massive overdose in the market on technology, when this rotation comes, you're gonna see a big move out of growth into value. It's... You can see it's really started this week, and I see a lot more ahead And then on slide 12, if you look at right there, big move out of the S&P 500, which is a lot of tech stocks, over toward the Russell 2000.
And you gotta-- you're breaking that down wedge there, which I think is pretty powerful move. So if you go into a period where there's too many IPOs that are coming in, there's too much money being sucked out of the market with new offerings and bond deals you'll see a great migration out of the S&P back over toward the Russell 2000.
And so that's an important part of this trade. The next one is oil services on slide number fourteen. Big outperformance this year. A lot of value names in there, the Weatherfords of the world, the Schlumbergers. They control a lot of valuable assets. The artificial intelligence potential of Schlumberger or SLB is literally the one of the most exciting trades or investments I can think of in the market today.
Everyone's in the chips. People have to start thinking of other parts of the market that are gonna benefit from artificial intelligence. The oil services is a big one, and you can see their big outperformance versus the S&P.
Erik: Larry, let's stay on that AI theme. What other parts of the market are beneficiaries of artificial intelligence?
Larry: Eric, number 18 slide. This is the mind blower, right? So over the last thirty years, we've been lectured and lectured, especially the last ten years, that the baby boomers are turning eighty years old. The average boomer is probably seventy, seventy years old. They control seventy-nine trillion of wealth.
Wall Street's been lecturing us, "You have to be long healthcare. You have..." Every analyst has been preaching this for the last fifteen, twenty years. And lo and behold, healthcare, as a percentage of the S&P 500, has gone from sixteen percent to eight percent with all of these baby boomers. One of the reasons why it's accelerating is people are selling healthcare stocks to make room for tech stocks, right?
To make room for the Space Xs of the world. So the cheapness of healthcare relative to tech is extremely attractive, and it goes back to the year 2000, like you said, with that AOL Time Warner deal. You kinda had a big break, and healthcare and staples really destroyed technology from 2000 to 2002. But at the end of the day, healthcare today is such a cheap part of the market, and you've had...
In the last two months, you've had a, not only people selling healthcare to make room for tech stocks, but you've had a lot of quantitative momentum players in the market. And guess what they're doing They've been going long momentum, which is what we call high momentum stocks like semiconductors, and they've been short low momentum, staples and healthcare.
So it's like a perfect storm. You've got a lot of quants playing this game that are... they're really creating incredible cheapness in the healthcare space. But at the same time, you have a lot of asset managers that are selling down healthcare to make room for all these big tech IPOs.
To me, this creates a colossal opportunity, an incredible opportunity looking forward for the next five years. You wanna be selling down your exposure to technology and increasing your to healthcare. Look at slide number twenty, Eric. Look at this factor momentum factor. It's way out of whack relative to the previous regimes.
And so once again, momentum, you see there, everyone's long aggressive momentum, which is the semiconductors. Everyone's short healthcare. And as you can see here, we're at very rare territory. And I think with quarter and month end coming up at the end of the month into the second half of the year, the probability that we have a huge turn here, I think is a very high probability of a move out of high momentum into low momentum.
So out of the semiconductors and aggressive growth over toward healthcare, I think it's gonna be a big winner the second half of the year.
Erik: Larry, everything you're saying is really resonating for me, but it's from a different angle I wanna run past you, which is, so many tourists are looking at this saying, but AI, the computers are so smart now."
And my reaction is, wait a minute. The humans who invented artificial intelligence are pretty darn smart too. And what they all seem to be doing, the very smartest of them, ones who truly invented this stuff, is they're selling their equity to bag holders as fast as they can. There's a race on right now between Anthropic and OpenAI and SpaceX.
All of these big technology private unicorn companies are either going public or in the case of Google, doing secondaries. Seems like everybody's trying to sell stock to retail at the same time. Am I interpreting that correctly as reinforcing what you just said about this transfer from momentum to value?
Larry: Yes. Jack Bogle, r- God rest his soul, is rolling over in his grave. The S&P 500 was constructed and invented with the best of intentions, and passive investors have crushed it. The S&P 500, the Nasdaq, these are passive indexes. In the old days, active managers that run money had more capital than these indexes.
Today, I have a theory that we laid out in our book, Eric, is that once you get near 60%, 65% passive versus active, and all that means is so much capital is in indexes that are not thinking, they're just owning things. And When that happens, the indexes become, can become more and more gameable. And you're seeing this on S&P 500 inclusion.
Stocks like Lululemon come into the S&P 500. Everybody, the, the in the know crowd knows this and they buy it up ahead of time. It's so the same thing with these IPOs. The billionaire investors on the West Coast, the venture capital people, they have-- think of SpaceX, right?
$30 billion valuation in 2019, 30 billion to now 1.8 trillion when it comes public. And so when they come public and they are accelerating these I- IPOs into the indexes like you saw with the Nasdaq, the S&P, it's gonna be over the next year. So passive investors are the bag holders up against really, billionaire investors that have been in these IPOs for d- a decade now and maturing.
In the old days, Microsoft came public at less than a billion dollars, right? Facebook came public at 100 billion, right? And now companies are coming public at 1.8 trillion. It's a colossal failure of common sense. They're gonna destroy indexing, okay? Because there should be rules against this, but the rules are being bent in favor of letting the billionaires dump stock in the hands of retail.
Erik: That sure feels like what's going on. Let's move on to page 21. What's Intuitive Surgical?
Larry: So last week, Eric, we hosted a private call with a billionaire family office, and what I try to do is I do these cage matches where I get a good bull and a good bear in the room, in a Zoom room, and I call them the cage matches.
And guess what? They fight to the death. It's absolutely hilarious, but you learn so much. And think about healthcare, everything we talked about five minutes ago with everyone's long momentum been selling down healthcare. Look at Intuitive Surgical. And then when you talk to people in the family office space that are in artificial intelligence medical sector, right?
So billionaire family office, they've got the-- They're on the front row seat. The intelligence that they have relative to most investors in that sector is off the charts. And they made the point to me that they love the Surgicals of the world, the Baxters, because guess what? Just think of Intuitive.
They have the best data. The best data. It's-- Think of Tesla ten, twenty years ago or t-ten years ago, what they've done with the data on the road. It's every road system in the world now, all that data is in the hands of Tesla, right? Same thing with Intuitive Surgical. Doctors today with robotics can operate on patients in other countries.
And the data in the future of artificial intelligence, the big beneficiaries are companies like Intuitive that have that incredibly valuable data. I think, and I'm hearing this from the, like I said, the top family offices in the AI medical field, these stocks are unloved, underowned, everyone's in the chips.
And if you buy Intuitive Surgical now on the two hundred week moving average, to us that's a really screaming buy because over the next ten years, five years, the data and the artificial intelligence that's gonna take that data, it's gonna turn Intuitive Surgical into a absolute profit beast.
Erik: What's tourmaline oil on page twenty-two?
Larry: Okay, that's our last idea. So another family office that we spoke to last week... we have a Bloomberg chat with hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds, and we do these ideas dinners in New York. Next week we're gonna be in Toronto and Montreal. And so the last ten days we got some of these big oil hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension funds in a room and we had a about trapped gas.
This is the next artificial intelligence play. So think about this. There's supposed to be 800 to 1,000 data centers built over the next five years in and around the world. Five trillion of spending, right? Some of those data centers are in the wrong places, what we call NIMBY, not my backyard, right?
And so you're seeing some political pushback around the country for data centers that are in the wrong places. Guess what? There are companies like Tourmaline in Canada that have gas. It's trapped. It's difficult to get to. Over the next five, ten years, all of this trapped gas in Canada, and especially in Texas, is gonna be harnessed and extremely valuable because you're gonna be able to take those data centers and move them in and create a, like a private turbine near that natural gas and really harness that cheap, relatively worthless natural gas because it's trapped.
And so you're taking trapped gas, and you're making it available to data centers. And Tourmaline's in discussion with hyperscalers right now. I think this is one of the best trades over the next five, ten years. Plus the political backdrop. Carney in Canada relative to is far less hostile to this investment philosophy.
And The last thing is with the war, the-- one of the points that the big hedge funds have been making to us in the chat, this war in Iraq and the Strait of Hormuz and LNG, what it's doing is it's making US natural gas and Canadian natural gas much more valuable. Because if you're a global buyer of L-LNG and your g- and your gas has been trapped in the Middle East, you're burnt, you're not happy.
And it's almost like America, attacked Iran, but what they've actually done is they've increased the value of US and Canadian gas assets. I don't know if that was intentional, but think about the buyers of natural gas globally, of LNG, the-- it's gonna benefit Tourmaline and US natural gas exporters dramatically over the next five, 10 years.
I think you're... I think Tourmaline, your downside's 15, 20%, your upside's 200%.
Erik: I wanna move on now to your final slide in the deck, slide 23, which is the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust. I'm gonna ask you to expand this topic a little bit more to also include the uranium miners, if we could talk about that as well, 'cause I've gotta tell you, I need some help listening when markets speak, and I-I'll tell you exactly why.
I couldn't possibly be more long-term bullish on uranium and uranium miners because I think the nuclear news flow couldn't possibly be better. Even before you consider all these SMRs and advanced reactors and all that stuff, we already had a uranium deficit on the horizon that just to run the reactors that are already in place that haven't been built yet.
So I just can't think of any reason not to be bullish long term, except for one thing, which is this is a famously high retail participation, high volatility sector. Not so much the Sprott Uranium Trust, but the miners are a really high volatility, high retail participation sector. And if what we just talked about a few minutes ago about the momentum stocks maybe being right on the precipice of a big sell-off, if we get a broad market risk event, if this Iran war gets worse and it, leads to a bunch of negative events in the market I can't imagine the uranium miners not getting slammed by that.
What do you do in a situation like that? I could be s-super bullish on one hand, but I'm really concerned about what could happen in the market next.
Larry: So what I've been thinking about, at The Bear Trap Report, we go back and forth between the uranium commodity And the companies, the Camecos of the world, the NexGens the Denison Mines.
And what I try to do is when the market-- when I don't like the market short term in terms of Strait of Hormuz, in terms of all kinds of things coming at us with inflation, like you said, Eric, high beta sectors get hammered much more than the commodity or in general. So it's-- Uranium, gold miners, they're a very high beta sector.
But what's interesting with uranium now, the SRUUF, it's down 5% year to date, almost 6, but Cameco's up 4% still. So the underperformance of the commodity gets me excited right now, and I think I wanna buy the URNM or the NUKZ, which is the ETFs that own these companies. I wanna buy them on a little bit more pain like we had last April, May of 2025 with the trade war.
You look at the drawdowns, like you s- just like you nailed it, Eric. These companies really are susceptible to market volatility. And so you wanna be in the commodity if you expect volatility ahead, and then you wanna rotate into the miners during that big kind of huge drawdown in the market. So we hosted a call two weeks ago with a famous family office in the uranium space, and he made a couple great points.
First of all, he completely agrees with you around the 2027, '28 deficits. And but I think the sexiest part of his story is supply and demand. And it's p- the point that he made to me, and I'm hearing this from some of the most sophisticated investors in the world, and that is on the supply side, the NexGens, the Camecos, the Denisons, they tend to overpromise on production.
And so For example, that NexGen mine that's supposed to come on in later this decade. A lot of the people, a lot of the family offices that are close to the uranium space think that they're probably exaggerating by a year or two. And so you have a supply problem because of, bec-because of the kind of over-exaggeration of production in the years to come.
So that-that's where the supply s- problem is. On the demand side, it's so obvious with what we're doing in the United States, we need the, we need to build... the United States, this is a real s- this is a real national security problem, and so we're gonna really ramp up nuclear power the next two, three years in terms of nuclear power plants.
It's gonna take a while, right? And around the world, countries are more friendly now. The Germanys of the world, the Japans of the world. So you have this increase of demand that's coming at us. You got a shortness of supply, the amount, the about of time that it's gonna take NexGen to get that facility up and running, and then you have the big brain drain.
So if you think of brain drain, think of Saskatchewan, and think of like uranium assets around the world. They're hard to get to. There's environmental regulations, and a lot of the talent has moved into Bitcoin mining, for example. Like a lot of times what happens in bear markets is that the bear markets over five or 10 years that are really grueling, nasty bear markets, they actually, you see the best engineers, the best intelligence, the best brainpower, kinda leaves the sector for other hot parts of the markets around the world, whether it be artificial intelligence or whether it be Bitcoin mining.
And so to me, that's a really sexy part of the story. And so that's once again, that's a supply issue. So we're looking at two thousand and twenty-seven, twenty-eight, twenty-nine with a massive supply-demand problem. So SRUUF, we sold some in our trade alerts in the first quarter on that kind of move up.
We're buying, we've been buying down here and, I really see a beautiful outlook over the next two, three years. And guess what? The most important part of this story It's the contract buyers. The contract buyers, the major utilities, they've been sitting on their hands the last decade because once again, the bear market conditioned them to really not panic buy on uranium.
But when you talk to people on the front lines, the big family offices that are close and really on the front lines, boots on the ground type people, they see the contract buyers really starting to get nervous behind the scenes. You're gonna see the ramp up in purchases. In other words, uranium's not a spot market like in the commodity market.
There's no futures. So these contract buyers are really gonna have to step up the next 12 to 18 months because they see the supply and demand problem. So the risk reward in uranium now is absolutely one of the most attractive entry points for the commodity that I've ever seen.
Erik: But your take on it is invest in the commodity now, rotate into the miners only after the pain that hasn't quite happened yet.
Larry: And that's what we saw last year with the trade war. It was just absolutely ridiculous. The sector was viciously for sale. Same thing in the summer of 2024 with the Japanese yen crisis, the carry trade blowup.
In both instances the commodity, I'm sorry I should say the producers on the uranium side were down like 30, 40%, 45% in a short, very short order. 'Cause once again, like you said, retail tourists, some weak hands at the table, and all that means is m- imagine you're playing a poker game.
Somebody does a big raise, and that's like the same thing as a big shock in the market. A shock in the market knocks a lot of the tourists back on the bus, and they leave and go home. They take their ball and go home.
Erik: Larry, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview. Before I let you go, let's just touch on what you do at The Bear Traps Report for our institutional audience.
You're also a bestselling author of a- what I think is the best title for a finance book ever conceived, which is How to Listen When Markets Speak.
Larry: I'm really proud of Eric. I can't believe that we have a two books with now about a million copies sold, over a million copies with The Colossal Failure of Common Sense and How to Listen When Markets Speak.
I'm so grateful to you and all of our supporters around the world. It's This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.. What we do for Macro Voices audience is we give people discounts because once again, it's an institutional platform where we share information, democratize information, but we wanna make it affordable for the smaller investor as well.
Erik: And that's at beartrapsreport.com. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com.
Erik: Joining me now is Rabobank's global strategist for economics and markets, Michael Every. Michael, it's great to get you back on the show. I'm sure you've heard the great news today, and we are recording, just so our listeners will know, on Monday afternoon, so three days before this episode will air. A lot can happen in the news flow lately.
But as of Monday afternoon, the news is President Trump says, "Don't worry, everything's all set. Oil prices are about to drop like a rock, and time is on our side." Do you concur, sir?
Michael: No, I don't think that time is on anyone's side, first of all. I think that's true for every human being throughout history that time doesn't work in our favor.
Entropy is a universal truth. But specifically, that news flow, of course, that we had on the Monday as we're speaking, was superseded within I think about an hour and a half, two hours maximum, where we went from a tweet saying, "Okay, Iran doesn't want to talk. That's fine. We don't have to talk. Maybe we've done too much talking.
I'll just maintain the blockade," to then suddenly backpedaling and saying no, the reason for Iran not talking is because Israel was still moving against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now I'm telling Israel they can't move against Hezbollah in Lebanon. And Hezbollah have promised they're going to stop attacking Israel pinky swear and therefore everything can continue, and we're gonna continue talking to Iran."
So maybe that doesn't necessarily contradict the fact that Trump thinks that time is on his side, and I think you, you can put that to one side as a separate argument, but it certainly shows just how dynamic the news flow is and how incredibly confusing and befuddling this tweet-driven crisis continues to be for all of us.
Erik: Michael, let's go a little deeper on the time on our side perspective with respect to the global oil market. A lot of people have been warning for a long time, myself included, that we're going to run out of the buffers in the system. We're gonna get to the point where we don't have the crude oil needed to supply the global economy, and the only resort left is gonna be a wild price reaction in order to destroy at least 10 million barrels per day of demand.
A lot of macro guys are saying, "Look, stop listening to these doomer commodity idiots. They don't know anything. Obviously, they've been proven wrong. Oil prices didn't go to 200. Everybody relax. We, time is on our side. We've got plenty of time. We produce plenty of oil. We can wait this out, and we can w- you know, the president is right to feel that he can wait this out."
What do you think? It's true that the oil prices have not gone to the moon yet. Does that mean that we're safe?
Michael: First of all, full disclosure, I'm not an energy expert, and I know you speak to many, and indeed you're very well-versed in that field yourself. So I don't want to try and over-represent my specialism here.
But I can't really recall such a dichotomy and passionate dichotomy of views as we have over this particular crisis, where, as you said, you've got absolute experts saying this is going to end in absolute catastrophe within, weeks. And these are people who, are neck deep in this industry.
And then to be fair, you have a few who understand the industry who are saying maybe it can be okay." But you get a lot, as you said, of macro fellow travelers who are great with an Excel spreadsheet and very good at being similar to that sarcastic meme of the elderly guy with the white beard drinking a cup of coffee saying, I've finished being an expert on X now, and now I'm an expert on Y," saying it hasn't gone wrong yet, therefore everything will be okay."
And when you've got that kind of talent stack really disagreeing, but the people who are really well-versed in the industry panicking the most, that makes me extremely nervous because I've worked through many different potential crises similar to this, and most of the time I've been the one pointing at the gray rhino or the black swan and saying, "This is bad," be it, all the way back to the global financial crisis 20-odd years ago, and everyone else around me who's, making money by not seeing it saying, "No, it's all okay."
And most of the time it's worth listening to those downside risks when they're that big. So I think at the very least, everyone should be paying attention rather than confidently rubbing their hands and saying the people who understand this industry like the back of their hand are all wrong.
Erik: Let's talk about what the follow-on and knock-on effects of this could be. One of the things that's really perplexing me is at first I thought, this has to be inflationary. We already, I thought, were probably into a secular inflation. It seemed to me this was gonna really force the argument, and I was really surprised when I talked to Mike Green, who said he thinks that it's going to be deflationary and the Fed is gonna be forced to cut aggressively because of this oil crisis.
And I said, "Mike, can't you see that $150 oil is inflationary?" And he said, "Yes, I can see that. Can't you see that $500 oil is deflationary?" And I said, "Oh, that's a point." How do you see this playing out and how in the world do you analyze this if you don't really know, and it seems like experts can't agree on how far this can go?
Michael: Let's break that down for a moment. First of all, you would get, a lot of heated disagreement about whether we'd ever get to 150, and if we start talking 500, which is then, it's the first time I've heard that number mentioned, I think, that's a heart attack on the screen, isn't it?
In its simplest form, we have to recognize that central banking, as currently constituted, isn't able to deal with these kind of crises. We've had repeated, examples of that over the past few years where institutions which are effectively neo-Keynesian and all to do with demand management struggle to adapt to something the supply side and then have to try and work out, do they deal with second order effects?
And more importantly, is it temporary on the supply side, which of course, or that famous word transitory or is it something that's protect- potentially structural? And if so, what do they do? And effectively it's it's almost like that old comment, I think from the 1960s, the feminist comment, the, a woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle.
Like central banks understand supply side or structural supply side shocks like a fish understands a bicycle. They're just entirely different things. So you can listen to any number of different central banking experts who will say they should do this, they should do that, they should cut rates, they should raise rates, they should do nothing at all."
They're all wrong and they're all right at the same time because it's a very complex problem, and I don't think any of them really are the full solution to it.
Erik: We've got Kevin Warsh taking over as the Federal Reserve chair. How does that factor into this equation?
Michael: He was already prior to this happening, muttering about the fact that he wanted to change the Fed.
And I don't think that's going away. And looking at the fact that AI in his mind from, in public statements, is likely to be very deflationary and as a result, there's room for the rate cuts there because of that future deflation. Now it's a bit of a curve ball to say that you've got that deflation plus the, potential for the absolute economic cacophony and chaos that could be caused by the kind of outcomes that you are referring to hypothetically It's very hard to call.
But I think the interesting thing will be listening to these central bankers who, while they may talk less under a Warsh Fed, tend to be so apparently transparent about what they're thinking and try to make clear to everyone how they're thinking about these things. It will be interesting to watch them squirm to an extent and make clear they just don't know what to do.
Because I repeat my larger point that I think the mechanisms we have set up now simply cannot function the way that we want them to. Clearly what you would need instead, at the very minimum, are vast strategic petroleum reserves or the equivalent across various different products which are no longer flowing because of the Hormuz crisis, which central banks could look to tap to try and smooth these processes out, which are, hundreds if not thousands of year old policies used in various different countries around the world and which China still uses today.
And you have to say to yourself, is that not a better mechanism than just making borrowing costs on aggregate for the entire economy, either more expensive or less with all the second and third and fourth order effects and with a lag. So I'm not trying to dodge the question in any way. I'm actually trying to hammer the point home that I don't know what Warsh will say.
I don't know what any central bank will say. I'm not sure whether they'll all be united, and I'd imagine they're probably gonna be on the phone to each other trying to make sure that they all at least hang together collectively rather than bravely trying to go in different directions with the odd exception.
But I don't think any of them are set up for it intellectually, and I don't think any of their advisors are, because all the economists who do the number crunching for them also don't have any models which work in this particular environment that we're talking about. They're presuming that this w- were structural and is as bad as you were just alluding to, which is not what I'm forecasting.
But if that is the case, yeah, w- what does one do? The en- the entire infrastructure that you've set up isn't fit for purpose anymore.
Erik: You described Kevin Warsh as muttering about changing the Fed. What do you think is on his mind long term? What do you think he and President Trump and Scott Bessent maybe are architecting in terms of a new central bank regime for the United States?
Michael: I think it is important to return to Iran, and I'm sure we'll do that in a few minutes. But if we kind of segue to that particular discussion, from my perspective, if you'll recall, in many of the chats that we've had over the years, I've been underlining that I thought when Trump was reelected that he would shift from economic policy to economic statecraft.
That was the, the line I was traveling with. And the US is openly now saying publicly that economic statecraft is what it's pursuing, and that's absolutely part and parcel of the argument I was just making then about this energy crisis Because you cannot have an independent central bank which is trying to target 2% CPI and all the other paraphernalia that it claims to be targeting And not have joined up thinking across every element of state and government towards the national security goals or the foreign policy goal that you're aiming for with economic statecraft, and not have the central bank as part of that.
The central bank is so important in all that we do. It's just logically ridiculous to conceive of a Fed saying we're not going to change. We're going to keep doing everything Greenspan did or Bernanke did or Yellen did." And he- who cares about the struggle for AI? Who cares about the struggle for the supply side?
Who cares about national security? Who cares that we're in, at a war at the moment, or that we need to re-arm rapidly to make sure that we can fight the next one, wherever that were to pop up? None of that matters to us. We're just gonna look at 2% CPI. Now, I can assure you there's a long queue of economists who will say that's the right way to go.
Of course, they're apparatchiks within a certain Soviet style machine, and that's how they think, and, that's the answer they'll always give. But from a political economy perspective, looking down from a helicopter view, it's just really irrational to conceive that Warsh would not be aware of the fact that Bessent, who's been pushing for him along with Trump to get this particular role, is himself plotting that particular course.
So un- unless he's worn a mask the whole time, now gets his sh- his feet under the table at the Fed and says I'm just gonna be the same as everybody else," which, you can't rule out, but it's pretty unlikely, the Fed will, from my particular perspective of global strategy, gradually be moving more towards the economic statecraft field.
And I think one giveaway on that, before we maybe, pivot back to Iran again, is that Warsh, when he was asked, "What do you think about dollar swap lines?" Which I think are really crucial at the moment in many different ways. He gave an interesting answer where he alluded to the fact that he thought Fed independence didn't apply to them because they were a geopolitical transaction, effectively, and they are, which I think is hon- honesty on his part.
But if he's serious about that, what that means is that potentially, instead of everyone just thinking the Fed is a technocratic institution, which is there to provide euro dollar liquidity to anyone around the world, particularly, the old boys club of largely Western and OECD central banks who need it to prop up their financial markets from time to time of course, in the US interest.
Now, potentially, this can be very much under the remit of the presidency or the treasury with a much more explicitly quid pro quo agenda, which we have actually seen, of course, running through the oil market via the DOE recently And I think that speaks to exactly the point I'm trying to make here about economic statecraft emerging, and again, this all factoring into this Iran crisis.
Erik: Let's pivot back to Iran. As you said you told me off the air that you had several wild outcomes that you could conceive as possible, not predictions, but possibilities. Let's go wild. What are they?
Michael: Okay, so this isn't a forecast, but again, it's from an economic statecraft lens, taking a big picture view, joining dots and projecting them forward as a what if, which I find is a useful discussion point.
So before we get into the nitty-gritty or maybe even avoiding the nitty-gritty of how long this crisis is going to grind on and what the ultimate outcome is, let's presume that the US is cognizant of the fact that were we to get a TACO, which actually would be, as far as I'm concerned, the whole enchilada of a retreat from the Middle East and abandonment of US allies there, and effectively handing over Hormuz and all the energy in the Middle East to, an Iranian nexus along with its allies, that would be a geostrategic disaster for what the US is trying to achieve in terms of economic statecraft and for the entire West.
So if we presume it can't do that, and we presume therefore it's going to just keep maintaining this blockade going forward if it can't move ahead with more aggressive military action, which is seemingly the message that we're getting at the moment You know, how long is a piece of string? How long can this blockade run?
Potentially long enough to start taking us towards some of the worst case oil scenarios that you're describing if you're in that particular camp, and I think a lot of people are. What is to stop the US taking even more radical economic statecraft action itself vis-a-vis energy? Because we've seen the US, for example, regularly dip into the SPR.
Now that's economic statecraft. Biden did it. Trump's doing it again now, and that's one of the reasons why we're not seeing energy prices going up, and actually, if anything, they're coming down overall trending lower. But that's obviously, a pot of a physical capital that's only got so much in the banks so to speak.
But what if they were to say number one, we are going to stop exports of refined products"? Now, they've denied it, but of course, you should never consider anything until it's been officially denied. And I think, lots of people can talk through the nuts and bolts of that, and it wouldn't necessarily achieve what they want to achieve, but you couldn't rule it out.
But that's the US in isolation. The more radical idea I had is that we could actually see the US in the face of a looming energy crisis where it really is just catastrophic, potentially, in, in the near term horizon, looking at a certain subset of countries, for example Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, Guyana others in Latin America, and key players in the Middle East who are still prepared to work with it, and key countries in Asia who are US allies who have key refining capacity, and saying, "Look, let's do the math here.
If we look at oil production and oil consumption," and I know that oil is not generic, I know there are different kinds obviously, "but we have the right mix and match between us of production, consumption, and refineries. If we form a closed loop, we can potentially get through this, and it's everyone else who's in serious trouble."
So that would really fragment the global energy markets in a way that we've already started to see in terms of different pricing for different kinds of product for different geography, but it would take that to an extreme. And the kind of the pun that I'm playing on for this idea is instead of having NAFTA, which of course no longer exists, and the USMCA itself is now being renegotiated as we speak.
Instead of having NAFTA, you have NAPTHA, which is the North American Petroleum and Hydrocarbons Trading Hub Association Where effectively you have, again, this closed loop for energy, which means that the US could say to others look, we can ride this out. It's you who can't. Are you going to help us solve it or not?"
Erik: And what would the next card be in that deck if it's we're gonna force you to play ball with us, you're gonna have to do what we ask you to do in order to solve this, and they say, "Okay, Uncle, we have to do what you say." What does the US tell those countries to do?
Michael: Again, this is purely a hypothetical.
It's not a forecast but I enjoy these kind of, scenario projections. Rather than using military statecraft, which is obviously what worked in Venezuela in a very focused manner, and is what is not working at the moment vis-a-vis Iran versus where it was a few months ago, we've hit this stalemate, this comes purely back to economic statecraft and coercion, which is work with us and together with Fed swap lines, which of course have now been offered to the UAE, which if is itself very cash rich, has a currency pegged to the dollar, and has an awful lot of energy, and is no longer in OPEC and OPEC Plus as we know.
Let's start offering swap lines to people so they have that ultimate financial backstop, which most commodity producers traditionally don't. It's only the old boy network of, Europe, BOJ, Etc., Etc., who have it when needed for financial assets. No. Okay, now it's for new allies rather than old allies, and it's for physical commodities.
So let's offer that. Let's offer the defense umbrella while it still has some meaning, which is one of the reasons why the US, I think, can't cut and run and do a taco, which as I joked, is the whole enchilada. But if we do that and then say, "And together with these other countries banging heads together, we can make sure that we can survive the energy crisis and others can't," I think just that carrot itself would see a lot of people rethinking.
In the same way an adjunct to this that while Canada has been obviously daggers drawn with the US because of the way it's been treated in public and one can understand why it's gone there, the change in rhetoric in some recent headlines from them has been remarkable. That in January you had the Prime Minister, Carney saying that we're in favor of a new world order working with China, which is quite remarkable rhetoric, for a NATO ally bordering the US to last week saying, "We want to form a new partnership with the US to make America great again," and that's a direct quote.
So imagine what's gonna happen or what could happen were we to see that kind of looming energy crisis, and I think that coercion itself, that carrot together with that stick that we're creating this crisis by not just walking away could do a lot of the moving parts or be a lot of the moving parts in and of itself without any guns being needed to be placed on any tables.
Erik: You're describing a scenario where the US has a stronger hand of cards than other players at the table because we could weather the crisis longer than others could. It seems to me that in some ways China, China has more reserves, more oil reserves than anybody, including the United States. They haven't drawn them all down.
The US has already started to ra- well, it, during the Biden administration has already drawn down its strategic pro- petroleum reserve considerably. It's now being drawn down to much lower lows. China's held onto all of theirs. Now, China doesn't have the production capability that the US has, so i- it's not an apples to, to apples comparison.
But i- is China in a particularly strong position here, and what are the scenarios where China might assert their strong hand?
Michael: First of all, let's think about what their strong hand is, and obviously they are a commodity champion, either as the net importer and therefore everyone has to pay attention to them, and if they have the stocks in theory, they can be the net supplier to people in the way that the US actually is at the moment and Japan is by drawing down its particular reserves and sharing them with others in Asia.
So if China's stocks are as high as they say, and let's just say that there are different views on that, I'm not getting into it and I'm not trying to nudge, wink, wink, but there are public views out there that they're not as high as people think or they're even higher. We really don't know, but let's presume they're very high.
Then potentially China can turn around and say, "Look, the US has the ability for now to dip into the SPR for a while. It's got that defense stack. It's got the ability to step in and help on other fronts too. So we can step in physically with product and say, "If you actually need oil, we have buckets of it.
We can offer you the renminbi via renminbi swap lines," which can be set up in various different ways. And effectively, we can be there, through a medium-term crisis in the same way that the US can. And maybe we don't have the same military cards to play yet, but maybe in another few years we will, and, Russia can help out at the margin.
So you could potentially see that as being some kind of alternative emerging over time. But that really does depend on whether China wants to share. And you'll notice that initially during this crisis, the first thing they did was to stop exporting refined products and fertilizer, Etc., which didn't exactly stand behind that view.
And interestingly enough, it's only, I think around an hour after the UAE left OPEC and OPEC Plus that suddenly China started exporting again, because I think they realized that these geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting, and they needed to start staying ahead of the game and realizing that would be potentially an offering they would have to make to people.
But that's only true if they have the reserves. Let's take the other completely hypothetical case that they don't. Let's say that they're not there the way that they profess, and how would we know? Then they're not in particularly strong position. They can, maybe keep going for another couple of months, and then just as many other countries w- would realize by the time that we get to late summer, things are looking really pretty messy.
At which point, that brings us back to, the hypothesis that I've been expounding for quite some time, which is that ultimately part of this resolution could be, ironically, China having to work with the US against its own ally, Iran, because it realizes that the potential damage to it from this crisis i- is even larger than losing Iran as an ally.
Now, we're not there yet, clearly, otherwise there'd be more movement or at least you'd pick up rumors of it, even if it isn't being, reported in the mainstream press. It's still logical that could appear at some moment, but it purely depends, as I said, in terms of what China can assemble, and that's a product of what they do or don't have as cards in hand, and there's no transparency on that front.
Erik: Michael, let's come back to the US implications of this. Experts are telling us that even if the crisis ended tomorrow, it would take, eh, four or five months before oil prices and particularly finished product gasoline prices would start to stabilize again. Okay. The midterm elections are only five months away now.
So if gasoline prices stay at these extreme elevated levels all the way through the midterm elections, does that make it extremely difficult for the Republicans to hold on to the Congress? And if they lose the Congress, what are the implications?
Michael: Let's unpack that in a couple of different ways.
First of all, as we have seen, and as you were referring to at the beginning of this conversation, all it takes is a few handy tweets and prices can go down 5, 6% in a day. Tweeting doesn't cost that much, and it's amazing how much of an impact it can have for a while. Ultimately, if we are going to hit that pinch point up ahead, it's not going to work forever unless that particularly optimistic view that this is a crisis that can be worked through because, for example, China is importing much less at the moment, and is there some kind of background cooperation going on with the US?
We simply don't know. Then that might be one solution. If not, and we do find that tweets don't work anymore and prices start moving higher, that's exactly the pressure that would lead to hypothetically the US making one of two different choices. Number one is saying, "Okay, we have to go the whole enchilada," and say, "This is a mega taco," which, really does us enormous geostrategic damage and the entire West.
Or we have to look at the naphtha scenario I was just talking about, which is we will have lower prices in conjunction with others, but it means that they're going to be much, much higher in a larger subset of countries and, we're not gonna get our reputation back on the other side of that, but we can live with it But that's just the energy side of it.
You then have to look at the US itself, and I'm actually speaking from the US today, which is one of the reasons why I apologize if I'm stumbling over my words somewhat. The jet lag traveling here from Asia is quite remarkable sometimes. But we've seen this, constitutional upheaval, and I do think we have to be cognizant of the fact that obviously high gasoline prices are very unpopular.
But at the same time, it's always a binary, one party or the other. And it's also about enthusiasm. So provided enthusiasm can be kept up by Trump way or one way or another, and I'm not saying that can happen, but it's not impossible. If you can make it a sharp binary between whatever Trump is putting forward as a platform at the time versus what the Democrats are doing, with the redistricting that we're currently seeing it's still not a gimme that he loses the midterms.
And we have seen very experienced election callers really humiliated several times, not just in America, but around the world in recent years. And I wouldn't rule out that the confidence that people have of what it will look like in November could prove, misplaced once again.
Erik: Michael, let's move on to gold now.
A lot of us thought that the reason gold has been so weak and why we saw a breakdown in the usual correlation where normally, bombs start falling, gold goes up. In this crisis, it's been bombs falling, gold goes down. Most people, myself included, have assumed that the reason for that has been that we're seeing an oil price-driven inflation signal that's spooking the precious metals market.
We just had a 10-day long, pretty significant risk-off cycle in oil prices and, gold didn't recover to new all-time highs or anywhere close to it. So maybe we're I'm feeling like maybe I've misdiagnosed why we've had all of this weakness in gold. And so I wonder what do you think has caused gold to be so weak, and what's it gonna take for it to bottom and eventually turn around, or does it turn around?
Michael: Again, without giving any kind of investment advice, I'm looking at this as part of a bigger picture thesis rather than focusing on one asset and then trying to explain everything back from there because, that's my methodology the former, not the latter. I think an interesting anecdote, and that's the best I will do here because people who look at gold full-time will obviously get, passionate about this and send me very angry emails.
But I think the best anecdote to explain this is very early on in the war, you saw the fact that people were finding that they were having to sell gold for dollars to try and then move them abroad and then buy other assets again. So when it actually came, push came to shove in the Middle East, you actually had missiles flying in a region which historically likes gold a lot, you suddenly have people realizing it's not the easiest thing to flee with.
You're actually a high net worth individual with a safe full of dollars, sorry, sa- a safe full of gold. And it is ironically for all the problem with fiat currency, which I, I'm not gonna unpack here, we're all aware of the downsides, it's pretty easy to get out of the country, via one press of a button at times.
And then on the other side of that, do you really wanna put it back into, very heavy to carry metals on the other side? Now, that's only one factor amongst many, but I do think it feeds into a broader thread running through Iran, running through economic statecraft, running through what the Fed and Warsh are doing.
And that is what is our emerging geopolitical, geoeconomic, geofinancial architecture looking like on the other side of this war? Because, at the moment you could say the war is in an interregnum. We don't know if it's gonna start again or just fade away. The shooting we've seen over the past couple of days has been, quote unquote, "mostly peaceful bombing," if you can, get away with that phrase.
But people aren't genuinely focusing yet on what things will look like when it is over, whether the US wins or loses or this draw drags on longer. And we've talked about the energy side of it to a degree, but many other things factor into it, and the dollar, gold, stable coins, commodities, all of them factor in too, and in a very big way.
Erik: Michael, let's come back to your specialty of economic statecraft. That includes stable coins. It includes the swap lines that I think have been offered to the UAE. There's probably other dimensions of this. Take us out to the bigger picture of what's going on here in terms of what you think Trump and Bessent really have in mind longer term.
What are their intentions for the US to assert economic statecraft, and how are the ways that's gonna play out?
Michael: Sure. I think the easiest summary of that is that clearly there's absolutely no appetite from Bessent or from Trump to give up the global power of the dollar, but there's a full understanding that the euro dollar system, which does give the US a great deal of power, is also responsible for de-industrializing it because everyone demands the euro dollar, which comes from holding US financial assets rather than productive assets.
So you can make the link that effectively, you know the rules-based order was propped up ultimately by the US military. The US military was propped up by US industry, and US industry was killed effectively by the US dollar system, and therefore the US dollar system killed the system the rules-based order, which actually props up.
So it's a closed loop, and I, I've been arguing that in various different ways for a long time. But that doesn't mean you wanna give the dollar up completely. So I think what they are going to try and do, and we've discussed this in part before, but again, it runs through this war, it runs through energy, it runs through commodities, trying to push back at what China is doing, like through letters through a stick of rock It is the use of stable coins to effectively create lower interest rates in the US and effectively sucking euro dollars out of parts of the global economy and replacing them with these digital tokens, which to an extent for the US are buy one, get one free.
Why would you not want to do that? And they also have a sorting effect in that the countries that will trade with you, that will put tariffs on China and share a common external tariff with you against them, and split their technology supply chains and work with you on defense, they will be the ones that will expect the accept these digital tokens, which are not money, but they can become money if people will accept them as money.
They will be the ones who will accept them, and the ones who won't ultimately weren't going to be your allies anyway. So there's a sorting effect, there's a reorganizational effect, there's a buy one get one free, and there's fiscal breathing room through all of that. So that's what I think the US is trying to achieve there, and I think they were already, they were moving towards that.
The Iran crisis/war is likely to accelerate that, particularly, depending on how it ends. But that's just the US view. There are other countries and other players involved here, obviously. It's not only the US playing the game. And the interaction of how all the different players come together will drive ultimately what that architecture looks like.
Erik: You mentioned earlier the scenario of you, you said something to the effect of, if the US wins this war with Iran or loses this war. It really got me thinking, obviously the US is not gonna lose the war in the sense of Iran won and destroyed the United States and the country doesn't exist anymore.
So what does losing the war for the United States look like? Is it just the scenario where Trump is forced to taco and walk away and say okay, that didn't work out the way we thought," and just walk away from this, leaving Iran kind of controlling the strait? Is that the lose scenario or is there a worse one I haven't thought of?
Michael: It's a cascading effect that flows on from that, because what it would do at a meta level is show that even when you have a very ostensibly gung-ho president like Trump, in reality, of course, he hasn't been getting involved in wars on a large scale up until recently, and of course, that's what he's campaigned on so successfully in the past, which is, counter to the image that some people have of him domestically and internationally.
But even when you have someone who's prepared to, talk very tough about these things, that effectively the US would be in a state that the geostrategist Ed Ludback refers to as post-heroic Whereby, and this isn't any kind of criticism, it's just an observation, that the US is so casualty-phobic that while it has this magnificent technological military machine, which is of course very highly reliant on inputs from China and others, and that's part of what Trump is trying to address by, onshoring and shifting supply chains, Etc., Etc., It's limited in what it can achieve.
It can do a lot, but it can't achieve everything it needs to in the same way that Israel wasn't able to fully defeat Hamas because it would've required, many more men on the ground going everywhere. The US would've needed to have boots on the ground versus Iran in some scenarios, you could argue that.
And if that political will for that isn't there, then you can say therefore there are certain geostrategic problems or quandaries that the US simply isn't going to be able to resolve, and the cost of being involved is going to get higher and higher without any realistic prospect of victory. Ergo, the more logical thing to do is to, as you said, cut and run and say however we dress it up, Iran controls Hormuz," Etc., Etc..
But that would shatter the US image globally, which is why in the past I've referred to it as a 1956 crisis for the US in the way that the UK and France experienced one, and it dropped them from being great powers to just being powers. And the US would of course remain a hyper power, were this to happen, but people would recognize there are lots of things it just can't or won't do anymore, and that does absolutely change the parameters within which its opponents would expect it to then operate.
So it really is very significant. And within the Middle East in particular, just to underline that, it would change the dynamic totally. It wouldn't necessarily be for the better for anyone else either because if Iran says effectively we're top dog," even the, though the UAE has openly come out and, and attacked Iran several times, which has now been revealed, much of the Gulf might end up having to try and make terms with Iran even though they don't like it.
But not everyone would. It's potentially the case that the UAE and Israel would continue sniping away at it, and you could still therefore have stru-structurally high energy prices even if the US says we're out of here." Countries that are permanently based there may not accept the fact that happens and say we're not gonna give up."
So there are lots and lots of cascading effects, both for the region, for the US, and for the entire West that flow on from it. And how you price that is interesting, but I think you would have to really take a step back and think, is one still as positive on the US dollar and on US assets in their totality if you're accepting that there's a very firm limit to what the US is prepared to do?
Erik: Final question, Michael. Let's go back to the Kevin Warsh Fed. I think you're right that the theme here is going to be economic statecraft, stables coin statecraft, and so forth. What policies do you think, if you had to predict the wild surprise scenarios that nobody sees coming, not predictions, but scenarios or possibilities, wild outcomes, what are the Fed policies that Kevin Warsh might advance that would surprise everyone?
Michael: I've been talking about this for a while, so this isn't completely new, but I'm not sure if we've discussed it here or again, my jet lag is so severe that I can't remember if we have. Apologies. And that's this, that Warsh is openly talking about trying to reduce the Fed balance sheet, which itself would really set the cat among the pigeons, as I'm sure you're aware.
But at the same time, Trump is talking about expanding the Pentagon budget next year by $500 billion. How do you square that circle? And ultimately, alongside a corollary to this, which I think is the Fed may have to start looking at the supply side rather than the demand side and which sectors of the economy need lower or higher rates than others rather than one size fits all, which I've never understood the logic for in a geopolitical environment.
The Fed might be having to think, do we really need to be offering QE style balance sheet support to the financial part of the economy, which effectively doesn't do anything in terms of actual physical bang for the buck?" Fair enough. But do we need to be looking at some kind of acronym, tacit balance sheet support using one mechanism or another?
And there are lots of ways, of course, this could be dressed up in a technocratic way that wouldn't make it look quite as egregious as it is when I describe it in a simple form like this, to saying we can offer the same QE support that we have done up until now, but for the physical economy." So for example, again, swap lines or stable coin support for countries that are going to physically build out mines, port, infrastructure, shipbuilding, military supply chains, Etc., Etc., Etc., to re-industrialize and re-militarize parts of the US.
And I think I've made this joke on this podcast before, and if I haven't now's the time, and if I have, I humbly apologize, which is I've said for years that we're now living in a world of Warcraft, and I think we can all recognize that, whether this particular war is on hiatus or not. But effectively, the joke here is that would be using what I also call financial Farcraft, which is just financialization, to try and prepare for a world of Warcraft.
And I don't think people have, in markets broadly, got their heads around what it would mean to have extra liquidity that goes to some sectors, but it doesn't flow to all the favored ones, which is what an entire generation, if not two, of financial market participants have grown up expecting as normal.
But I think we are now in a new normal, and therefore that paradigm will have to shift.
Erik: Michael, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview. I really enjoy our talks every time we get the opportunity. Before I let you go, please tell our listeners a little bit more about what you do at Rabobank and how they can follow your work.
Michael: Sure. As you've probably heard I'm the global strategist at Rabobank for the economics and markets team, which means I look cross-asset, cross-geography, and cross-disciplinary to try and join the dots and project those dots forward to look for the kind of rather esoteric emerging trends that I'm talking about that once upon a time only happened every few years or every decade or so, and were just colorful entertainment up until that point, but now seem to be happening once every couple of weeks.
And so we really do need to be spending much more time talking about them. And if you'd like to join me in those conversations, if you're a Rabobank client, please go to the Rabobank Knowledge website. And if you're not, look for me on LinkedIn and also look for me on X, and the handle is @themichaelevery.
Erik: Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues, and be sure to stay tuned because we've got a cameo appearance from Commodity Context founder Rory Johnston with an update on some of the logistic issues in the crude oil market
Erik: Joining me now is Geopolitica Institute founder and CEO Dr. Pippa Malmgren. By popular listener request, we've had quite a few emails from people basically saying, "You've got to get Dr. Pippa back to talk about the Iran conflict." Just wait, she's got a whole lot more to tell us than just Iran. But Pippa, it's great to have you back.
Let's start with the Iran conflict. I have to tell you, there is so much talk on the table about, oh the deal is just... we're hours away from closing the deal. The way I'm interpreting this is we're nowhere close to any kind of deal because President Trump has said very firmly and Iran has said very firmly at the same time Trump says they must turn over their 60% enriched near weapons grade uranium.
Iran says, "No way, not negotiable. We're never gonna give it up." It seems to me like until one of those sides caves on that specific point, there is no deal and there is no resolution. Am I reading that right?
Pippa: First of all, hi, Eric. It's so great to be back on with you. I do love the sessions with you 'cause you let me go deep into the whole breadth of what one needs to understand.
And on that, we need to start understanding, first of all, the superpowers are negotiating between themselves, right? The US, China particularly, Russia as well, and they are attempting to resolve all of the outstanding geopolitical issues all at once. This is a kind of Rubik's Cube approach, where you say you can't fix any one of them independently of the others.
And therefore, it really matters that we understand this, that the US is basically saying to China, for example, "We can negotiate a deal on Taiwan. There are conditions around that, but we accept that Taiwan is in your world and that Cuba and Venezuela are in ours. So you get out of our part of the world, we'll get out a little bit out of your part of the world."
Again, the conditions are important 'cause it's not just a clear swap. Part of the conditions are that China needs to become more like Taiwan, because the Chinese economy is not functioning very well, and if China's economy glitches, the whole world economy glitches. And so Trump has been reaching out effectively to the Communist Party saying, "You guys have two big choices in front of you," which I personally describe as either Star Wars or Star Trek.
Star Wars is where we go to war with people, which between these two superpowers would literally be the end of Earth. Nobody can survive that superpower conflict given the level of nuclear weapons that we have today. Or we decide to go to war with problems. That's the Star Trek scenario And China is absolutely signaling that it prefers Star Trek, no question.
But to do Star Trek, China can't run its economy the way it has been, and therefore, not only does it need to be more like Taiwan, but the US needs to offer China access to the US market on more preferable terms than have been available in the past. And specifically, China needs to move from a world where everything's stamped "Made in China" to a world where they're stamped "Owned by China."
In other words, they need to copy the exact same model the Europeans did after World War II, the Japanese did a little bit later, which is you start by exporting cheap goods based on cheap labor, and you end up making goods in the US to the point that you can build global brands. Americans, a lot of Americans, they actually think that BMW and Mercedes are American brands these days, right?
And so this is the only way you can raise national income. So the US is basically saying let's figure out a deal that we can get us all there." They've just said they're gonna create a board to review which businesses in China can come into the United States on that basis. So Iran. So then Iran is part of this deal.
Now, first, who are the Iranians is a very important question because now that the leadership has either left for Moscow or been eliminated by the United States, what's left is not really leadership. It's like the remnants of a structure that no longer exists. It's we could almost say a lot of stragglers that are now competing with each other because they all know that there is a deal coming from the United States, and they want to emerge as the guy who gets to shake hands with the United States, in the same way that the new leader of Syria used to be considered a very bad terrorist guy and now is a head of state that the United States says good things about.
Because the strategy is not regime change. The strategy is conversion. It is to create the conditions that are so favorable that it's not worth remaining where you were. It is worth basically giving up the terrorism in exchange for a place in the world economy and some cash in the bank. So you're right, the uranium's the sticking point, but not for the reasons we think.
It's not about the Iranian nuclear program, in a sense. They know that everyone in the region is opposed to them becoming a nuclear power They know that China was their ally, but the, what was left of the, IRGC, when they made the decision to start lobbing closing the Strait of Hormuz, who did that hurt most?
That hurt China, their own sponsor. So at that point, China becomes extremely pragmatic and says "Hey guys we were on your side, but no, this is not gonna work." The president comes in and says, "Yeah, we agree." So the US and China start collaborating on the conditions under which the Strait of Hormuz can be reopened, and notice that the first ships that came through are all Chinese oil-carrying vessels.
Also, the US has been very clear with China, of course, China can buy all the oil it needs from Venezuela, from Alaska, right? We cut a deal to sell Alaskan oil to China during the Trump G summit. But there's a kind of silent parentheses which is, unless you wanna go to war with the United States, in which case the US can now turn the taps off on these things.
So that option of Star Wars is literally just not even available. So let's not talk about that. Let's go to Star Trek, which is where we all win. So the Iranians understand the real reason the president wants the uranium is because he wants to prove definitively the origin of that uranium, and his belief is that it is American, and that it was sent to Iran as part of the various deals cut under the period when Senator Clinton was the Secretary of State, when President Obama was in office, and when President Biden was in office, that part of the deal was not just sending vast amounts of cash to Iran, but also quietly, surreptitiously facilitating their nuclear program.
Now obviously that sounds completely nuts to many people, but this is what he is after, is the receipts. He wants to be able to prove that this nefarious position was even worse than we think. So that's why he also talks about gold dust, right? That the uranium is gold dust. In other words, he only needs a few grams to be able to prove the origin.
Also, now that the Iranian leadership, what's left of it, I don't even wanna call it leadership, it's just what remains, they started lobbing missiles at all their neighbors And destroying extremely valuable infrastructure, not to mention hitting a nuclear plant. So now everyone in the Middle East is aligned.
There is no daylight between them. They all are like, "This cannot continue. These guys cannot be allowed to disrupt the entire region." So they have no more friends in that respect, and now that Cuba and Venezuela are shaking hands with the United States and China's not supporting them anymore, what's left?
Russia. Russia, like China, is open to a swap. So if they have a choice between Iran and Ukraine, they're gonna focus on Ukraine, and the president understands that. China understands that, and that's why the last piece of this Rubik's Cube that's being negotiated is not Iran. That's considered pretty much a done deal.
The question is, how long do these folks keep lobbing missiles around in their internal competition to emerge as the winner that gets to shake hands with the world? But the real problem is how do we get to a resolution over Ukraine? And I think the-- that's a separate conversation we can have, but I think now we have a better context and understanding.
And by the way, for those who haven't been paying attention, 'cause I find a lot of people are like, "Oh, what are you talking about? Cuba is never gonna flip." And I'm like, did you notice that the head of the CIA flew into Havana on the very day that Trump and Xi met? And the reason you don't see Secretary of State Rubio there is because the US is not doing diplomacy in Cuba.
The US is dictating terms, and it's basically said, "You can have 100 million in cash," which you need because they have no gasoline, they have no diesel, they have no lights on. So they are in a, raise your hand and say, "Uncle" moment, where they are up the creek and the conditions are being laid out by the US.
So these things are historic. Any one of them is historic, but you have to understand the whole thing together. It's a Rubik's Cube. It's not about individual locations anymore.
Erik: Wow, so much to unpack here. We'll definitely get back to Ukraine and all the rest of it, but I wanna stay on Russia for start. So I- I'm not following exactly what you're saying about the origin of Iran's uranium, and I think this is something that's been so badly not reported by the mainstream media that I wanna start with a little bit of context for our listeners.
Iran has 441 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. It's in UF6, which is the stuff that's a gas when it's in the centrifuge, but it's a solid form at room temperature. It's in about 17 or 18 casks that are each about the size of a scuba tank. So that's the... And that's not speculation.
IAEA inspectors have gone and looked at it, put a seal on it and said, "We've seen this." So nobody disputes that they have that. The other thing to understand is 60% enriched uranium is never ever something, at least not in that quantity, that has any explanation in civilian use. This has everything to do with Iran being what's known as a threshold state.
They don't have nuclear weapons. They don't have weapons-grade uranium. But they've done 99% of the work necessary to get their uranium to weapons grade. It's only 1% more effort to go from 60% to 90% enrichment if you've got operable centrifuges to do that enrichment in. It's not clear whether or not their centrifuges are still working or completely destroyed or what the status is there.
But they've got this uranium. It sounds like you're saying, Pippa, you think that they got it from the US? And i- if so, how would you prove that? Even if you had these 17 canisters or tanks of uranium, each the size of a scuba tank, y- are you saying you do some kind of DNA test on it and figure out who sold it to you?
Pippa: Yeah, that's exactly. And I'm not saying that this is my belief. I am saying I believe it is the president's belief And the actions he's taking reflect this belief. But what's even more important is we have to be really careful about this idea of what constitutes a nuclear weapon. When I was in the White House I was very privileged to get the chance to work on nuclear threats to the domestic economy.
So everybody on the National Security Council was out chasing terrorists down globally, but the group that I was part of, we were looking at what would happen if a terrorist hit a shopping mall in America with not an ICBM, right? Not what you're talking about, a nuclear weapon, but something that has nuclear material attached to a traditional old-fashioned explosive.
That's what we call a dirty bomb. And this is where a lot of the confusion has come in about, what-- how close was Iran to having a nuclear weapon? The answer is they already had it. It's just w- are we talking about an ICBM that you can deliver for 5,000 miles, or are we talking about something you put in a backpack and you can destroy an area for 10,000 years, right?
Both of them are serious threats, and both of them are things that the, people that we're discussing seem to be perfectly morally content to do. So when we talk about getting the uranium, it's not just how highly enriched it is. You don't even-- You can take uranium from a dentist office refuse, and then you can put that in something, right?
We have to understand that we're talking about a range of nuclear threats, not just one kind. So that's the first thing. And now there's universal agreement, as I said, in the Middle East, everybody's "These guys can't have any of it. None." So that's a- an overarching understanding we have to have.
The second thing is, can you tell where it came from? My understanding is you can, and I think that what the president is aiming at... As he's undergoing a extraordinary effort to go back in time and find out exactly what happened when and why it happened, because it's ever more clear that, there was, a massive effort to undermine his first presidency, to prevent him from executing the vision that he had.
and he believes that the other side was willing to go to almost any lengths to get their way, and that included start being literally paying the very terrorists that we were supposed to be chasing down. And we know that. That's in the public domain now, right? Even when Trump recently entered office, the, when the excavation of USAID and other such channels began, and everybody's "Wait, why are we sending $40 million a week to the Taliban?
Wait, what the heck? What's causing that?" And it's part of this history of a belief that sometimes it's better to work with an opponent. It's the old, the enemy of my enemy is my friend logic, or the belief that you need an opponent to justify Congress allocating funds, or you're so used to working with an opponent that you've converted some of them, and so you have to give them cover stories.
There's a million reasons that the people doing all this would say were perfectly legitimate But in Trump's view, they were not perfectly legitimate. And so I'm just saying that one of the reasons that he is insisting on a physical access to this material is because of that, and the people on the other side know this, so they're holding out for the highest possible price.
So it strikes me that we're not actually in a state negotiation anymore, we're in a price negotiation. The folks left know that they are not going to be running this country, partly because, depends your-- how you count it, but something between, let's say 60 and 90 million Iranians are pretty mad about all this and do not want these people in charge.
So they're gonna have to face their own public, which is not gonna be pretty. So will they actually survive that? There's a chance they probably won't. That's why a number of them, when they were offered the opportunity to take the-- what Russia put on the table, which is take an apartment in Moscow, it's free, have a pension, and live a life where you can have a coffee without worrying, Americans are chasing you down.
But they didn't offer that to everyone. They only offered that to the really senior people. So the people left didn't get the offer. So where are they gonna go? What options do they have? The only real option left is to either join forces with the US and become part of the new world. That was partly the reason that Trump said, "Okay, everybody joins the Abraham Accords now."
'Cause then everybody becomes an enforcer against this kind of thinking. And so basically, where are you gonna run and hide? The whole rest of the Middle East is gonna shut you down as well. There's no place to go. That's why I think we are gonna end up with a deal. I do think Iran is going to emerge back into the family of nations with new leadership.
Is it gonna be messy? Yeah. But the US is not doing what it did in Iraq, which is just to destroy the government and then walk away and hope for the best. They're instead saying, "Okay, let's all together work on removing the one group of people who have adverse interests to the whole rest of the world, and then try to figure out how do we create the conditions for Iran to choose their own leadership?"
Erik: Pippa, the distinction that you drew at the beginning of that between what's possible and what the president believes to be possible not being the same thing seems central in my mind. And frankly I'm just gonna point out that in the president's most recent Truth Social post, he was absolutely adamant-
Pippa: Yeah
Erik: that the US absolutely, positively, there's only two options that he said. One is Iran turns over its enriched uranium and gives it to the United States. The other is that the US Atomic Energy Commission be present in Iran and supervise and oversee any downblending or destruction operation that might occur in Iran.
Pippa: Yes.
Erik: I can't help but point out, Pippa, that the US Atomic Energy Commission was dissolved in 1974, 52 years ago. So the president's command of of all of these topics maybe leaves a little bit to be desired.
Pippa: Yeah, and I hear you, but no, what he means is American atomic energy experts, that basically a US team of, our most cutting edge experts to oversee the process.
Erik: Okay, but you think that the motive is not just to make sure that Iran does not possess this nuclear threshold state condition of having the, this near weapons grade material. You think it is to to do an, a forensic operation- Yes ... to prove that it's really got Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi's DNA mixed in with that U238 and 235.
There's also a little bit of Barack's fingerprints on it somewhere.
Pippa: Yes. I think that is the belief of this
Erik: White House. Of the president. And do you- Yes ... think that any of these nuclear experts, whether they're from whatever IAEA would be the normal agency to do that, do they believe that it's possible to do?
I've never heard of a forensic analysis of enriched uranium to determine its source. So far as I know it-
Pippa: And also remember, it won't only be about the material, it'll also be about the history and when you're negotiating and you're offering a lot of money on the table, what you're asking is for people to start singing.
You're saying, " We'll offer you this money, but we want to know what is the history? Where did things come from? Where did you get the insight? What, how, why did you m- how did you make this leap with your nuclear process? Was this given to you?" There's a whole forensic excavation that I think is occurring and going to continue occurring.
And so I'm just adding in that this piece of it Exists. Now, we can argue about whether it's sensible, and I'm not, a nuclear forensic expert by a million miles. But do we think that nuclear forensic experts could do this kind of work? I think the answer is yes. And when you listen to them, their answer is yes.
So I just think when we're trying to understand what's going on in the world, we cannot look at this thing the way the media is presenting it, which is the leadership of Iran is negotiating with the leadership of the United States, 'cause that is not what is happening. It is what is left of what was a command control structure negotiating really now with the various superpowers, 'cause China is very involved in this as well.
And even China agrees and has said, "We do not... we also don't support any nuclear weapons. Is their fundamental position, whether that's for Russia or Iran. So the US and China are aligned on this piece. And so I just think that's a better frame for understanding the back and forth than the traditional way of looking at it.
Erik: Okay. With that framework in place, let's come back to the current global energy disruption situation. What we have going on is both sides are saying they're not gonna back down on t- somebody's gotta cave on this giving over of the enriched nuclear material in order to end this conflict and fully reopen the strait.
Every single crude oil expert that we've spoken with has said the same thing, which is the buffers and safety margins have pretty much been used up. If the strait remains closed for another month, we're gonna be looking at out of control oil prices, $150, $200 oil prices. This has to get wrapped up in the next month, or the world is in a really big pickle with respect to energy.
Do you a-agree with that appraisal of the situation? And if so, do you see it, a, an agreement being made on this nuclear material in the next few weeks? Or how does this resolve? And if it doesn't, what happens to the global energy market?
Pippa: Sure. So first thing is we have to understand that the United States is perfectly fine with the strait remaining closed, because this forces the whole world to buy these molecules of oil and gas that are currently blocked in the strait, they have to buy them from America.
So the US is saying, "We're open for business. We got all-- everything the world needs, we can sell plus the petroleum byproducts. They're all here too." I'll give you an example. I remember a few weeks ago, I was in South Korea and went up to the North Korean border and, all the headlines were saying, "Oh my God, semiconductor production globally is gonna collapse," because since the IRGC hit the various production plants in Qatar, there was not enough helium for semiconductor production.
And I'm like, "But the largest helium reserve on Earth is in Texas. They're just gonna buy from Texas." And then three weeks later, headlines: Hynix, Samsung semiconductors close the deal with Texas. So we-- when-- It's like people don't understand, you can just shift the supply chain. Now, you can't shift it forever because the US doesn't have unlimited supplies forever, but it does have these supplies probably for about two years.
So that's one layer. Second layer is part of what the US is trying to do is shift the whole world away from molecules to atoms, because we're trying to enter a world where it's not oil and gas that power our future, it is small modular reactors, it is basically nuclear energy in new, safe forms.
And I keep referring it to my written work on Substack as we have to understand we now can put a star in a box, literally So for example, there's a company, there's several, but there's one in California called Valor Atomics. Valor is making a box that's literally half the size of a car, and what's miraculous is that it's not just a small modular reactor, which of course we've had, for decades.
That's what powered the US Navy since the '50s. So we know this works and it's safe. But they're putting them in these small boxes that then you can literally move anywhere you want. So not only can the US now create a nuclear power plant quickly, but we can create a distributed nuclear plant that we can put anywhere you need it.
So another one in Austin, where I'm now living, 'cause it's our new tech center, which is quite amazing here. Another one called Aalo which is making small modular reactors. These things are... Just to be really clear, 'cause I think people don't understand. The new technology evolves around what they call TRISO fuel, which are little tiny pellets the size of a poppy seed, which have super hard shells that are almost impossible to break, and inside is the fissile material, the nuclear material, I should say.
And so it can't melt down. This is not like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. That risk does not exist. And it takes literally half a handful of TRISO pellets to fuel, as I'm told, 5,000 homes I had originally thought for a year, and I keep being corrected and being told no, indefinitely." Okay. So since the US and China are leading in this new nuclear technology The US is delighted to be making a ton of money on the oil that it can sell to the world for the next couple of years in order to finance the transition from the old drill, baby, drill approach to let's just use new forms of clean energy.
Of which, by the way, nuclear is just one. There's also a whole bunch of others which are developing super quickly. And by the way, this takes me to, and it's important we all know about the Genesis mission, and most people, even investors in the market, they're like, "What is that?" That's the announcement by the White House that all our national labs, so that's Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore and the Argonne and all these amazing labs that have had our best scientists since the end of the Second World War, they've all been totally classified.
N- none of the data has ever been let out the door, let alone, even internally, they've never been allowed to talk to each other, right? It's like Apple, right? People who work on the glass can't work on any other part of it, so that nobody knows, how to make a whole iPhone. The president said this is gonna stop.
We're gonna lift the lid off all of them. We're gonna run AI over all the data, and we're gonna connect the dots within the labs and across the labs, and we're betting there's a whole bunch of world-shaking technologies that are gonna come out of that and massively accelerate The solutions like new forms of energy.
Now, related to that is definitely gonna be nuclear fusion and how close are we? So again, I have investors who say, "Oh, nuclear, that means $30 billion and 30 years." No. In Austin, we have one company here that is a, it's a startup doing this technology I've described. They have built a small modular reactor with less than 300 people in less than 365 days, right?
The governor said go. I give approval. I can see that there's no, health risk here, no meltdown risk." Boom. We're in a different world. So that's why the US is like, "Okay, I understand everybody's in pain as long as the Strait of Hormuz is closed, but that's not our fault. It's these guys.
And if these guys would go home, then we could open everything up." But as long as they're gonna be a pain and keep it closed, the fact is we're a net beneficiary of this process. The US is also gonna be able to invest a whole lot more in its own oil and gas while this is going on, right? There's nothing like high energy prices to stimulate investment and CapEx and especially in alternative energies, which is definitely happening as well.
So you can start to see oh, that sort of explains why the White House is not like panicking like everybody else. But of course, if you're European, the idea that you have to buy your oil and gas from President Trump Is pretty galling, so they're like, "We don't wanna do it." But what other options do they have?
You can buy from the Russians. Who do you prefer? But these guys in the Strait are basically saying you can't buy it from anybody in the Middle East. So that's n- the US didn't do that, right? That was their decision.
Erik: So many things to unpack here, Pippa. Someday we're gonna have to sit down and have a debate on triso versus not triso fuel.
But- Sure ... I agree with you that that Allo particularly, which does not use triso fuel, is a really exciting startup right next to you- yeah ... in Austin there. They're doing some absolutely amazing things. If we had the best thing we could do w- would be to make 25 more companies like Allo, because they're really on the right track.
Pippa: Exactly.
Erik: And I think we're headed in that direction. The thing I'm still missing, and I'm just gonna come very quickly back to it, is- Sure. ... we've got about 13 million barrels per day of production shut-ins in the Persian Gulf region as a result of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. The US doesn't have spare capacity to service all of that.
There's a little bit that's going through the pipelines and so forth. The East-West Pipeline in Saudi Arabia is delivering some through the Red Sea.
Pippa: Yeah.
Erik: But still, we've got to somehow destroy about 10 million barrels of demand unless that strait gets fully reopened really quickly.
Where do you see that coming from?
Pippa: So why do you think Trump and Xi just had this meeting? That is exactly, they are in total alignment because who will suffer most? China, not the US. So you can be sure that China is also putting enormous pressure and incentives for this to stop, and so is everybody else in the Middle East.
So again, what are you actually dealing with? Are you really dealing with the leadership of a nation, or are you dealing with a bunch of people who understand that the whole world would like them to stop doing this and are willing to pay them to stop doing this, and your incentive is to just sit tight 'cause you'll get a bigger offer tomorrow than today?
So that's why the threat of another military action becomes necessary. It's not a costless decision to say no.
Erik: We've gotta get to the point where we reopen the strait. I think we, we can all agree that the strait needs to get reopened and reopened soon, or the world is going to face a real energy crisis.
And as you said, the most powerful nations around the world are all aligned on that. But the guys that have the drones and the missiles right next door to the strait are the Iranian IRGC, which has been, by its design, separated and decentralized into 32 different command and control regions that all independently are engaged in a religious war.
Pippa: Exactly.
Erik: So what's gonna bring that to an end?
Pippa: Exactly. So and to my point, you have a whole bunch of independent groups that don't have a command control structure, and that's why, like you'll just see The Wall Street Journal is reporting right now, six hours ago US Navy is guiding ships through Strait of Hormuz, right?
They're just quietly coordinating, and everybody understands if you hit one of them, all hell is gonna break loose. So this is a way of beginning the process of moving the control away from these kind of warring factions. So I don't know. How long do these warring factions last? When do they finally either just get exhausted, they say yes to the money they get taken out by a military action?
I don't know, but it just strikes me with all of this alignment between the US, all the regional nations, and China That it's not gonna last that long is, I- would be my view
Erik: President Trump has said on several occasions, "Look, we've got time on our side," and I don't think that statement is true. I don't think we have time on our side.
Is he-
Pippa: Oh, yeah ...
Erik: Does he know better and he's just bluffing, and it's part of his negotiating style? Or does the president really believe that we've got plenty of time and we don't need to worry about-
Pippa: I think I just outlined the exact case of why the United States does in fact have time on its side, right?
It is exactly why. It's not the world has time on its side. It's the US has-
Erik: Okay ...
Pippa: time on its
side.
Erik: So this comes back to I'm thinking to something Louis Gave said on this program- ... a few weeks ago when I said, "Louis, how can it be that we're not, that the stock market is not freaking out about this energy crisis?"
And Louis said, "Unfortunately, the bottom line is that i- when we get to a real crisis situation, which we probably will, the resources go to the highest bidder, and if millions of people are gonna starve to death as a result of this crisis, they won't be in countries that affect NVIDIA's earnings, and that's the reason the stock market is not crashing on this."
Is that basically what's going on here, is if there's going to be massive human suffering as a result of this, it won't be in the US, it won't be in China, and it won't be any place that affects the earnings of NVIDIA?
Pippa: That's a... I do, I know and love Louis. It's a very brutal analysis that you've outlined there.
I think it's more that everybody understands that all the players are moving toward a resolution. They have agreed on quite a few issues. Yes, there's some sticking points, but it's not that we're starting from scratch. We've come a long way from day one. So I guess the market is just betting that, first of all, when you have that many nations all involved and moving in one direction, these guys can't hang on that long.
That's one. And remember, they have no support internally in Iran, right? Like I said they're... The reason they don't get thrown out is only because they're the only ones with guns. And are they really religious? Are they really a theocracy? That's also an open question. Some yes, but many no.
This is a pragmatic situation. That's why Scott Bessent has been very clear about, making the conditions such that they would have no paycheck for several months before the military action began, so they'd already be destabilized and vulnerable to negotiations which I think many of them were.
So I also think the world can see that we are quickly moving into a world where we need to be off oil and gas anyway, and we're coming up with new methodologies all the time, even in fertilizers, right? Everybody was like, "Oh my gosh, now no one will be able to plant. There won't be enough fertilizer." And then suddenly you see we're developing all these new forms of things like green ammonia that don't even use any petroleum byproduct.
So it's accelerating the technological shifts away from oil and gas. Now, of course there's a lag, so I'm not saying this happens tomorrow, but it's the same thing. Like a parallel issue is the semiconductor production in Taiwan, and there's this debate right now where, Chemath came out a few days ago and said, "Yeah, the...
It's we've only gotta rely on Taiwan for another 18 months, maybe two years, and after that the production's moved to the US and T- Texas and Arizona, and they'll just take over." And then there was an outcry. People said, "No, we don't have the expertise. We don't have the capability. It's gonna take 10 years."
Okay, but all you've got is a bid offer spread then. The reality is that the core focus at the cutting edge of technology is going to happen in the US. It's not going to be happening in Taiwan the way it did. The US has already moved most of those engineers to the US anyway. These are the things we have to understand.
In an AI-led world, the speed at which you can shift from one kind of technology to another is absolutely blinding. And I think actually this is a wake-up call to everybody in the oil and gas industry who've been like, "Ah, yeah, nuclear, that's years and decades away. Nuclear fusion will never happen."
And you're like with artificial intelligence where you can do literally millions of test scenarios in seconds, it is happening, and it is gonna happen a lot faster than they realize, and you are gonna see the building of nuclear power plants at a speed and scale that doesn't match our mental model of 30 billion in 30 years.
So I think that's why the markets are like, " Yeah, we're in a transition, but not the end of the world."
Erik: Let's go a little deeper on a topic that I know you're passionate about, which is a lot of people right now are up in arms, and there's literally people protesting in the streets, particularly in universities, saying, "AI is gonna take all of our jobs.
It's gonna destroy the economy. We're going to have mass unemployment because AI is just the worst thing that's ever happened." I personally think that they're wrong, but give me your take. Why-- How should we think about both AI and robotics? Are these the greatest productivity enhancers ever, or are these the greatest threats to employment ever?
Pippa: First, all technologies cut both ways, right? The car can safely transport you and your family from A to B, and it can kill everybody in your family as well, mow you down. So all technologies, it depends how you use them, and we need to be careful about that. But you have to understand the key thing about AI and robotics is we live in a world where the debt burden for all the major players, for the United States, for Europe, for Britain, for China, is so massive that a regular human being who needs to sleep at night can't outrun this thing.
So again, the superpowers are looking at this going, "The only way that we can get ahead of this terrible hole that's been created is to go to a whole new level of production." And this is not the same as productivity, because we're not talking about productivity. We're talking about how do we get to a world where energy doesn't cost anything, where literally the star in a box with TRISO fuel is permanently powering 5,000 homes and nobody is having to really pay more than pennies for that.
That world is now within reach because of AI and robotics. People have a hard time with that. They're like, "Wait, what?" And I keep pointing out, look, every single person, that's probably listening to this podcast, they all have a washer and a dryer. Those are robots. But they're not sitting around saying, "Oh gosh, I really miss the old days when I had to hand wash all the clothes."
No. You... They're doing it for you, and nobody misses this task So in a sense, we're confusing jobs and tasks with income and standard of living. And the disconnect is happening, and it's hard for the, especially the older generation, to imagine a world where you don't have to work very hard to get a high standard of living because the cost of supplying it is collapsing.
I'll give you a practical example. Here in Austin as well, there's this amazing company called Icon, which is doing 3D-printed homes, and in fact, 3D-printed neighborhoods. And I've driven through the neighborhood where you can buy a three-bedroom, absolutely stunningly beautiful house that's got perfect wiring and has a Tesla Powerwall, so you're already not really paying for your electricity and have the capacity to start selling your electricity back to the grid, which means your 3D-printed home is paying the mortgage on your behalf.
Now, not 100% today, but that will come. And I would add in, we're making big advances in some other new forms of energy like wireless transmission of energy space-based solar power. Japan has just made a big breakthrough there. This is gonna happen. So now you're not even dependent on the power grid anymore because we can move energy without it.
So imagine a life where that 3D-printed home is only gonna cost 100 grand, because that's where we're heading, right? It costs the same or actually a little bit less now than a three-bedroom house that already exists in Austin. But once they get the hang of doing this, then the price is gonna collapse.
So suddenly then you can have a really nice house, not have to pay very much for the energy, if anything. Actually, maybe earn enough that it pays your mortgage or part of it. How hard do you have to work? The answer is not so hard. In other words, AI and robotics are about freeing us up from these basic tasks like laundry washing, do it on our behalf at a scale that's not achievable by a human And suddenly we can devote our time and attention to much more serious and interesting problems.
But this creates some social, dislocation, to say the least, because we're so accustomed to having our identity tied to our job. The idea that now you won't even be working for one company with one income stream, but you'll have a portfolio of activities, and you don't even need to earn that much to have a high standard of living, this means you have to start defining who you are without reference to a job title.
And I think that is not well articulated or even understood, but that is the bigger problem than even the, "I won't have a job," right? It's, "I won't have a job," means I won't have an income. But people are already figuring out how to get AI to generate income without us even having to do very much. So of course, not everybody's gonna figure it out, so I'm not saying everyone progresses at the same speed.
But when you watch especially young people starting to get the hang of it, they're creating crazy businesses. I'll just give you one that just personally tickles my funny bone. I just think it's so interesting. Some kid somewhere figured out that he could record the sound of the rain and then upload it as a track onto Sono, set up AI agents to go market this thing as a, like a, what do they call it?
AMSR, or ASMR, and suddenly he's making 10 grand a month. And you're like, We have to open our imaginations to what this stuff can do, which is very hard to do if you're all locked into, "I am terrified that I am going to lose my job." And by the way, why is your job all tasks? And if it is all tasks, let the robotics and automation and AI do it, and figure out what's the more important problem that needs to be solved, 'cause that's where a human excels.
A human is the most brilliant problem solver ever to walk on the face of Earth. So it's about restoring our confidence and our capacity to be, epic problem solvers as opposed to cogs in a machine that are just conducting narrow tasks for a paycheck.
Erik: Pippa, last topic I wanna touch on, I, at risk of being what might sound a little bit conspiratorial, something's going on, and I'm not sure what.
But, you've talked quite a bit in past interviews about there being lots of different ways that warfare has evolved, and things don't really happen in terms of, soldiers in trenches shooting at each other anymore. The hybrid warfare is much more sophisticated. There's a couple of stories that don't get a lot of attention.
One is oil infrastructure all over the world, refineries and so forth. Some of them have been attacked as part of military conflicts, but there's a lot of other ones that just have had these mysterious accidents, like too many to explain by chance probability. And then there's all these scientists that keep disappearing.
It feels like, we're back to 1960s spy movies where somebody's taken out- ... the oil infrastructure, and the smartest people who know how to fix things are suddenly disappearing. I know that sounds conspiratorial, but is there something real to this?
Pippa: I have written a bit on these in my Substack column lately.
So I think, look, there are a few things. On the infrastructure when you have old infrastructure that's very hard to just walk away from because the capital investment has been so enormous, and the cost of decommissioning is so high. It's a very human tendency that things just burn down. Oh my goodness, and then you have insurance, and then you start again, right?
This has been happening throughout the course of human history, so that's not new. But maybe it's accelerating in a world where people can see that all these new technologies are arriving so rapidly that old infrastructure is redundant much faster than it used to be. So I'd put a little bit down to, oh my goodness, the darn thing burned down.
Gosh. There's that. I think we do-- you, you know that I've been arguing since, gosh 2021, I started to say I think we are now in World War III, and at that time it really sounded completely out there. People are like, "What are you talking about?" But now I think we can see in retrospect that it was beginning, right?
We started to see when, the Russians started to cut the sub cables in the Arctic which I've talked about a lot, in order to try to disrupt the global flow of information. That was a kind of precursor to the tanks rolling into Ukraine. That event now in retrospect, is clearly part of what was a global conflict, but it wasn't recognized as that at the time.
So today it's funny, we live in a world, people are like, "Oh my God, we're in World War III." And I'm like, "Actually, we've been in it, and I think now it's beginning to be resolved, like we're coming to the end of this episode." But others have only just recognized it. Anyway, if either way, it's not crazy to assume that your opposition isn't just going to try to deal with you on neutral ground or expected places.
Are there Russian or Chinese or Iranian operatives in the US that might have an interest in disrupting US critical infrastructure? I think Homeland Security under every single president would say yes. So are they successful sometimes? Probably yes. Does anyone want to explain it as that's what it was?
No, because then everyone would be totally scared, because the idea that there's a conflict here in the US is too terrifying. So instead you just have these accidents But I'm sure that people in that world of strategic security think a certain percentage of them might be from, opponents of the United States.
So the good news is that it seems pretty contained, right? We so far haven't had something that is on a scale that the public has really registered. So I think that's something. So I think there are many reasons why we might be seeing this happen. But again, what's so extraordinary is all these events occurring and the markets are still pretty solid.
So obviously the markets aren't too worried about the loss of the physical infrastructure, even in a war zone like what we see around the strait, let alone adding onto it critical infrastructure of oil and gas in the US. It's actually encouraging that you could remove that much capacity and everybody goes, "Okay, we'll just move on from here," right?
So that's one thing. The scientists are a related matter in my view. And th- this is a more-- to me, more interesting, more important subject because we have maybe now something between 12 and 15 of the most senior American Nuclear scientists or people who were working on materials related to nuclear, capability have literally just disappeared or suddenly been killed in very odd ways, in statistically unlikely ways.
And maybe the tell has been that for a long time there was no investigation. And you're like, "Wait, how can our most senior people, people who are running things like the Air Force Research Lab, just suddenly be gone and nobody asks any questions? So what's going on?" And I think the answer is nobody knows.
We have started to realize this is not only happening in the United States, it's also happening in China. A lot of their senior scientists have suddenly disappeared, or especially younger ones, died under strange circumstances. So again, I look at this and I'm like look, we're having extraordinary events happen right now.
Not only the Genesis mission, which is where, like I said, all those super classified technologies around nuclear are suddenly going to be revealed, made available to the public in what the president will no doubt view as a kind of Robin Hood move, right? Take it out of the control of the traditional military industrial complex and put it into the control of the public who paid for it.
But are there gonna be people who don't want that to happen? Sure. It's nice having a monopoly on certain technologies. So is there a pushback going on? Is this about removing the people who know how to do these things? Is that? I don't know. I'm a little bit hopeful that it might be the opposite, that maybe there's a gathering of the best scientists on the planet on this subject in anticipation of announcements from both the US and China that we've had massively important breakthroughs.
So is this then tied as well to, or is it pure coincidence that you have a president who suddenly announced and is in fact executing the declassification of all the documents and evidence related to the famous UAP, UFO, call it what you will, anomalous phenomena subject. And I think they are intertwined.
It's difficult to disentangle them. And the public is beginning to see, and, let's face it a billion people have now looked at the declassified website that the White House put together. And I thought personally it was a very important signal when the White House set up two websites alien.gov and aliens.gov, and everybody laughed and said, "Okay, the president's losing his marbles," and da.
And I'm like, oh, this is maybe very clever because I bet a bunch of these scientists who've been working on these super hyper-classified subjects probably have developed patents around their knowledge, maybe not on the exact thing they're working on, but on tangential aspects, 'cause this is what scientists do, right?
But under US law, if the origin of a technology is not human, then the patents are not valid. So is this an effort by the president to say, "You guys who've had access to all this technology and didn't share it with the public, I'm gonna not only take it off you, but I'm not gonna allow you to say that you still own it through some patent claim.
And instead, you're gonna find out that because there's a possibility that it has a non-human origin, that patents are nullified." Could that be part of the story? I'm not saying that's definitively the case. I think it's an interesting thing to think about. And so now as this stuff is being declassified, We have to ask, why would anybody be upset about all this?
And notice the speech that the president gave a couple of months ago to the defense community, where he basically said, "You guys have been optimizing for share buybacks and for profits, and this is gonna end. You're now gonna optimize for the creation of defense equipment that actually works at a reasonable price.
And so the old game is over." Which, by the way, is the same position he has with the pharma companies, where he said you guys were charging Americans three times as much for drugs as you charged anybody else in the world. This is over, and that's just the way it is." And they have said that's what we're gonna do."
So it's a kind of a general strategy to reduce costs on the American budget and the American taxpayer. So even if it's not true, let's say there are-- there is no non-human intelligence, this whole thing is a ruse, it's still an interesting strategy for reorienting the balance of power over technology.
It's still an interesting strategy for bringing technologies that have been You know, outside of public use into public use. Now, whether or not you believe, there's intelligence beyond humans is a different matter, but I think this is also an extremely important, interesting question to ask at a time when AI is accelerating, and we all can feel it as we're talking to the AI.
It sure feels like an intelligent, maybe more intelligent something is on the other side. And I'm-- as I'm talking to you, I'm looking out a window at a bunch of trees, and I'm thinking we're so arrogant as humans when we say, "Is there intelligence, non-human intelligence?" And you're like, trees move in the direction of the sunshine.
That is an intelligence, right? We know that trees migrate their roots together, and they share information through that root network. That's intelligence. So this idea that, we're alone and there's nothing else this intelligent, that is actually not right. And can I just-- I know it's taking a little time, but can I just tell you one quick story about whales?
'Cause this is just my favorite one. AI has recently cracked one of the whale languages. They discovered that these whales have specific and shared nicknames for the marine biologists who study them. So of course, the marine biologists are all like, "Oh my God, what's its nickname for me?"
And I'm like guys, did anybody ask the whales what do they think? What is their opinion? What knowledge do they ha-" "No, we just wanna know what is it calling me," 'cause we're so darn egotistical. So are we at a moment with this declassification process that was forcing humanity to recognize that we are not the only intelligence in this universe?
There's plenty of it right outside our window if we just look at it and reframe it in a different way And what possibilities does that open to our understanding of the world? So I'm-- I think it's a very exciting time in technology, and this is the reason I'm not down on the, "Oh my God, we're all gonna have a recession."
I think that we're coming into something that is bigger than the Industrial Revolution, for all of humanity. So I wanna I be clear. I may be the most optimistic economist on the planet at the moment but somebody has to walk through the upside because everybody else has covered the downside.
Erik: Pippa, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. We do have to call it there in the interest of time. But for our listeners who want even more we do have more coming up in the sense that Pippa and I and Jim Bianco will be doing a video discussion for Zero Hedge about Kevin Warsh on the Fed and what that's going to bring, monetary policy, a whole bunch of things.
That's... We don't have, unfortunately, as of our publication, or at least as of we're recording this interview, we don't actually have a date for that from Zero Hedge, but it should be next week sometime. So follow Zero Hedge Debates on X if you wanna find out about that one. We'll try to get it into this week's Research Roundup email, but I'm not sure that we'll get a date from Zero Hedge before we go to air on Thursday.
Meanwhile, we do have, by pure coincidence, Jim Bianco coming up for a cameo appearance coming up next to talk about an update on the Iran conflict. Pippa, before I let you go, I wanna come back to your Pippa's Pen and Podcast, which is your fantastic Substack. I'm addicted. For people who don't know about it we've got a link t- on the Research Roundup email where you can click to connect to it.
Tell people what they can expect to find there and how they can sign up.
Pippa: Yeah. So this is where I like to write about all these things that are going on in the world economy and to help people widen the aperture of the view through which they see the world.
The lens gets made smaller every day by all the algorithms that only give you more of what you like, and they fence off what you don't like. So I'm trying to widen the view, and that's what I write about on... in the column.
Erik: Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com.
Erik: Joining me now is Boxwood CEO Morgan Downey, who's probably much better known as the author of Oil 101. For any listeners who are not familiar with that book I guess for most professional investors even, maybe if you're not in the oil market, you haven't heard of it. But if you are in the oil market, there's nobody who's anybody who didn't start their career reading Oil 101 by Morgan Downey, which is a book that really goes from upstream to downstream and tells the whole story of how the energy market works, from the logistics and the tankers all the way to futures trading.
It's an amazing book. There is a new version. We'll talk about that at the end of the interview. But Morgan, I wanna start with the big picture. Boy, Middle East I keep telling my listeners I think it's a really big deal, maybe more than the equity market is discounting. You're the expert.
You're literally the man who wrote the book on the market. Is this just another hiccup, a- another little Middle East skirmish, or is this a significant event in the history of the oil market?
Morgan: This is the significant event. The next 50, 100 years whenever the next history of oil over the next 200 years probably is written.
We are living in an event that people have modeled, traders have modeled it, risk managers have modeled it, the oil market itself has modeled it for the last 60 years, and this is it. This is the most significant event in the oil market. And over the last, s- since, probably World War II, to be honest.
Even it's greater than the 1970s crises. It's a larger, it's a larger event. And what's interesting is that a lot of things that people had presumed were going to happen when a situation like this occurs, this, the shutting of the Strait of Hormuz, have not happened. We haven't seen $500 oil yet, yet, because we're still in the middle of the crisis.
We're at 100, just over $100. And we also haven't seen a panic and a kind of, with equity markets are still relatively strong. So this is a crisis that everyone had worried about that potentially would happen. It's happened and is happening. But now A lot of the assumptions of how the world would react have not come to pass.
As I said, equities seem to be sailing along okay. Oil prices are a little bit higher, but not at crisis levels higher. It seems that the world's kind of taking this in stride, which is very unusual. The world taking this in stride is not what people would've predicted.
Erik: So why is that? Because as you say, this is, Strait of Hormuz closure has literally been the stuff of doomsday blogs. Yeah. It's what the doomers say, "Oh my God, Strait of Hormuz closed for a few weeks, you'd see thousand dollar oil," yes. Yeah it's been way longer than anybody...
And I used to get laughed out of the room for worrying about this because people thought it was a doomsday scenario that's never gonna happen. And even the people who were the biggest skeptics, Morgan, what they said is, "That can't happen because the consequences would be so dire that we couldn't, possibly let it go on for more than a few weeks."
Well- Yeah ... but it did. Nothing really that big of a deal has happened yet.
Morgan: Yeah. And I think a few key things have mitigated, at least in the short term, and we're s- we're over two months into this situation, but a few things have happened. One was the huge strategic petroleum reserves releases around the world.
So you had the US SPR release a whole bunch of other countries within the IEA, the International Energy Organization released SPRs. China has a big SPR, their own domestic SPR. So there was a large short-term dumping of oil, physical oil into the oil market. And oil is a very unusual commodity.
It's not unusual. It's like any commodity in that the oil industry hates to carry inventories. Carrying inventories, storing oil in tanks or in pipelines or ships or whatever, it costs money. What the oil industry loves to get it out of the ground and get it to the customer as quickly as possible.
It's never really that profitable to store oil. So the oil industry tends to try and run inventories, stored oil as lean as possible. That's always been the case for since the oil industry began 150 years ago. And that lot of oil from these strategic petroleum reserves that's a lot of oil for all of it to be released in one month into the market.
It's like someone a snake eating an antelope. It's kinda stalled- the rally in oil markets because the oil market kinda has to digest that big glut of oil from the SPR releases that were released in one glut. So that was the first thing that stalled the rally.
It stopped it immediately. It was like throwing water on a fire. It just quenched it. The challenge is that there's only so much SPR out there. There's not... this is not an indefinite situation where you can keep dumping SPR into the market, but it did stall that initial rally.
And then in addition to that, you had some demand reduction. You're-- when you went from, we were, before the crisis, in the 60s basis WTI or even Brent crude, and now we got up to 100. Some demand did fall off. It wasn't a huge amount, but a little Usually it's jet fuel is the first thing that reacts when oil spikes.
So jet fuel demand fell off a little bit enough that it took the edge off the rally. So you had the SPR release, you had a little bit of demand destruction. Demand destruction in oil, as I said, jet fuel's one of the first to go because it's it's discretionary. People just choose n- to drive to their vacation or take a train rather than fly to the other side of the world.
So jet fuel, there was a little bit of demand destruction, and then you had, so you had the SPRs, you had a little bit of demand destruction And then you had a what I think is the kind of the hidden thing that has occurred in the oil market over the past five years in particular, is that over the past five years, we had a huge increase in efficiency in inventory use across the oil industry, and it's one of the most boring things to talk about.
If you look at BP or Shell or Exxon's financials, deep in there, they'll talk about working capital usage and that they've gotten 20, 30% more efficient in terms of their working capital usage, which is basically a lot of its inventory, storage oil. They've reduced their need to store oil by 20, 30% over the last five years.
A lot of that is due to they've now got sensors, electronic sensors on pipelines and tanks, so they get real-time data on inventory levels. It used to be 10 years ago, 20 years ago, a guy sticking a stick into a big tank. It was literally that basic, even as recent as 10, 20 years ago. That's all gone now.
It's all electronic. You've got much better demand forecasting models so people can... the oil industry is a lot of really lo- small local markets. It's a big global market, but at the end of the day, there's usually this airport, this tank terminal, this gas station. It's a very local market. And so the oil industry has become much better at forecasting local, hyper local level demand.
It's almost like Amazon does delivery. The oil industry has applied that same big data technology to inventories such that the world has rounding the numbers here, 8 billion barrels of oil in storage globally in SPRs and commercial storage. 10 years ago had 8 billion.
Today, it has also 8 billion, but the world has loosened up the need for that 8 billion by about 1 billion barrels. So there's a hidden kind of extra availability of oil in the market in these inventories that has been loosened up by just technology improvements over the past five years. And if the evidence for this is you have to just look, just search for working capital of BP.
They announced their last year they had, as I said, reduced their inventory levels by 25, 30%. And so that I think has been a hidden reason for oil kind of being a little bit looser in terms of this not rallying to $200, $500. And then finally, another reason is there was a lot of oil in floating tankers.
Everyone points to it. There was 150, 180 million barrels of Iranian oil because Iran, remember before this, the crisis, it was sanctioned and via mostly US sanctions. But that meant that Chinese refineries and a lot of refineries around the world, they would buy the occasional cargo, but they were very reluctant to deal with Iranian oil.
So Iran had to store all this They kept producing oil and they just put it in in tankers offshore Malaysia and offshore Singapore, near Singapore, and a lot of that oil now is being drawn down. So there was a, there was a little bit of excess... not a little bit, a lot of excess supply in the market.
And so all of that together combined, the big SPR, that was like a first shot that, that really took the energy out of the rally. And the world has got probably another one or two slugs of SPR releases that could hit the market if governments decide it over the next month or so. But and then you had the inventory efficiencies, you had the floating storage that Iran and a few other countries had.
And so you had all of these kinda combined to take the edge off the rally and the oil price rally, but the underlying crisis is still there. And, one of the, one of the things when people talk about a crisis, everyone thinks about we're gonna run out of oil, like as in tanks will go to tank, empty tanks.
That doesn't happen. The world is a f- big... The oil world is a f- a big floating, people make the analogy of it's a big floating bathtub in that no one's gonna run out of oil. The world is still producing w- we, before the crisis, 105 million barrels a day. Now it's 95 million barrels per day, roughly.
And so the, but the world is still producing 95 million barrels per day. It's still a lot of oil being produced and refined. It- all that's gonna happen is that oil prices now we're in a situation where we kinda have to go up, unless the crisis ends today, and even if it ends today, we, this may happen.
Oil prices have to go up to kill more demand destruction. And demand destruction, the oil industry started in 1859, demand has only fallen four years in all that time. So over a hu- almost 160 years, oil has only fallen, demand year on year, even throughout wars, World War I, World War II, it only fell in 1973, 1978 2009, the housing crisis, and COVID.
Four times over the last 160 years. And Prices are gonna have to rally to cause that fifth year of demand destruction in the oil industry. Oil is very inelastic. People need it to drive to and from work, to and from school. It's one of those things, it's an essential of modern life, and it doesn't matter how, "Green People" say they are you buy anything, literally a pint of milk in a, or gallon of milk in a shop that everything is transported via oil.
So it's in everything that people touch. And so- Price has to go a lot higher to kill demand. As I said, d- jet fuel is the first thing to, to the first cookie to crumble in the oil demand sequence. The next one tends to be gasoline for cars and then diesel for trucking and so on.
But it's basically, it's starting to happen, but it needs to happen much more severely. And, so we're not gonna hit a situation where tanks are empty, but we're gonna have to hit a situation where if this goes on, we are going to go to 200-plus oil if this goes on. We're currently the middle of May or towards the end of May here, 2026, and we're two months on-- more than two months into the crisis.
If this goes, this can't go on for another month when we can have a few slugs of SPR releases, but this is not sustainable without, with $100 oil. We need oil prices... Either two things have to happen: oil prices have to go much higher, 200-plus probably, to kill demand, or the crisis ends today, and then even if the crisis ends today, there's gonna be a wind-up time of people ha- all this production in the Middle East has been shut in.
It has to be restarted. Tankers have to start going in and out through the Strait of Hormuz. So there's gonna be a recovery time and and longer term, five years plus I think the Strait of Hormuz is going to be removed as a choke point for the world oil market in, within five years.
Every Gulf producer, Saudi, UAE, all of them Iraq, they're all going to start building these pipelines, overland pipelines to avoid the Strait of Hormuz regardless of cost, and the Strait of Hormuz is not going to be an issue in five years plus. So this is a five-year issue. Iran played their card. They choked the Strait of Hormuz like everyone worried about for years.
They've played that card. Now, all these pipelines are gonna be built. It's gonna cost $50, $75 billion. And put this in context can this... Is that a lot of money? Saudi Arabia on that NEOM project, that kind of desert city that they were gonna build, was gonna be $1 trillion. So 50 to 75 billion, yes, it's a lot of money.
In the Saudi oil industry, no, it's not a lot of money. It'll add $1 or $2 a barrel onto the cost, and for the Saudis and others to avoid using the Strait of Hormuz within five years, they're gonna build these pipelines. So the Strait of Hormuz has got five years left as a choke point. Beyond that, it's gonna be replaced by pipelines.
It is... There-- These pipelines are already... Drawing boards are, have already been drafted to get these things built. So it's a certainty that that strait is, within five years, will no longer be a choke point.
Erik: Okay, so recapping what we've discussed so far, it is m- fairly easy to understand how we got to where we are today, which is we came into this crisis with a fairly significant supply surplus.
Then as we got into the crisis, there was a whole bunch of SPR releases. There's a whole bunch of floating storage. For a while, Iran was exporting a lot of its own oil. China has a huge inventory o- of SPR and commercial storage. It all makes sense, but the question that's in my mind now is that explains how we got six weeks farther into this than I thought possible at these prices.
How short is that fuse from here? Is this something where, oh we could still go on for three more months and then it's gonna really start to get bad? Or are we down to just a matter of weeks or less before this really turns into a major big deal?
Morgan: We're down to weeks. Yeah, it's really become that simple.
Erik: And is it linear? Is it... Should we expect prices to gradually start creeping higher and higher? Or is this something where one day an event happens where somebody says, "Oh my gosh, we're completely out at location X," and that's a Bloomberg headline, and people panic and, it all happens at once?
Morgan: I think when people say they're gonna be out, I think that the only places that will be out of storage will be those places that set the local price below the international price. So oil will be still available. As I said, there's still 95 million barrels per day produced outside of, that's available to the global market.
There was 105 before this crisis, and so 10 million barrels a day of inventory, or sorry, of daily production has to be killed. That demand has to be... And the only way to kill demand is higher prices. So we're gonna see $100. It still doesn't... it reduces demand a little bit, but it doesn't reduce demand enough.
We're going to have to see a lot higher prices before to c- to reduce demand by 10 million barrels per day. And w- what I think is gonna happen is that you're going to have a situation where there will be some sort of negotia- not negotiation, some sort of either stalemate where we get a a kind of a ceasefire-type situation, and the strait kind of opens, but it opens, I think, slower than people anticipate because you're going to have tankers willing to transit that strait, and that's a lot of tankers every day.
It's 100-plus tankers that go through that the Strait of Hormuz. And so you've got to have a situation where- the process has to be restarted, and that restart process y- your listeners are of course very familiar with the fact that these tankers from the Middle East to China, Middle East to Japan, they take a month to, to make that journey.
So this process is like a flywheel. Once it stops, you... it takes a month or so to get back up and running, probably even longer, maybe two months. And even then, even if the tankers start moving a lot of this production is shut in, and so that production, when it's shut in, literally people have turned valves at the wellhead to stop oil coming out of these wells.
And those valves have to be turned back on. The whole process, oil is a flow type process. Everything is always in movement. These liquids are always in movement. These things have to be restarted as well. And the hope is that not much damage has been done to these, this production, these wells by shutting in production, but there's always some damage and always some unknown when that restarts.
And so that whole process, like a flywheel, is gonna take one or two months to get back up and running. So even if today, m- end of May 2026, the process starts up and running, we're into June, Jul- end of July before we've got a full even close to recovery. So This is gonna take a bit.
It's gonna take a while, and I think that what's gonna happen is that people will realize it within... people are familiar with equity markets and foreign exchange markets where you can literally print paper or print equities, issue stocks, and it's immediate. Just it's an electronic transaction.
Oil is not like that. It takes... there's a a, if it's a physical process, it takes a while to get started and stop. And I think that the markets have become have think that this is like a COVID-type situation where the government will print money to get the whole process started again.
It, that doesn't help. It l- it helps certain markets, but it won't help in oil because this is engineers have to get literally on the ground, start up production. In Qatar, there's a lot of natural gas there, LNG, liquified natural gas that facilities have been damaged and might take three or four years to repair if they can even get the repairs done in that time because parts are, they, these turbines are very are being demanded by a lot of industries, including data centers.
But I think that the market has been, less panicked. No one likes to panic in any situation. The panic is never helpful. But I think this is, we're in a crisis where this market is unusually calm. And as I said, there's, and you mentioned, there's a bunch of reasons why we've haven't rallied fast, the SPR dump, the inventory overhang, all of these things have happened, but I think that they've lulled the market into this feeling of safety that is not r- reality.
We're still in this crisis, and it's a it's like someone had a heart attack, and they've made it to the hospital, the emergency room. They're still in the middle of a heart attack. It's one of those w- where we s- even to get the heart started and the blood flowing again, we still need to get that the, it, that there's still a risk in this whole situation. And I would be shocked if we're not over $150 within a month. It, I think this is gonna take a lot longer, even if it, as I said, even if peace is declared today, it's gonna take a lot longer to restart than people think for confidence to restore in the oil market itself and for all those valves to be turned back on, and for...
and it's n- when I say turn the valves back on, it, they're not, I'm simplifying it grossly by saying that. You've gotta have a whole situation where a lot of these Saudi wells, these reservoirs are water-flooded, where there's water pumped on underneath the oil to help keep the pressures in the reservoirs c- up so the oil comes out of the ground.
And these, it's a, there's a, an engineering, very complex engineering process. It's not just turning a valve behind the scenes to produce all of this oil, and that process has never really been shut in to this extent ever. And there's a lot of gonna be, a lot of unknowns that are gonna be f- discovered over the next two, three months, four months that could really complicate the restart.
So we're still in the middle of the crisis. That's, one thing to, to think about in terms of it... We should we need to c- create demand destruction to deal with the current crisis. But then going forward, the restart process, I have this feeling it could take a lot longer than people anticipate.
And so I... my personal view is I think we stay at $100 plus. People think we're gonna collapse immediately following the strait reopening in two or three months' time. I think we stay at $100 plus for a year unless there's... barring an economic, global economic recession or anything like that.
I think that th- this risk premium for... that's gonna, is gonna stay there because even if there's a p- peace declared today, there's gonna be the risk that Iran falls back and the crisis restarts in another six months' time or four months' time. So I think that the current crisis, we need higher prices immediately to kill oil demand.
secondly, the r- the restart process, I think it's gonna take a lot longer, six months to one year, maybe even longer. In some cases like the LNG in Qatar, it's gonna take four or five years because engineering facilities were damaged by drones. I think it's gonna take a l- a lot longer than people think.
And so I think that we may see $100 plus oil, barring a recession or anything like that, $100 plus oil for a year or two, and which is... that creates opportunities for other parts of the oil industry. The US oil industry, Permian producers are having a great time right at this moment.
Erik: Let's talk a little bit farther out then about how... beyond just the immediate recovery, how the global energy markets evolve afterwards, because it seems to me we've already seen some pretty strong signals. United Arab Emirates was probably half of global spare capacity before this crisis.
Pulling out of OPEC seems to me like a really clear signal that their intention is gonna be to pedal as fast as they can and just produce as much oil as they possibly can as soon as this is over. First of all, would you agree with that? And if it is, doesn't that kinda leave us in a place where, okay, then Saudi Arabia would be the only remaining spare capacity?
They're not gonna just, sit this one out and let everybody else make the profit. They're probably gonna produce as fast as they can too. So doesn't that mean that although maybe that will help bring the prices down and the supply back online, doesn't it mean that we end up with no spare capacity at the end of the day?
And then, okay we'll just make more. Wait a minute. There's been underinvestment in the energy sector due to ESG for more than a decade now. It seems to me like Maybe for the next, decade or so, we've got an investment deficit-driven energy crunch. Is
Morgan: that realistic?
I think it is realistic. I think you've got... The, going back to the UAE, them leaving OPEC UAE was always-- Everyone in OPEC except for-- OPEC is Saudi Arabia. It always has been Saudi Arabia. They've been the big boy on the block in terms of cutting production to maintain prices high, at a higher level than otherwise would be.
So Saudi has always been the real OPEC. All of these other countries, O- UAE and everyone else, they've been cover to make it seem like there's a global consensus. It's one of these, it sells much better when there's a group involved. Even, it's a cartel.
That's what... They're a price-setting cartel to try and keep prices high. So it's it doesn't sell well to the consumer that they're trying to keep prices high. That's why OPEC exists. So Saudi has been hiding behind all these other countries, including UAE. UAE itself, they've been they've had, their, their politically, they're, they've had issues with Saudi Arabia over the last t- for a long time.
They're a much more Western-focused entity, with Dubai, the success of Dubai in tourism and all of that. So they've been much more they're probably 10, 20 years ahead of Saudi in terms of diversify- trying to diversify their economy away from oil. And so I think that them leaving OPEC, it, it was it was always something I think that the oil market suspected that they would do. But now that they have done it yeah, they're gonna produce us flat out just like anyone else. They're gonna do they have no OPEC constraint. So it's gonna be, Saudi is gonna be the only player left with major spare capacity in OPEC.
So the dynamics of OPEC in terms of oil prices and that, I think that at a grand level, I don't think it's gonna change the long-term outlook for oil in terms of Saudi was always the big br- big brother in OPEC. It's gonna continue to be the big brother.
Yes, UAE left, but I don't think it's as big a deal as the market kinda as it's not gonna be a big deal long term. Going to the the thing you mentioned about longer term and ESG and investment in oil and gas pre- Three months ago, we were at $60, give or take, WTI. The marginal producer in the world was the US Permian producers, all these fracking wells in West Texas.
They were the marginal production that grew over the last 10 years. I- when I wrote Oil 101, that was published in 2009. Since 2009, what's called conventional oil production, as in you drill a hole straight down... i'm simplifying grossly here, but you drill a hole straight down and you, you hit a reservoir and the oil comes up by itself.
That production has stagnated. It's gone sideways over the last 15, 20 years. All of the growth in oil supply over the last 15 years has been from fracking, which is a US phenomenon because it's more kind of a manufacturing type process. You drill, you move the well on a pad the drilling rig 50 meters, you drill again, you frack, you drill sideways.
All of these kind of technologies have only been developed in the last 15, 20 years. So since 2009 oil production has come from this fracking and horizontal drilling as well as heavy oil out of s- out of Canada. Those have been the two major supply areas over the past 15 years. Both of those things are high cost.
They're very capital intensive. They're People make the analogy that they're akin to manufacturing because as I said, you used to drill a well, and it would be the only you would drill on a, in, within 40 acres. Now, you drill a well, you move 100 meters, you drill another well, or 50 meters, you drill another well.
So it's it's become much more capital intensive, but that, what that means is that the the marginal cost of production over time ha- is now 60, $70 per barrel for crude oil. So as long as we stay above $70, give or take WTI crude oil the oil industry can fund itself. Can, at $100, the oil industry is actually a little bit, it's decently profitable.
At 70, some w- marginal producers start shutting in production. In terms of the ESG and the investment against energy growth, w- a lot of that that ESG initiatives, those initiatives were to stall oil production, stall nat gas production. Those ESG kind of initiatives have fallen out of favor and the oil industry has just moved on beyond them.
It's at $100 oil as we are today, give or take, and the oil industry doesn't really... w- the oil industry is still very conscientious about pollution and making sure the environment is taken care of. It's not a, it's not a careless industry. But those kind of ESG where people were trying to reduce energy production, those kind of initiatives I think have stalled.
There's still a remnant of the, philosophical objections out there. You've got now a big push, you may have seen in social media all these people complaining about AI data centers, and everyone's couching it in, "Oh, they're too noisy.
Oh, they consume water." They don't consume water. They actually have closed systems, or they don't they don't... They recycle their usage. People say they're burning nat gas and other fuels. Yes, they do. Yeah, they do. That's a reality. The world's economy does need energy, and AI data cen- data centers are, 4% or 5%, or will be in the next year or two of global oil consumption or global nat gas and power consumption.
But that kind of ESG anti-energy underpinning is still there. It k- morphs into different forms. It's currently morphing into an anti-data center initiative. I think that what happens is that, people forget because people are disconnected from where their energy comes from.
Oil, nat gas and coal are still 80% of the world's energy usage. And for good or bad, for good, here we are talking on the internet on other sides of the world and listeners are listening in from all over the world. The energy from oil, nat gas, and coal enables this situation where we are living in a safe, much safer more knowledge is available type environment.
If you cut energy supply, cut nat gas, cut oil, cut coal you're trying to stall a lot of the global economy. And people can be disconnected from where basic things come from, even their food. A lot of food we've discovered from the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, fertilizer also comes from nat gas.
It is the famous nitrogen creation process, and it relies on cheap natural gas. So a lot of fertilizer a lot of plastics, a lot of the energy to move things around the world, food and tractors and everything like that comes from energy, from oil, nat gas and coal. And if you restrict those energy sources.
And if you try and go for just wind and just solar, they're good. Wind and solar, there's nothing wrong with them, and they have their place, but they don't meet all of the flexibility and the use cases. You can't make fertilizer from solar yet. Maybe one day you... someone will discover something.
But one day, the oil and nat gas and coal they are essential to, hydrocarbons are essential to modern life. And, things like nuclear, they're also very useful and should be, I think, myself personally, I think should, they should be expanded as a part of renewables ecosystem. And but I think that the oil industry at $100 oil, I think is going to be okay.
I think at 70 and 60, which it was a few months ago, it was not struggling, but it wasn't it wasn't thriving. So I think at $100 oil, the world in the next few years will get enough oil out of the ground and nat gas to enable and enable growth to continue. And an interesting kind of side note is that Saudi Arabia, they their famously cost of oil production is five, $10 a barrel, and here we are at $100.
Unfortunately for Saudi, it's their only industry pretty much, and so they're... If you factor in all of their government welfare and costs like that, military their cost of production goes up to $95. So Saudi is, at $100 oil, is break even. So I think here we-- That's, it's interesting that we got to $100 oil.
I think this is a spot where consumers can tolerate, producers can make a decent profit and g- and bring additional barrels onto the market. But in a crisis, $100 oil is not enough. We need to get much higher quicker if this continues, if this crisis continues. I think it looks like it, even if it's resolved, this is a crisis that's gonna take a while to restart.
I think we're gonna see $150 plus oil over the next month or two regardless of what happens, even if there's peace in today. I think that we're gonna, we need to slow down demand, oil demand a little bit by 10 million barrels per day, 10% roughly over the next few months or weeks at least.
Erik: I agree with you, but at the same time I'm very concerned because from a macro perspective the world could easily tolerate a spike to $150 oil that lasts for a couple of days.
But if we're talking about months and months of $150 oil, I think that's a, a global recession to depression kind of outlook.
Morgan: So- it is. Oh my gosh. The a- the analogy of that situ- or the comparison of that is the housing crisis 2008. People forget the, in the run-up to the 2008 housing crisis, one of the things that pushed the market, the macroeconomy over the edge, was we were at $150 WTI.
We were at, from 2005 to 2008, the oil market moved Up $100 a barrel, and just right before the crisis in the summer of 2008, we were at 150 plus per barrel oil, and that was the final straw that pushed the market over the edge. And right up to the middle of 2008, everyone knew the housing crisis was highly leveraged, even though people say, "Oh, I, they didn't know it was coming," and whatever.
It was... Everyone knew that the market was very leveraged. But the market still hummed along right up until oil got to 150, and then that was it. That money has to come from somewhere. People, only have so much spending money or disposable income, and if they have to choose between buying a, going on vacation or buying a new computer or a new phone or driving to work, they're gonna...
if it's $150 oil, which is, $5 plus, $6 plus per gallon gasoline it's, they're gonna choose to drive to work because it's an essential. So unfortunate thing about $150 oil will kill the economy. It it, there's no doubt about that. It's even if it's over for a few months, it's gonna really hurt.
Erik: It seems to me the critical question to ask then is if what you've said so far basically leads me to conclude that the prices only have to stay super high for long enough to cause about 15 million barrels per day of demand destruction. Okay, can the global economy tolerate 15 million barrels a day of demand destruction because, okay, we'll just carpool?
Or is that enough of a hit in... it's about 7% or 8% of global energy consumption. Can you just, cut that back and everybody carpools to work and it's okay? Or is that just a shutdown kind of event for the global economy?
Morgan: I think it's gonna be a shutdown type event. I don't think it's gonna shut down, but it's gonna be an event where marginal Businesses that rely on low oil prices, tourism even delivery...
everything is delivered, you buy anything on the internet these days, it comes by oil. People, they forget it's a diesel truck. Maybe the last mile is electric, but the big long-haul trucks that drive on highways, they're all diesel. Trains are diesel, train aircraft are jet fuel.
And that, getting that 10 10 million barrels per day cut in demand destruction, it's going to be very painful because as I said, it's oil is inelastic, it's an essential of daily life. It's one of the last things people cut, and so the only reason they cut consumption is because prices get too high.
And it's gonna be, I think it's gonna, it'll be a little bit painful. It's a terrible thing to say, but it's, it doesn't happen that often in the oil industry. As I said, it's only happened four times in 160 years where oil demand has fallen year on year, and those four times oil prices had to rally a lot.
In going back to 1973, oil prices went up fourfold, 400%, which, in the space of six months. So we went from back then, these are pre-inflation adjusted dollar prices, but we went up 400% within six months. That was the first kind of recent times oil crisis. And that was a, it caused demand destruction.
And the one thing I would always mention to people is that when they think about the 1970s, 'cause they're the kind of the classic oil demand destruction, 1973 and 1978. It was the OPEC and the Iran situations in ni- in the 1970s. And people also have this image, the grainly, grainy low-res images of lines at gas stations.
And the interesting thing to always note is that the only, one of the few places in the world that had lines at gas stations was the US, and the reason it had those lines is that US government in, as a reaction to the oil crisis in the 1970s, the US set the price, the domestic price of oil in the US below the international price.
And so it created a shortage because if you're a, an oil producer in Saudi Arabia, you wouldn't send your oil to the US because the price was capped. And so the lines were all artificial. They were government-created lines in the 1970s. So there's-- there will be no shortage of oil in this crisis. There will be no lines or shortage of oil if you have no price caps.
The flip side of that is that you might have $200 per barrel oil with no lines. And so for a lot of governments will feel like they need to intervene. The problem is oil is a global market. If you put a local price cap, you're just gonna cause lines in your local country. So if Germany puts a price cap or England, UK puts a price cap, there's gonna be lines in that country alone.
Everyone else will be fine. They'll be paying $200 per barrel, but they'll be-- they'll have supply. There's that interesting dynamic of comparing... Because this, in this situation, every oil analyst, including myself, we look at back at history and say, "What happened in the past?"
This time is different. There's a whole bunch of different dynamics are happening right now. But the, the-- a few lessons to be learned from the 1970s was, one big lesson is, if you are a government, do not cap your local price of oil. You are gonna cause a local shortage in your market. That's the one big lesson that I would encourage if you're a government-influencing person, do not set a price cap on your local market.
It's, it backfires big time
Erik: I w- I would counter that with I can't remember if it was Warren Buffett or Charlie Munger who said the the biggest lesson that history teaches us is that people don't learn from history. And I don't think governments have learned their lesson or are going to learn their lesson.
I predict that they... There will be price controls, and they will cause all of the adverse consequences that you're predicting. But that doesn't mean they're not gonna do it.
Morgan: Yeah. There are price controls out there for certain goods. India has famously price controls, and they're already finding shortages of of oil.
Allowing the free market to operate, it feels sometimes it gives people a sense of there's no... You're losing control because the price is being set out there in the market. Sometimes it's al- it's the... not sometimes, it's almost always the best thing to do, is just let the market do its thing.
It... Prices will, yes, they will have to go higher to kill some demand, to sh- create some demand destruction. But y- at least your, if your local population wants to buy oil, it's gonna be available. It's gonna be a little bit higher price, yes. But there's no... Apart from Saudi Arabia, they really are, with their spare capacity, trying to control the price of oil, the marginal price of oil, and all these governments with their dumping of the SPR into the market in a very short period of time, they're trying to keep the price down.
So there is, quote-unquote, "manipulation of markets" going on, but there's no nefarious secret group or country or company trying to do. I think everything's pretty relatively transparent, so it's just a matter of, look at history, look what happened in the 1970s. Don't put a local price cap.
You're just gonna kill your local economy. It's basic common sense. And yeah, unfortunately, as you said, some g- some governments fail at basic common sense in history.
Erik: Let's come at this from another angle, because if I think about the consequences of everything that you're saying, what you're really saying here, Morgan, is It's not a question of prices might rise, prices might not rise. It's a question of prices must rise enough to cause 10 million barrels or about 10% of global energy demand. We have to see demand destruction on the tune of approximately 10% gross of total global energy production or energy demand.
Yep. When's the last time the world went through a 10% reduction in energy demand and- Okay ... or came anywhere close to it? Yeah. And what happened economically then?
Morgan: So here's where, in, on trading floors and hedge funds and and basically s- research firms, they always try and back test when something like this happened before, what happened in the market then.
The challenge with that is that sometimes the situation is very different. So this is a supply side shock. There's a production has stopped oil coming to the market. The consumer still is out there doing okay. The most recent comparison was COVID, unfortunately, was 2020 when demand, because of the shutdowns and lock-ins demand collapsed by a lot, where it was, 20% at one stage over the, month to month in early 2020.
And so that was the last time oil had a a, it's... That was a consumption side shock. W- One of the very few consumption side shocks that happened to the oil market ever. And in that situation, we had the oil market became, discombobulated. I hate to use that word because it's a strange word, but we had WTI priced at negative prices because storage tanks became full.
It was like the opposite of the current situation in that we had demand collapsed because everyone stopped flying, stopped traveling. Every, the world kind of transport kinda shut down for a month or more than a few months. And oil inventories filled because the oil is like a flow. It's like a human body.
It's as I said, the oil industry doesn't like to store oil. It likes to keep everything flowing through the pipes, get it to the consumer, drill more, get it to the consumer. And so when COVID happened demand stopped. The oil industry is still pumping, and 'cause the oil industry hates to shut in wells because it causes all these down problems.
So that was the last time we had a kind of a 10% or greater than 10% fall off in demand. Demand recovered rel- very quickly in COVID even. But the prior situation was 2009 the financial crisis, 2008, 2009. That was the prior situation where... So 2020 COVID, 10% drop. 2008, 2009, 10% drop in oil demand.
And then before that it was the two 1970s shocks, the 1978 Iran, w- the Iranian revolution when the Shah, which was the he was a US style king installed there in the 1950s, but the overthrow of the Shah and the installation of the Islamic regime. And then 1973 was the the Arab oil embargo, so those four situations, COVID 2020 2008 the f- financial crisis, and then the two '70s shocks. Those, over the last 60 years, those are the four data points y- as an oil analyst or a hedge fund, you gotta try and back test and see, okay, when these things happened in the past 60 years, what happened to the rest of the economy?
In every situation equities took a huge dive immediately. So 2008, obviously the 1970s but also equities struggled in the 1970s. The only situation where equities rallied was COVID, and we all know what happened in COVID. There was the money printing and and the stimulus checks went out.
And so I think one of the big reasons behind equities being so strong into this crisis is that COVID stimulus is still fresh in people's minds. And everyone thinks that if this thing gets bad enough, as in this crisis goes on for another month, oil goes to 150, we may have another stimulus. It could be just turn on the printing presses.
It's inflationary and it comes out in the wash in the end. This money printing doesn't come out of nowhere. Everyone has to pay for it in the long term. But short term, that will have a big boost to equity prices. If you put 10, 20 grand into each family in the US or in Europe or everywhere around the world because of an oil crisis, I think that there's a little bit of thinking that equities, we're going to see a big bailout in terms of a stimulus if this gets worse and if it gets worse fast.
We may see, I think the equity markets are looking forward saying, we're going to have a COVID-style bailout if this thing gets really bad. And it's sad that the world has that kind of view now that, the printing press is going to save us or save equity markets. But it did during COVID.
And, people have got that fresh in their memory. That was only five years ago. I think that people think that if this oil crisis gets bad enough, equity markets will be bailed out by the printing press and a stimulus. That's, I think, a lot of what's in addition to the SPU dumping and all this kind of inventories in terms of a lot of the oil market itself is the sting has been taken out by shoving so much inventory into the supply chain over a period of weeks that the oil industry is struggling to manage these SPR releases.
I think that similarly, I think people are looking at equities and saying, hey, if the situation gets bad, we'll just do a COVID-style print and give everyone 10 grand and 20 grand and they can go off and buy tech stocks or- Fill up their tank once ... or fill up the tanks once buy some cryptocurrency and and make it 2020 rain again.
Erik: Let's go back to the two most recent major data points, which was the 2020 COVID crisis and the 2008 into 2009 great financial crisis. How long, how many months did demand destruction stay above 10% during each of those events? And how many months do you anticipate, e- even if we were to open the Strait of Hormuz next week, how many months do we have to have that 10 million barrels of demand destruction in order to balance this market?
In other words, put those two on a scale. Is this half as big as 2008? Is it just as big as 2008 in terms of how many months of more than 10% demand destruction it's going to involve?
Morgan: That's a very good question, and the interesting answer is it doesn't take very long at all. It takes... Oil gets to 150, and oil will move there fast.
It... People think we're gonna stay at $100 for a long period of time. Give the market a three or four weeks from now, if we're still here in the middle of June that's, we're gonna get to 150. If we're in the same situation, strait is closed, as I said, I think that even if peace is declared today, I think this is gonna be...
the restart time is gonna force oil to get to 150 plus, even with the restart today. And so it doesn't... And then going back to comparing it to 2008 and 2000-- and 2020 oil didn't have to... On a, if you inflation adjust the price level back to today's money, oil prices only have to stay above 150 for a few months, and you get that destruction.
People stop. A lot of discretionary consumption just falls out of the market immediately. Because when you think about it, it, people start canceling vacations. They don't book long trips. They stay local. They will cut back on other things. People will still buy oil, but they will buy less of it, and they'll be more conscious of, consumption that, that involves oil s- spending.
And so it doesn't take that long. I think in 20-- in 2008, I think we only stayed above $150 for a few months. I think it was, it literally was two or three months. And in 2020 oil demand fell below 10%, and again, it was only a few months. And that-- 2020's a complicated one because there were so many...
It was in a very unusual situation with the stimulus checks and the whole f- obviously the situation. 2008 is the better comparison, and it only took about two months of $150-plus oil for-- in the middle of 2008, for consumption to fall and stall. And then obviously we had a- an equity crisis immediately around, after that.
So it basically this happens fast. And so I would encourage your listeners to, to be prepared for, if you're one of those things, even oil, oil companies fa- are famous for the fact of, they do stress testing of their portfolios. Banks do that now since the financial crisis also.
And but they basically I would-- if you have-- y- you should be stress testing your portfolio, not just in a negative way, in a positive way, because some things will actually become very cheap when you have $150-plus oil. I would be stress testing your portfolio for 150 to $200 oil happening over the next month.
What will you do when that happens? Because that is a more than 50% chance of probability of happening over the next two months, 150 to $200 oil. The economy's gonna take a moment, as in it's gonna react negatively, the macroeconomy, and it's gonna look bad. It's gonna look-- People will be starting to say really bad things about the economy.
We're in a doom-type situation. Equities might do okay in this because as I said the people are gonna think we're gonna money print our way out of it. It doesn't help the oil industry, unfortunately, the money printing, but it might he- help equity valuations and multiples might expand because of that.
But I would s- if-- as of today, the end of May 2006, I would be stress testing my portfolio for 150 to $200 oil within the next 30 days. And what will you do when that happens? Some things, airlines, a lot of the US airlines are not hedged. Some of the European airlines are hedged. A lot of them actually are Ryanair and Lufthansa and a lot of these guys.
But so you're gonna see a lot of these instru- interesting dynamics are gonna start to appear. Oil and gas producers in the US are gonna be-- are gonna have a really good summer. No one-- They're, they're normal people like you and I. They're not gloating over higher oil prices.
They would like prices to be $100 or $4 per MBtu for nat gas. People would like those prices to be their producers. Those producers are gonna look could be looking cheap today versus if we get to 150 to $200 oil 150, $200 oil is not sustainable f- over a longer period of time, at least today.
And but I would be stress testing my portfolio today in anticipation of this happening over the next 30 days.
Erik: On that uplifting note, we're gonna have to call time on this interview. I can't thank you enough, Morgan, for a terrific interview. But before I let you go, there's another piece of news in the oil market, maybe not quite as big as the Hormuz crisis, but close, and that is a new edition of Oil 101, the book that almost all of us read in the beginning back when it came out in 2009.
Why now, almost 20 years later? I don't think this was brought on by this crisis. You were writing the new book before the crisis hit. So why the new edition? What's new in it? And for those listeners who haven't read Oil 101, tell us a little bit about just the structure of the book and what it's about 'cause it's definitely the bible that everyone goes by.
Morgan: Prior to the first edition of Oil 101, I was an oil trader. I traded, I still do futures physical oil swaps, OTC swaps. So but I was-- I had to assemble all of my knowledge and as did everyone in the industry, from dribs and drabs. There was no single source where you could say, "Okay, I want to learn about shipping oil and pipelines as well as refining, as well as a bit of history and context," like a bigger picture, zoom up a little bit.
But still not in a dumbed down way, in a relatively, information intense way. And so I wrote the book I wish someone else had written. I had to-- I kinda had to write the book. I felt obliged to do it. And that was in 2009. And the oil industry in 2009, and so we're now obviously in 2026, 2009, fracking and hydraulic fracking as well as-- so back in the big recovery in US oil production as well as a whole bunch of other kind of developments like electric cars hadn't-- didn't really exist.
It sounds like a long time ago now, 15 years. And I wrote the first edition in 2009. It became-- it was- People bought paper books back then. People don't do that now . But p- it became a really-- it became a global bestseller. It was... Basically, you get a new trader on a desk, or you're starting a job in an oil refinery or an, a nat gas producer in the US, you get handed this book.
And it stood the test of time. It's-- A lot of it was, has been evergreen. But a few things did really need to be addressed in the second edition. One was the huge growth in US oil production. So That in itself was an interesting tale of how did that happen?
And it is actually a very interesting story. The whole backstory of how US oil recovery that had been a long-term oil production, had been long-term decline, how that turned around, and the US is now the largest oil producer in the world. And is a net exporter. That was 15 years ago, that was not the case.
It was not looking good. And a lot of this was turned around by technology. The oil industry is highly innovative. People think of NVIDIA and tech companies like that when they think of technology. The oil industry is a extremely technology-intensive industry, and which is the reason why the US has become one of the largest oil producers, if not the largest oil producer depending on the month at the moment.
And so that was one reason, just to cover the changing supply, including especially the US oil production growth. And the second thing was I wanted to make it fully electronic. So it's now, it's on... If you go to morgandowney.com it's there on the on the internet.
It's much more interactive. The charts... it's no longer just a book because things change so quickly, obviously, these days that it needed to be delivered in a different format. So the second edition which is produced tw- 2026 it has much more interaction.
Everything is interactive about it, as well as it enables me I have a chapter on the Strait of Hormuz crisis, and And I update it every day or two. It's allows me to talk about, how much inventory is in SPU or how much is being drawn down. So it's basically a modern delivery mechanism for the same book.
So you can still buy the physical book off Amazon and things like that. And it's still worth getting because it's, some people like the tactile nature of being able to flip to the index and look for a particular obscure word, like what does API mean or some acronym. And so physical book is still useful, but the...
You can just go to morgandowney.com and... Or just look up Oil 101, just Google it, and you'll find the book. And it's just a modern version. It just needed, to be more interactive, which is great. It enables the book to keep up with current, evolving situations like this the Hormuz crisis.
Erik: Okay, Morgan, and just briefly, tell me what is Boxwood? You're now a software guy.
Morgan: Yeah. So as mentioned, the oil industry is a very technology-focused industry, and Boxwood is a piece of software that oil and gas producers, so the people that get oil and gas out of the ground, primarily in the US they use it to manage their hedging.
So if you're a nat gas producer and you need to lock in $4 per MMBtu gas, you can use this software called Boxwood to help you get that overview and as well as detailed level analysis. So it's air traffic control for financial markets for oil and gas companies. So it allows them to make really fast-moving decisions and very smart decisions using the Boxwood software.
So it's like a tool used by the CFO, the CEO, the treasurer of oil and gas companies primarily in the US, but all around the world, and it's called Boxwood, B-O-X-W-O-O-D.
Erik: And again, listeners, the book is Oil 101. Your research roundup email contains a link where you can find both the Amazon link as well as a link to Morgan's website, which is morgandowney.com.
Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com
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