Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna welcome Mike Alkin to MacroVoices. Erik and Mike discuss:

  • Uranium's Structural Deficit and the AI Trade
  • Cameco Valuation and Term Price Reporting
  • Utility Under-Contracting and the Cost Curve
  • Conversion and Enrichment Prices
  • Physical Uranium vs. Mining Equities
  • Mike Alkin argues uranium's structural supply deficit would exist even if no data center opened, although bank AI baskets drive the sector's day-to-day flows.
  • Alkin says utilities are contracting a little over half their needs, while 75-85% of uranium normally moves under long-term contracts for security of supply.
  • Alkin says forecasters' weighted average production cost rose from $24 a pound in 2019 to $38 in 2025, while lowest-cost Kazatomprom's is $38.45, so the cost curve needs a reset.
  • Alkin says Cameco, at about 31 times EBITDA in 2022, now trades near 8-9 times, and that reported term prices of $98-$99 sit below the triple digits Cameco says it gets.
  • Alkin expects uranium, up 4x, to catch up with the fuel-cycle services, with conversion up from $4 to $60 and enrichment from $30 to over $200.

Mike Alkin — Sachem Cove Capital's founder and Chief Investment Officer (as introduced on the show)

Cold open and introduction

Mike Alkin: There is not enough economically viable uranium to satisfy the world's existing reactor fleet of 440 operating reactors, of which a little over 420 are actually producing electricity, and the pipeline of 80 new reactors coming online.

Erik Townsend: That was Sachem Cove chief investment officer Mike Alkin. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 558 was produced on November 12th, 2026. 2026. Uranium prices are moving up as more and more fuel buyers recognize the structural bull market has legs, but uranium mining shares are being dragged down as investor sentiment collapses into fears that the AI CapEx boom will go bust in the wake of the blue tsunami and Democrats' threats to make AI and data centers public enemy number one.

The uranium bull thesis has nothing to do with AI or data centers and doesn't rely on them for future uranium demand. But the market is the market, and fundamentals notwithstanding, the Street has lumped all things nuclear into AI and data center baskets. So we're bringing back the number one fund manager in the uranium sector to discuss this crossroads of investor sentiment and the mining shares crashing to Liberation day lows, just as the fuel buyers are all turning bullish on uranium prices. Mike shared his slide deck from the recent NEI Nuclear Fuels Conference with us as well, and you'll find it linked in your Research Roundup.

Unfortunately, we didn't get to most of the slides in the deck because we ran out of time talking about issues affecting sentiment and the fundamentals of the trade, but I strongly encourage listeners to download and peruse the deck as well.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

Introduction and the AI-basket question

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Mike Alkin, who of course is founder and chief investment officer at Sachem Cove capital Management, probably the most respected uranium-focused fund manager there is. I'd say, Mike, it's really what, you and Art Hyde at Segra and Guy Keller at, uh—

Mike Alkin: Yeah, those are the 3, Erik. Me, Art, and Adam over at Segra, and Guy in Australia are the 3 that have, and then there's some others, but it's not their core focus.

Erik Townsend: It's great to get you back on the show. I think that right now we are at an incredibly important point in this uranium market because the fundamentals couldn't possibly be better. But you and I both know this trade, despite that the fundamentals don't really dictate it, gets basketed with AI, and we are feeling incredible pain from fears of the AI CapEx boom blowing up. So let's start before we get in, and I should tell our listeners, Mike prepared a terrific slide deck. This is actually for the NEI fuel Conference.

I'm going to say, folks, this is one of the best slide decks that we've shared recently with listeners. So for those of you who are driving or at the gym or whatever, be sure when you get home to download the slide deck, which you'll find linked in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com. Look for the button above Mike's picture that says looking for the downloads. So Mike, before we get to the slide deck, let's just get your overall view on, first of all, does it make sense to tie the fundamentals of uranium prices to AI CapEx?

A lot of people are associating nuclear energy with AI and AI data centers. Does that make sense on a fundamental level? And if it doesn't, is the market doing that anyway? And what does that mean for our investments?

Uranium fundamentals versus the AI CapEx trade

Mike Alkin: I'll answer the second part is yes, the market is doing that. The first part of the question is it does not matter. You know, there at the end of the day, I've been investing in the uranium trade, if you will, you know, for almost 10 years now. And, and that we expressed our view with our vehicle starting back then when uranium prices were $17, $18, $19, $20 a pound. And here, you know, they're pushing $100 plus now. The thesis is very simple. There, you know, nothing's changed. And if, as you know, Erik, as being an investor, when things change, if your thesis changes and you have thesis creep. Here, that's, that's not it.

What we've had is the thesis is very simple. There is not enough economically viable uranium to satisfy the world's existing reactor fleet of 440 operating reactors, of which a little over 420 are actually producing electricity, and the pipeline of 80 new reactors coming online, and then the growth of those. And when this trade first started, it was a Nuclear was maybe a half percent grower, and now it's a 4 to 5% grower.

None of that has anything to do with data centers, artificial intelligence, the growth of artificial intelligence, what models are profitable, what models won't be profitable. If a data center didn't open, there is still a massive structural deficit in uranium. And we can get into market structure, but so no, it does not matter. Now it matters because the market thinks it matters. So as a PM, you have to be aware of what the market cares, right? Because the market could remain irrational for a long time.

What you've seen over the last few years, and by the way, some of these uranium junior mining companies are as guilty as anyone because what they do is take the view, you know, when you see Three Mile Island being restarted or you see a power purchase agreement between a hyperscaler and a nuclear power plant, all of a sudden people start to equate that with uranium being necessary for artificial intelligence and a revitalization of nuclear power is because of that. It's absolutely nothing to do with it. However, you know, never let a good story get in the way with the facts is how some people operate.

So what you see is they start showing up in all of these different presentations is, you know, hey, we're part of the AI trade, we're part of the data centers and the revolution that's taking place there. Well, be careful what you ask for because now all of a sudden people start looking at it saying, well, is this CapEx going to be And there's a real good reason to question all of that CapEx being spent. Well, then you get lumped in. And where do you get lumped in? You get lumped in at the banks when the Goldmans and the Morgans and everyone else puts these baskets together, right? As you know, it's easier to express a trade through a basket. Client calls up, says, I'll take the AI basket, the momentum basket, whatever the basket is. Nuclear gets lumped in with that.

So what winds up happening is it becomes, facts be damned, it becomes flows. And so when the flows are moving one way, it's hard to stem that tide. And it has gotten caught up into the artificial intelligence data center basket. Now, at the end of the day, we think there are structural deficits, and we'll talk about this in the deck, that are reaching into the 15, 20, 25-plus percent of demand for as far as the eye can see.

But in the day-to-day, nobody cares, right? So if people are freaked out because rates are moving up and they're thinking these are long-lived assets and that they don't know what the cost to build a mine is going to be, and you've got AI baskets and you've got announcements where data centers are being delayed, not in my backyard, all that stuff. Or the DEMs are taking off. They're going to really shut it down. These things get shot. And so it's part of it. You just have to figure out how to manage around that.

Miners or metal: Cameco, Kazatomprom and price reporting

Erik Townsend: Mike, let's dive into how you manage that because something I'm seeing is a real dichotomy. Some of the people that I respect in the uranium trade are saying, look, Cameco just had this earnings call, which was understandable. Cost of mining is going up. Their costs are going up. They missed some earnings. Big deal. The price of uranium is going up too. The outlook is great. They're selling SPUT, so they're selling their exposure to the metal in order to buy the miners because they perceive that it just can't get any worse than this. Other people are saying, wait a minute, this AI CapEx fear thing, even if it doesn't make sense, could take those miners down. I'd rather own the metal than the miner. And they're going the other way. They're selling Cameco to buy SPUT.

Which one makes more sense?

Mike Alkin: So it's a fabulous question. You know, you're dealing with a few things. Number one, let's start with the premise that mining is hard and mining is very hard across commodities. Uranium mining has turned out to be exceptionally hard and exceptionally more expensive. And as we're going to talk about, I'm sure the cost to mine has become extraordinarily expensive. For a, and your listeners will see this in the deck, but just to wrap a little context around it, Kazatomprom, the state-owned entity of Kazakhstan, the world's largest uranium producer.

Kazakhstan is 41% of global uranium supply. The state-owned company is half of that. The rest is through joint ventures that are out there. They came public 2018, 2019, and at the time in their prospectus, they put a forecast out. And they suggested that their price by 2026 would be about $14 a pound, $13, $14 a pound, right over a little bit lower than where it was at the time. And you fast forward, and that was using a tenge of 340. They cost in tenge, sell in dollars. So a weaker tenge really is a margin boost for them.

Well, fast forward to today. So when they, where they were predicting in the $14 range, today their cost is $38.45 per pound, not $14. And if you were to normalize the FX to the 340 tenge versus the 450, 75, 500 tenge that it had seen for a bulk of the time, you're looking at over $55 a pound. And so, but what winds up happening from that is a couple of things.

And having been around this investment now for, you know, this sector for 10 years, I can't emphasize enough how difficult it is to mine uranium. I can't also emphasize the scarcity value that should be placed on those that can do it. And so I understand some people, like you mentioned earlier, the call, you're seeing the cost going higher.

And so the quarter's not good. First of all, Cameco's giving annual guidance. They're not updated. They don't update on a quarterly basis.

But what you see is as these costs are going higher, so too is the cost of is the price of uranium. So you're seeing significant increases in the price of uranium because the miners can't sell the capacity they have at the prices that the utilities would like to buy it. So now here we go. You asked, how do you play it? Do you play it through the miners because they're extraordinarily cheap, some would argue, or do you play it through the metal? That's an individual risk tolerance, right?

Because what we have seen, and you will see this in the deck, is project after project. is massively missing the supply that they, that they have promised when they were in the development stage or in the production stage. And we're not talking by a little bit, we're talking by a significant amount. You're talking prices that have gone up anywhere from 80 to 90 to a couple hundred percent higher than they suggested it would be. You're looking at production targets that are down by 50, 60, 70%.

And so while you would, so that the moment you own a company that is subject to that, right? So their numbers are going to change. But overall in the totality, that lack of production is just putting significant more pressure on what's already an undersupplied uranium market. And so, you know, you have a structural deficit.

There's not enough economically viable mine supply out there at these prices to bring it on. You've got a couple of new big projects coming online. It still doesn't solve your deficit. And so it's, it, bodes extremely well for price formation. The risk you take is you happen to own one of those miners that trips. And the history the last few years is one after the other is either doing it on production or costs.

And so again, ultimately what's happening is the prices are rising materially because of that. And so that ultimately will accrue to them. And there's not— that's not encouraging the prices where they are, even though The term market, which we'll talk about the importance of that, but that's where the bulk of uranium trades is literally at an all-time high right now. And so now if someone wants less risk, then they would express that through the physical commodity because you don't have mining risk and mining risk is real. Now what needs to go into the calculus, I would argue, for someone who is more inclined to own the equity to get the torque, Is to understand those that do mine and those that can mine. How good have they been at it? Because there should be a real scarcity value that's placed on that. And again, that's that's art, not science.

Right now, what got lost in the Cameco release is and price reporting here is a unique beast. The price that's reported in many instances is not where the price is trading. And so. Right? The fixed price contract is $98, $99 a pound right now. Cameco said it on the conference call, they're getting triple digits. So how is that possible? How are the price reporters not seeing that? Well, they are, but the way the price reporting is set up in the industry is they don't take where the price was contracted. They price where the lowest offer came in on a contract that they've heard about.

So if somebody came in below where Cameco was saying they're signing in the triple digits, even though that utility gave it to Cameco, the price reporter is pegging it to where they found the lowest offer. And what's their rationale? Well, it's a fungible commodity. Well, that's an absurd, an absolutely absurd explanation for it because at the end of the day, the geopolitical risks are staggering here, right? When you look at where the uranium is produced and where the uranium's consumed, 70% of it is produced in the East, and yet 70% is consumed in the West. And there are massive deficits in the West and not deficits, but a little bit of surplus in the East. But that goes to feed their own beast, the Russian programs, the Chinese programs, the Indian programs.

So anyway, the point is on Cameco's call, that was a really important thing. You know, if you've listened to them like we have for a decade to the Cameco calls, they don't even discuss the numbers. When I first started listening to them a decade ago, I said, am I missing something? Like they don't even, they don't even talk about the quarter. And so That is just the nature of that business. So their misses, you know, costs are up. Yes. One of the, sometimes people will say, well, with Cameco, well, they're not, they don't have full spot market exposure, so their prices will lag where the market is. Okay. That in a rip-roaring market, people get excited, you know, they get exercised about that. But also prices go up or down and there are times where as contracts roll off, they're signing it to higher prices. But to get back to your original question, it really comes down, can you make an argument?

So let's just do this math. 2022, Cameco invests in Westinghouse for their 49% stake. And at the time, Cameco, the price of uranium, the contract price was around $49 a pound. And Cameco was trading about 31 times EBITDA. Fast forward to today, That contract price, that the price report is $98 or $99, but it's well north of $100. So it's more than doubled. And depending on what one wants to assign the value to Westinghouse, pick a number. But if you put a reasonable assumption on it, Cameco's trading at like 8 or 9 times EBITDA. I mean, that's stupid in my view for the world's, the Western world's dominant uranium producer. And there is not, there's no one close. That's producing uranium right now that can produce like them.

So do they have a hiccup once in a while in a quarter? Sure. Who doesn't? But for their place in the landscape, you know, I think that the market overlooks that. But what happens, right? You put out a press release and for— they don't even guide. They had a delay for a couple of, you know, a few weeks at the mine and all of a sudden it's a miss. And as you know, the algos pick up headline miss and good night. You know, you get shot on that day.

Those who have a lower risk tolerance but want to express the view that uranium prices, if they do the work and they get comfortable that the thesis makes sense and uranium price formation is just really beginning and it needs to move significantly higher to satisfy these structural deficits, and you have a low risk tolerance, perhaps the physical metal is the way to go.

If one is inclined to say, my gosh, here we are, with a massive move up in the physical price. You know, prices have gone from $17, $18 a pound to over $100, and ceilings on certain contracts are in the $150s plus. Yet these equities have pulled back significantly just in the last few months, and valuations are back to where they were, even valuations 4 or 5 years ago when there was no certainty. And not that there's certainty now, but there was a lot more clouds around the future of the nuclear power industry. Back then, the trade was prices can't stay this low. They got to come to a certain price. Nobody factored in nuclear power growth going from 0.5% to 5%, and here we are. So yeah, it just depends on what one's risk tolerance is, but you can make a case for either one.

No bears at the NEI conference: fuel-buyer incentives

Erik Townsend: Let's get into the NEI conference that you just attended and the slide deck that you prepared for that conference. Before we dive into the slide deck though, there's something I find absolutely fascinating, which is you've been attending this conference for years and years and years. You were ridiculed, in some cases treated very disrespectfully on a personal level as the nutcase guy who's bullish on uranium when the people in the business who know better disagreed with you and you were kind of laughed out of the room. Now, that was when uranium was $20 a pound. Now that it's 5 times more, I asked a favor of you when you were going to this conference and I said, Mike, look, I've been asked by ZeroHedge to organize a debate on this topic. I need you to recruit one of these angry uranium bears who thinks you're an idiot.

Let's get them signed up for a debate.

Mike Alkin: And plenty of those.

Erik Townsend: I thought there was plenty of those. A lot of people that think you're the idiot and they're bearish. They're saying this is just a 2007 Cigar Lake thing. It's all going to blow over. Prices are going back down. Recruit one of those bears to do a debate and we can get this conversation now to hear the other side of the story. Mike, you had one job and you failed. What happened?

Mike Alkin: I failed miserably. You know, just for some background, right? So I didn't know uranium from anything. I looked at it a couple of times in my career at different points, but never invested in it. And then 2015, '16 started stumbling upon it and '17 and '18 doing deep research. And, you know, it was asymmetric. It made sense. And so, And express the view through an entity. At the time 2018 came around and the vehicle was up and running, I was learning the market structure. And Erik, I don't think by that point in time, and I'm forgetting, 20-something years, probably had been investing by then.

And I don't think I appreciated really market structure and the power of incentives. I knew about them. I paid a little attention to them, but I don't think I truly had a profound, really deep understanding of what that all meant. And just to give some background, and I think it's really important because it will help contextualize why I couldn't find anyone. I would—

Erik Townsend: Well, let's just get the fact on the table. You went to the conference to find the bear, and what you found is there were no bears. Everybody at the conference was bullish. And of course, it's not because you told them that over and over again for the last 5 years. It's their idea now.

Mike Alkin: No. And they think I'm an idiot. So they don't, you know, they told me in 2018, go home, you don't belong here. We're nuclear engineers, we buy stuff, you don't know anything. And they told me the same thing in 2019, 2020, '21, '22, '23. And the bet always at these conferences was pricing. If it was $20, it was going to $10. If it was $30, it was going to $20. If it was $40, it was going to $30.

You know, it wasn't really till prices got into the $80s would a fuel buyer sit down with me at a conference and say, okay, All right, maybe it's not going back to 30 or 40, but it's going to 50. Okay. And then, you know, as you get into the '$90s, it's like, okay, well, so maybe it gets to 100, but then it's going all the way back. Okay, great. I'm wide open to it. I've laid my cards out on the table.

I've told you everything. I put together decks. I've spent immense amount of time talking presentations and everything about it. I've laid out all the math. The supply, the demand, the inventories. None of this is my data. It's publicly available. My team and I have spent tens and tens of thousands of hours tearing it apart and trying to understand it and see where we're wrong. Every day we assume we're wrong. Here's what we've come up with. Now, if I'm an idiot, which I very well could be, just tell me why.

And they would not, and they don't do it.

Anyway, we talked about market structure. And why it's hard to find. 2017, I'm at a conference. I'm at a world Nuclear Association conference. I'm having dinner with some of the biggest fuel buyers. I was invited, I don't want to say the name, but I was invited by a commercial officer at one of the big uranium producers to a dinner with some of the big fuel buyers. And we sat down and I said, hey, you know, thanks for me.

I'm just a useful dope here trying to figure it all out. I'm stumbling. But by that time I had spent enough time doing supply demand where something was really bothering me. Didn't have a vehicle to express the view, but had done enough supply-demand work where I was saying, wait a second, I'm looking back at models coming from the sell side that's 3, 4 years old because nobody's around, right? Because uranium's down 90%. Nobody cares. The banks aren't paying attention. But when I lay out all the reactors in the world and I did a little nuclear math, and believe me, you know, I could do 4th grade math, but not much beyond that.

But once I educated myself as to how much uranium a reactor uses and then started going out and laying that out and saying, oh wow, okay, it's not a dying industry. Everything I read said it's a dying But it's actually growing a little bit. Now let me look at every mine in the world. And I look at every mine in the world and I said, okay, well, well, that's interesting because there's nowhere near as much economic uranium. There's uranium that's being produced right now where when those higher price contracts roll off, they're going to shut those mines. They have to. Fast forward 2017, it starts. I started thinking mines would have to be shut down. I started talking publicly about it over the next year, 18 months or so. Well, 25% of world supply came offline. Why? Because it was uneconomical.

In 2017, I'm sitting in a nuclear conference with some of the real big fuel buyers and I just said, hey guys, I'm just curious, view on inventories. And they said, oh, well, you know, there's billion-plus pounds of inventory out there and we use less than 200 pounds a year and we only need a couple, but there's a billion 4.

I said, oh, okay, a billion 4. I said, and I had just spent months going through all the inventory we could find. And what I concluded was of that billion 4, maybe 400 or 500 million was mobile, was going to enter the stream, but the rest was not going anywhere. You'd have to re-enrich it. You'd— there were depleted tails, they were sequestered in sovereign funds. It was just, that wasn't hitting the market. And it struck me, one of the big forecasters, there's 2 forecasters in the industry, 2 price reporters and forecasters. They do the same thing. And they had talked about, they put out an inventory report and it was 1.4 billion.

And I realized in sitting at this dinner, talking to this cohort, they were puffing their chest. They said, we're never buying uranium again. We're never going to have to buy it. It's 1.4 billion. Yeah. I said, okay, well, you know that you realize that that's not all, you know, I didn't know the term mobile, but it was not all usable. And they said, what are you talking about?

We're never going to have to buy it. It's going, it's actually going to $15. It's going to $10. I said, oh, okay.

I said, I'm just curious if, can I ask you guys how you're compensated? Are you guys paid to call bottoms? Because I, I've, there's a lot of pushback at the table and I'm, I'm just, I'm learning, but I've done enough supply-demand work to say that, that supply has to come offline. And then that's going to lead to deficits because this, this stuff is going to have to, some of this stuff's going to be just go away because they can't produce enough economical uranium.

Again, I was laughed at at the dinner and I said, can I just ask, are you compensated for calling bottoms? Well, you would've thought I asked them how much they have in their bank account. You know, they were offended that I would ask that question. I said, no, I'm not asking how much you make. Are you paid to call bottom? If you had an enterprising analyst and you called the bottom and uranium went double, triple, do you get a piece of that?

And they looked at me like I had 3 eyes and said, no. I said, oh, okay.

And so it was really there that I started to understand the market structure that I was dealing with. The power of incentives that I was dealing with. Most nuclear fuel buyers are nuclear engineers, right? Their IQ in their hand is bigger than my entire IQ. I mean, these are smart people, but they're not paid to be commercial. It's not like a gas trader or a coal trader or an oil trader that's working at these power plants.

So you're dealing with all of these different things. So as we started going on, I went to the Nuclear energy Institute in early 2018. I said, you don't know me from Adam. You guys represent the interests of all these nuclear power plants in Congress. Let me share with you why I think the math is wrong. Well, we did that and I found a liaison there who would talk to me. And over time, he finally understood what I was saying. And he said, you know, we have a conference coming up in Boston. I see what you're saying. Could you come speak to them?

I did that in 2018 and I got laughed out of the room. I got off the stage and a woman walked up to me. And she said, how dare you come and talk to us? You're a Wall Street bad guy. Literally, you're a Wall Street bad guy trying to scare these good, hardworking people who buy fuel for a living and do a great service for the country.

And you're just some Wall Street charlatan. And I said, like, are you out here? Like, who are you? Are you serious, lady? And I said, come with me. And we walked over to a little alcove in the conference area and I opened up my laptop, which is a bazillion lines of of supply-demand work. And I don't even know how many, back in 2018, how many tabs on a spreadsheet it was.

And I just said, let me show you the work we've done. Maybe we're 20 minutes into it. And she said, you know what? I owe you an apology. But what I realized was like, wow, this closed-loop, cloistered group of people that I'm in the bar then sitting there, no one comes up and asks, 2019, the NEI asked me to come back and do the same thing. Why? Because I talk to them regularly. I show them my math and they get it. And they said, come back. We owe it to them to speak to them. I was in Nashville, Tennessee, and I spoke to them and I got the same reaction. I was told I have no idea. I shouldn't belong there.

That's when I knew something was broken in this industry. Something was wrong. Not that— but, and where it goes back to, Erik, is the cost of uranium, the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle, the front end from upstream to downstream to getting it in a plant. It's a couple of years worth of time. There's 4 different steps.

That's 25% of the cost, roughly. Uranium could be mid-single digits to low double digits depending on pricing, but it's not 80 to 90% like coal and natural gas are.

So these folks are not commercial creatures. They're not paid to be, they're not incentivized to be. So here you, here we go. You fast forward all these years at these conferences, it's like pulling teeth to get them to meet with you. Maybe you grab 'em in a bar, you talk to them in the hallway, you get 'em in an elevator, but they show zero interest. Now this is, and again, what I was public at $17, we're well north of $100. I got something right and I, there's no ego here. I got it right. I get plenty wrong all the time, just, but I got the direction right and there's still no curiosity.

Now the difference is, When you go and start talking to people and say, hey, I'd love to talk, you want to charge? They're like, well, no, you know, we get it that pricing's here, but just wait till NexGen comes online in 2028, '29, 2030. Wait till Denison comes online, then our problems are solved. And I'm like, well, that's really interesting. No, they're not. Let's talk about structural deficits. They don't want to hear it.

But the point is trying to get someone to talk, a, the utilities, probably their structure wouldn't allow them to come on us like that. But it, you're not getting the disagreements. I'm not getting the pushback. I'm getting the, okay, so prices are here. Maybe they go down in the future as soon as this new supply comes online. Well, that's not solving your problem. So that was a really long-winded way of answering your question, but I thought it was important to give you some context as to why it's hard to find them. It, and—

Under-contracting, the cost-curve reset, conversion and enrichment

Erik Townsend: Well, I see this as a really, really important, I'll call it a crossover of sentiment. And we all know sentiment is hugely important in investing. On one hand, we've got a sentiment signal from Wall Street, which is, okay, we're not going to think through this uranium thing. We basket it in with AI because to us, that's what it seems to make sense. And because of the AI CapEx boom potentially being at risk of busting, the sentiment couldn't possibly be worse. Meanwhile, these guys that wouldn't contract it, and for years now, they have not been contracting at replacement rates. So they're drawing down on their inventories and their past contracts in order to keep them going. They're not buying more.

They've had an opposite reversal in sentiment.

So you've got the people that are actually doing the buying, and the spot price of uranium as well as the term price of uranium are going up as the fuel buyers' sentiment has turned bullish. You can't find a bear in the room. And at the same time, everything is on fire sale because Wall Street is basketing uranium in with nuclear. I mean, it seems like a value play, you know, panacea.

Mike Alkin: Yes, sir. It's bananas. And, but think about what you just said. So if you, you'll see in the deck, utilities are contracting a little over half of their needs.

Erik Townsend: Yep. That's slide 25 in the deck.

Mike Alkin: Yep. So basically what that means is, you know, in, in a given year you consume, pick a number, once, you know, going back years, 160, 170, 200. Now, if you look at industry forecasters, they're typically very low versus where we've seen it come out. But basically they're contracting because the market is such that about 80%, 75%, 80%, 85%, depending on the year, but in that number is bought under long-term contracts. Why? Because there's no substitute. If you get it wrong and you don't have supply guaranteed to come in, you got a problem because you can't coal to gas switch.

Uranium is it. And so they need security of supply. They're not financially incentivized to get it right. And so the contract, the long-term contracts kind of guide everything. And so what you will see when you look at the, I don't know if I, I don't think I have that slide in the deck, but they buy at peaks and they sell or don't contract when prices are low typically. Why? Because it doesn't matter to them. They buy what they buy when they buy it to secure supply. If you're not replacing what you're consuming in a year, technically the next year, the year after, as you're going to put stuff into the fuel cycle, you're drawing down inventories. And so you're sucking down inventories that are out there, but you're not testing the economic viability of supply.

So if you are the cohort of fuel buyers that are out there that are only buying half of what their needs are, yet the supply stack on paper is able to produce more than what that demand is. Commodities 101, supply-demand 101. When there's less demand for something and more supply, prices go down.

The long-term price of uranium, long-term price, has quadrupled. How is that possible when utilities are only pulling down half are only contracting for half of what they need.

Now, when you start to look at the math of how much supply is going to need to be contracted, you know, you're looking at over a couple of billion pounds by 2040, and this is mining. So 2040 is not quite tomorrow, but it's 2 days from now. So when they start those pounds, there's not enough economically viable pounds of above ground right now to feed that beast. So when they start going into the market, it is going to be like putting a pig through a python.

And you saw that last cycle because what you also have to do, not only— they've destocked for 15 years. Anyone who understands the commodity market, and I'm sure everyone on this or most people on this call do because you have a sophisticated audience, when you destock, what do you need to do? You need to restock. Yeah. So if you're looking at demands in the, in the 200, 210, 220, 230, well, you're going to have to be buying at 250, 260, and 270 to fill your coffers back up. And so that supply does not exist right now. Higher prices will incentivize that supply.

So let's get back to what we were talking about earlier about the costs. So if you just go to slide 26, you'll see we say the cost curve needs a reset. And so you'll see in the deck, you could understand mining costs, and I'm sure your listeners understand there's cash costs, then there's all-in sustaining costs, then there's all-in costs. There are different cost levels, right? If all these uranium companies, with the exception of a couple, are, that's all they do is mine uranium. They're pure plays. So if you can't, you can't run a company if you can't make money. And so, I mean, you can't run a mine if you can't run a company. And so you need an all-in cost. And as you'll see, we explain how we arrive at that all-in cost.

And my presentation in 2019 at the NEI talked all about how the costs are wrong. It was literally the costs are wrong. Basically what I'm showing you in this slide is the, it's the operating cost curve that the industry forecasters put out. And what you'll see is that cost curve that they put out going back to their 2019 they were showing the weighted average cost of production across the industry was $24 a pound, and then it was $27 in 2021. They put it out every 2 years.

And then it was $30 in 2023, and then it was $38 in 2025. That's the weighted average cost for the entire cost curve.

Kazatomprom, the world's biggest uranium miner and the lowest cost uranium miner, we put $40, it's $38.45. It's $38.45. Wow. Not the 38 of the weighted average cost. And so the cost curve's broken. It needs to be entirely reset. And you saw, you mentioned Cameco, that with their prices that were higher, well, the whole curve's moving up and to the right.

And so you're in a period now where fuel buyers have billions of pounds to contract to cover their needs out to 2040. And again, that's, if it's not tomorrow, it's 2 days from now. That's mining years. Because the mines that can satisfy that don't exist. They're not in production, they're not in development. And you're looking at deficits in the structural deficits of hundreds of millions of pounds as we stand now.

And again, it doesn't include AI, it doesn't include all that data center stuff. So at the end of the day, When contracting, like you saw, you see in these cycles when it turns, when people get nervous. Now prices have moved up 4x. Like I said, at these conferences, it's hard to find the bear from the other side, but they haven't panicked yet. When they start and they're— it will take one, Erik.

And let me explain the dynamic of this market. When you're looking at your, you know, there's 60 nuclear power plants in the world. And you know, you're, when you're, and when you're looking at the bigger entities, the ones with the, you know, several reactors, you know, they're sophisticated. They understand what's going on. Have they gotten a price call wrong? Yeah, a lot of them have. Have a few gotten it right? Yeah, a few have, but many have not. But they've gone along. They're not really that worried. But when you start to get down, and not to pick on any one particular one, but when you start to get down to The onesies and twosies, the folks that are— you have one reactor or 2 reactor. When you speak to some of them, super smart people, really nice, but not connected to what's going on in the day-to-day.

All it takes is one of them. And again, what I said earlier about the price reporting, the price reporting doesn't report where the price is struck. It reports where the lowest offer is on a deal. What I can see happening, and I is some of these smaller operators that aren't in the market on a regular basis, they might need it every 4, 5, 6, 7 years, and they're not commercial.

So right now the market is telling us, and you don't have to believe me, the price of uranium in the contract market is up 4x when they've only been buying half of what they need. That to me says a lot.

Now, if you take a utility that needs uranium and they haven't, that there's a shortage yet and they go in, well, what I can tell you is when the utilities were putting out requests for proposals a few years ago, they might've been getting 7, 8, 10, 12, or more people coming back to them. When they put those out now, they're getting very few coming back to them. Why?

Because it's turned, it's a seller's market. And the utility and the uranium miners don't want to sell their book at these prices. And so they step out, the big guys especially, they say, we're not interested.

There were multiple offers when RFPs went out for conversion services. And that was like that for years. It sat at $4 per kilogram for so many years and it was unprofitable. It was a dying part of the fuel cycle. Everyone took their eye off the ball and one of the countries went out and put out for conversion services and nobody bid. Nobody came to the table.

Conversions, it's over $60 right now. That set it off. And so remember, enrichment, uranium is the product. The services are enrichment, conversion, and fabrication. Those have had huge move, $4 to $60, $30 to $200 plus. Fabrication's also up. Uranium is 4x, but very quietly. The difference is the product always catches, or the product will catch up to where the service move has been.

And why? Because you can't The services don't matter if you don't have enough products. So they've got to incent the price. And so that's kind of where you're at right now. A very, I would say, more aware buyer base still wrestling with the fact that prices have gone up 4x. Nobody gets fired for that. Nobody's incentivized to get that right. They just don't run out of fuel.

So you're getting to that That I'm not going to say the come-to-Jesus moment, right? Everything is pointing there. When it happens, you don't know.

But you asked earlier, Cameco had a tough quarter, but people missed in the fact that Cameco told you they had triple-digit pricing and that's not being price reported. And they said that on the conference call. That's the takeaway from that call. All the other stuff is noise. You got to be on top of those things to be able to take advantage of them.

Light water leapfrog and the 2007 price analog

Erik Townsend: Mike, your analysis has always been based on the existing reactor fleet. You take the conservative approach and you say, look, forget about all the AI and the data centers and all that. Just look at the reactors that are running. And I certainly respect that's the conservative way to approach this. But hang on a second.

What if AI and data centers really is a thing?

Mike Alkin: Yeah, it's a great question.

Erik Townsend: And specifically, there's a phenomenon I've started calling the light water leapfrog, which is The same nuclear engineers who are stuck in not taking you seriously because you're not in their industry and you don't know anything. Yeah. These same guys, they remind me of the IBM mainframers in the '90s, the guys who were just convinced that the IBM mainframe was going to be the answer to computing forever. And of course, the smart people in the computer industry could see from the late 1970s that batch processing was not the way to build computer systems. But The mainframers were just so stuck on that paradigm, had to be the answer forever because that's what they knew and that's what they were used to.

And I see this happening again, that Generation 4 reactors, advanced reactors, are being ignored. If it's not from Westinghouse, it's not taken seriously. Yeah. Well, look, Aalo Atomics is building a factory right now in Georgetown, Texas, where they're going to assembly line mass produce 100 nuclear reactors. reactors a year. Now we only have 440 nuclear reactors in commercial operation, the whole planet. They're going to make another 100 per year. And of course it's speculative. They haven't proven that yet. I get it. But what if that comes true?

I mean, they've already taken their first reactor to criticality on the 4th of July, made news doing that. There's no reason not to think that these mass-produced reactors— and it's not just Aalo, it's Valar Atomics. There's several companies.

Mike Alkin: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: that are looking at assembly line mass production of nuclear reactors. A lot of them are microreactors. Aalo's the only one that's actually looking at something at a larger scale than that. But the thing is, they're talking, they're promising their customers that they're going to be delivering these factory mass-produced reactors in 2029. Okay, so let's assume that's marketing and it's really going to be 2030 or 2031. Okay, that's halfway or less than halfway from how long it's going to take before a new AP1000 that gets greenlit tomorrow.

It's going to be half built by then.

What if this light water leapfrog, I'm calling it, meaning that the Generation 4 technology actually hits the scene? And it won't hit the grid because the cost of it initially will be too high. But what if the data centers and All the other users of behind-the-meter power suddenly start needing to buy uranium, not in the 2040s, because everybody thinks that Generation 4 comes after Generation 3+. But what if manufacturing actually gets it to market sooner than the next AP1000 that gets built? What happens then?

Mike Alkin: What's the old Cold War joke? The duck and cover drills, bend over and kiss your ass goodbye. You won't get there because price can be an elixir, right? So are, as I mentioned earlier, there are depleted tails. Are there stockpiles? Are there very uneconomic projects that have been shuttered that require significantly higher price uranium that might be shallower, might be able to get access to their past producing mines that are not economically viable? In any scenario that you really think about reasonable right now.

But should what you're saying come to fruition, you can get the resources there. It's just not economical now. And for it to become economical, prices would have to move up way beyond what we're thinking about right now. And so, you know, I'll— the way I think about pricing, Is the long-term contract price, $8.99. Ceilings right now are $150, $160 with floors of $70, $75 in that ballpark with a spot price of $91, $92.

So you start to think about, well, what are some corollaries? Well, in the last cycle, if you go back and look, pricing went from $7 a pound in 2000 up to $137. in the spot market very briefly in '07. The contract high was about $95. But people look at spot because it's recorded every day, unlike contracts, which is once a month. But you look and say, okay, well, $137 in today's dollars, you're looking around $200 a pound.

And if you did the fundamental exercise of looking at what the supply-demand was at the time where contracts were— where contract pricing was hitting all-time highs back then for that period and spot was going up, there actually was a surplus of uranium in the market over the next 5 years. So if you sat down and said, okay, well, what is these guys buying 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-year contracts? What do the next 5 years look like? There was a surplus and pricing got to around $200 in today's dollars.

Fast forward to today, if we do that same exercise, which we have, there are massive deficits. And so when you start getting to contracting replacement rate levels, That's when price is going to have to readjust. Does it, you know, we don't, I'm not publicly forecasting that, you know, that's for us to know. But if it got to, if it got to $200 in today's dollars when there was a surplus in the market, where's it going today? Now, should your belief come to fruition, they're going to have to tap resources. They're going to have to tap stockpiles. They're going to have to tap really uneconomic mines and they'll have to become, they're still uneconomic, but they're going to have to pay up for them. You know, where pricing goes, who knows? So yeah, they'll have to jumpstart real shallow, low-grade mines, right? There's plenty on the— there's some on the African continent that are really uneconomical, but they'll be able to do it because it's low-grade mining, subscale. One of the things you're seeing right now is scale is everything.

And, you know, these smaller projects are really hard. 500,000, 1 million, 1.5 million, 2 million pounds. They're getting But freaking hammered on costs.

Fuel-buyer panic and hyperscaler fuel procurement

Erik Townsend: Mike, you said earlier that the fuel buyers do not get compensated for timing the market and essentially being smart traders. I'm pretty sure they do have career risk if they let the plant run out of uranium. So it seems to me that if you do see something, and one of the things I've predicted, and it's an outlier, but I think it's possible, Is at one point the same hyperscalers that are investing in these advanced reactor companies are going to figure out, wait a minute, it's not the reactor, it's the fuel station that we need to invest in. If a hyperscaler comes and says, oh, so NexGen has a big mine coming, we'll buy NexGen, we'll acquire it. Now you can't do that in Canada for legal reasons, but contractually you could just say, we want a offtake agreement, Leigh, we'll take the whole thing.

If there's a panic where all of a sudden the fuel buyers say, oh shit, that crazy nutcase Mike Alkin guy was actually right, I don't want to lose my job. I'm just going to contract for all of the supply that I might need. I'll go ahead and sign the contracts now. Grant Isaac taking that call is not going to say, oh, well, since we've been good friends for a long time, I'll honor last year's prices. That's not happening. So what happens at that point? If we get to the moment of, oh shit, where the people who were never incentivized financially to time the market realize they are incentivized financially to not lose their job if they got into a can't cover the need situation.

Mike Alkin: Yeah. I mean, my guess would be they'll be late to recognize it because they've not been early to recognize it. And that's where I get, I use that analogy, putting a pig through a python. You saw it in conversion services. Pricing went up 15 times, even a little bit more, and 7 times or so in enrichment.

And you've had 4x, 5x, depending on spot or term pricing move over the last 7, 8 years. But it's, that's been more gradual. You haven't even tested the capacity, right?

So would I be surprised to see a spike in a panic? No. I would hope the hyperscalers, they, we haven't spoken to them. No one's reached out to us on it. I would hope that they're recognizing that you could go and sign the PPAs and do all the stuff you want, but you better go figure out how you're going to get all this stuff you're building and all this data center stuff. If it comes to fruition, you better figure out how you're going to get fuel for it because I hope you're not just assuming that's that. Because if that's the case, you're going to pay through the nose for it.

AI CapEx bust risk, positioning and SPUT

Erik Townsend: Mike, last question's probably the most important one. Look, you and I couldn't possibly be in stronger agreement that this is an incredible value opportunity. We're way oversold. I get it. But look, Chuck Schumer is threatening, or at least intimating, that the Democrat platform after this blue tsunami could be to make AI and data centers public enemy number one. And whether we agree with it or like it or think it's rational, the reality is that nuclear stuff is basketed with AI. And if there's an AI CapEx bust, as much as we can agree it doesn't make any sense on a fundamental level, we're going to see a wipeout potentially. So it seems to me the big question for our sophisticated audience is how do you structure your trades to bring convexity into the equation so that you have— well, you either hedge it somehow or you bring convexity into your trading structure so that you can survive that potential big down before the big up?

Mike Alkin: Yeah, you know, I try and stay away from any type of insight or advice on that. I don't go near that. You know, I think what I would say though, Erik, is again, it, somebody's gotta recognize that it, there is some tie into it. It's fundamentally like we said, but markets can remain irrational. You know, one way to express the view that it doesn't get knocked around is physical uranium. You buy physical uranium, you don't, you know, it's not, they're not part of a basket.

Now, some of the ETFs might be the physical vehicles, but if you actually own the physical uranium, but you know, it is something that I think people have to be aware of. And, but where it gets trumped, no pun intended, not Donald Trump, but is, you know, there are big things circling out there, right? Should a, and again, it's not not that it's going to change the supply demand that much. It can over time. And what you said, if you built a new reactor tomorrow, it's going to be years before it comes online.

But there are big programs out there that are really part of executive orders. There's a lot swirling around where you could wake up one day to a utility signing on to build a brand new reactor. And that's what will scare the bears. be damned. And you'll see this.

And if that happens, you probably see this thing go off to the races because it likely wouldn't just be one, it would be multiple. And there's talks of up to 10 to 20 reactors that want to be started by 2030.

And when the AI sell-off has been occurring, nobody really cares and they're kind of putting it on the wayside, but they're forgetting that that stuff is real. That stuff's out there. That stuff is potentially, and again, you don't know if it's going to come to fruition, but there's a lot of smoke out there. And where there's smoke, you know, that, that can offset it. You know, it's, boy, you gotta have a strong stomach if you're investing in this sector.

But the asymmetry is, is pretty remarkable.

Erik Townsend: Mike, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. But before I let you go, for the accredited and institutional audience, what's the investor relations contact? How do they find out more about the fund that you manage?

Mike Alkin: Anyone could reach out to us. It's ir@sachemcove.com.

Erik Townsend: IR for investor relations at sachemcove.com. It is, of course, an institutional and accredited investor product only. For retail investors, I recommend the various ETFs, and particularly look at the massive discount right now to NAV on— if you want to buy uranium for 18% below its actual market price, you can do that at SPUT as well. But for the institutional audience, ir@sachemcove.com.

Where's the trade: SPUT discount bull call spread

Erik Townsend: And now it's time for our MacroVoices market Desk segment with Patrick and Massil. But Patrick, before we get to where's the trade, last week your free options masterclass took apart the Pelosi trades. What are you covering in this week's session?

Patrick Ceresna: So this week we're going to be talking about the JPMorgan options whale. Now, for those that don't know, it's a $20 billion fund that uses options to insure downside risk. It's one of the biggest options trades on Wall Street, and I'm going to be deconstructing it and explaining exactly how it works live next Tuesday, November 17th at 4:00 PM Eastern time. Listeners can register free at BigPictureTrading.com.

Erik Townsend: Okay, Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. Mike's argument is that the uranium supply deficit exists independently of the AI investment cycle. Existing reactors need fuel, utilities need to replenish inventories, and new mine supply continues to face rising costs and delays. Yet uranium investments are being sold alongside the broader AI trade, creating an opportunity to acquire physical exposure at a substantial discount to its underlying asset value. This week I'm looking at the Sprott physical uranium trust, which U.S. investors may know by its OTC symbol SRUUF. That quotation doesn't offer US-listed options, so this strategy requires access to the Canadian dollar listing U.UN with options trading on the Montreal Exchange. Using the $26.60 as a reference price, a return to full net asset value would imply a price around $31.50 based on our, our working estimate. But the trust frequently trades at a discount, so a full convergence is an ambitious just an assumption. The more practical question is whether today's deep discount could narrow to something closer to 5 to 10%.

At an unchanged $31.50 net asset value, even a 10% discount would imply a unit price near $28.35. That gives us a recovery objective without requiring uranium itself to appreciate. To express that, I'm looking at the January 15th, 2027, $25 by $28 bull call spread. Buying the $25 call around $2.50 and selling the $28 call at $0.90 produces a net debit of $1.60 per unit. All figures are in Canadian dollars.

The long call contains $1.60 of intrinsic value, and 90 cents of time value. So selling that upper strike offsets the time value entirely, leaving the expiration breakeven at $26.60, our reference price. So at $28 or higher at expiration, the spread produces a maximum profit of $1.40 per unit. We therefore need only a partial narrowing of the discount to reach the upper strike strike, assuming the underlying net asset value remains stable. Higher uranium prices could also support the unit price, giving us another route to the same outcome, or the two could simply be working together. Now, the discount can persist or widen, and falling uranium prices could reduce net asset value, but our maximum loss is the $1.60 premium paid, with January defining the window for the thesis to develop.

So we're committing limited capital with no net time premium at these reference prices for a modest normalization in valuation. We don't need uranium to surge or the discount to disappear. We just need enough of that valuation gap to close. That's where's the trade.

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick, turning to equities here. Stocks have recovered a lot of ground, but what would convince you that this correction we got over the last couple months is now

S&P bounce, Nasdaq weakness and the AI sell-off

Patrick Ceresna: That's a great question, Massil. So let's put this into context. Obviously, last Thursday we had a very big washout in the markets that caused some very short-term oversold readings right across the board. And really the story over the last week has been mean reversion. The S&P 500 now has rallied back towards 7,700, retesting the 50-day moving average and approaching a 61.8 retracement. of its prior decline. And so as of this moment, this has just been a bounce in the markets. And at the same time, the Nasdaq has actually been incredibly weak. While the S&P has corrected around 7% from peak to trough, the Nasdaq dropped closer to 16% peak to trough. And what has to be identified here is that the Nasdaq bounce has actually been relatively weaker and in many ways hasn't even taken a stab toward that 50-day moving average. The market actually staying structurally in sell mode. And even though the rally felt very real over the last few days, there's no evidence that a new bull market has resumed.

But what is the interesting part? Well, first of all, the breadth of the market has been surprisingly strong. We remain around 71% of stocks above their 50-day moving averages. That's because this entire sell-off has been almost entirely centered around the AI story and semiconductors. For instance, the semiconductor ETF, the SMH, is down roughly 30% from peak to trough during this period. So the question now is, will the sector rotation that's been rotating money out of this AI story into many of these consumer staples— So moving forward, the real risk is, does the broader market start to participate in a bigger sell-off, or does it stay resilient. What continues to be super interesting is that the Mag Sevens have been a mixed bag. While certainly Google and Nvidia have been substantial drags on the Mag Sevens, Apple continues to hold along 52-week highs. Will we continue to see a few of these Mag Sevens holding up, or is there going to be a widening of the potential sell cycle?

That's going to really decide whether or not the bull can re-resume or whether there's another big round of selling as we move forward.

Massil Beguenane: All right, let's talk inflation because the latest October report has

Hot CPI, the dollar breakout, oil and gold

Massil Beguenane: pushed yields and the dollar back higher again. Now, how does that change the picture going forward?

Patrick Ceresna: So inflation came in hotter than expected this week, 40 basis points on the CPI month over month and 30 basis points on core. So this is where the pressure on the whole market is going to likely come from. What we had was inflation came in hotter than expected, 40 basis points on CPI month over month, 30 basis basis points on core. And Waller came in with a message saying that a December tightening may have warrant a 50 basis point hike if these inflation numbers came in hot. And so now the rates markets is starting to price in the potential that there's going to be even a 50 basis point move here. The interesting part about this is that it created substantial moves in the bonds and dollar. What we saw was bonds materially break down and rates rocket higher on this expectation. At the same time, a decisive breakout in the US dollar to the upside. And what's notable is that it was against almost every cross-currency, the euro, the pound, the Aussie, the Canadian dollar, and even the yen broke a 1-month trade range with a dollar breakout.

And so what we're seeing here is that from an intermarket perspective, there was a very clear response And now the question is, is a hawkish and tight Fed and a rates market that is once again tightening conditions and a dollar that continues to strengthen going to behave as a disruptor to risk assets? This is certainly a headwind setting up for the markets here, Mas.

Massil Beguenane: Now, looking at crude oil, the asset has had one big roller coaster as the WTI gave back roughly $20 in a matter of a week. How are you weighing the next move

Patrick Ceresna: Well, definitely in this post-election period, oil went from $105 down to the mid-$80s, wiping out close to $20 of risk premium. The central question is, is the peace optimism warranted to pull out $20 of risk premium? Now, we're still in a backdrop of very depleted global inventories. There's very little buffer left in there. And will there be a genuine de-escalation in the Middle East, or is there a risk that the situation will once again deteriorate and the oil will resume back to the upside. It's a big factor because it's going to decide the path of inflation and certainly how hawkish the Fed is going to be. So this is going to be still in the driver's seat, and whether or not there's a re-escalation may very well act as a disruptor potentially to risk assets as we move

Massil Beguenane: All right, let's turn to gold because we saw a strong rebound in the asset as yields retreated, but now that's completely been reversed. What does that tell you about the underlying trend in precious metals?

Patrick Ceresna: Certainly a lot of gold investors got excited about the turn up in gold over the last week, but when the inflation numbers came in hot and that US dollar broke out, rates started to come up, suddenly gold is already fading off of a test of its 50-day moving average. Look, the primary trend is still down. Lower highs, lower lows. Almost all rallies are met with selling. At some point, gold will be cheap and will set up for a major buying opportunity and a reversal of trend. But as of this moment, when you really look at the way the price action is behaving, you have to respect that the prevailing downtrend that's been in place for almost a year is still very much there.

And so at this moment, respect the prevailing downtrend. The vulnerability is that a breakdown here could send us down towards $3,600 on the downside. We'll be watching for where that inflection point is for the potential next big buying opportunity.

Massil Beguenane: All right, listeners, and that does it for this week's trading Desk. I'm Massil Beguenane.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Have a great trading day, everyone.

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Erik Townsend: Purposes only.

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Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna welcome Michael Every to MacroVoices. Erik and Michael discuss:

  • The Blue Tsunami and War Powers
  • Israel, Iran and Energy Prices
  • Data-Center Pauses and the Uranium Selloff
  • Gridlock and the 2027 Debt Ceiling
  • Crack Spreads and the Tariff Regime
  • Michael Every argues the Democratic sweep is a geopolitical shock as well as a US political one: a war without Congress or public backing becomes far harder for the US to sustain after January.
  • If the US exits the Middle East, Every says Iran, alongside Russia, China and North Korea, could fill the vacuum, or Israel and Turkey could step up; neither outcome argues for lower energy prices, at least short-term.
  • If AI is genuinely national security, Every says the data-center pauses throw the US lead away to China.
  • Every sees a credible case for two years of gridlock but not indefinitely, and expects a 2027 debt-ceiling standoff to follow the familiar playbook before markets normalize.
  • On oil, Every sees further Russia-Ukraine escalation as more likely, keeping crack spreads and energy prices high until some resolution, and reads the recent drop in energy prices as optimism rather than realism.

Michael Every — Rabobank's Global Strategist (as introduced on the show)

Cold open and introduction

Michael Every: Tariffs are historically, as neomercantilist history shows, pretty much the only way that you are going to reindustrialize. And if the US isn't going to do that, how is it going to maintain an economy capable of supporting the vast military-industrial complex that it needs to be global policeman?

Erik Townsend: That was Rabobank geostrategist Michael Every. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices. the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 557 was produced on November 5th, 2026. This week's topic has to be the US midterm elections and their impacts on markets. And who better to cover that topic than Rabobank's Michael Every? We'll discuss the blue tsunami in the midterms, market implications of the data center moratoria, and how President Trump's likely growing conflicts with Congress will affect both the Iran and the Ukraine conflict.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

The blue tsunami as a geopolitical shock; Congress and war powers

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Rabobank's global strategist, Michael Every. Michael, it's great to have you back. Obviously, US elections and their consequences for financial markets are the only plausible topic for this week's show. Why don't we just dive in from the top? What's your take in terms of— I think it's pretty darn clear that Democrats took both houses of Congress, but let's go to the next level. What should we see that maybe not everyone is seeing?

Michael Every: Everyone is rightly talking about what a political shock this is within the US system. What perhaps not everyone fully grasps in all of its complexities is what a shock it is for the world in a geopolitical context, because what happens in America doesn't stay in America. And if things are going to be changing in America, they're going to change for everyone else too.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's talk about the things that are going to change for everyone else. Obviously, the big question, I think, what seems to me like the biggest question is the Democrats have already vowed to stop the Iran war. Of course, congressional approval is theoretically required for wars, but doesn't seem to always in practice be required. Is that going to change? Are the Democrats going to push that? And particularly, What levers do they have? Is there a funding cutoff? You know, if Democrats say you can't have a war without our approval because we've got the Congress and the president says, well, I'm the president, I'm going to do what I want, what can they do to stop him?

Michael Every: On that long constitutional grass remains to be seen. The power of the purse is significant, but I think the perhaps more pertinent point is it's difficult enough to win a war anyway, particularly in the Middle East. And we can see that very clearly at the moment. It's enormously harder when you're fighting a political war at home and you don't even have the backing of Congress, let alone of the public. So that's only going to make it harder for the US to continue to act longer term, at least after January when we get the new Congress sitting. And that's an important caveat there.

But that itself has enormous ramifications. Because if this is something that's going to be the norm, just not for this war, but more generally that the US is now constrained on foreign policy by a Congress that doesn't want the kind of adventures that have been quite normal up until recently, it means that the US is a greatly constrained geopolitical actor. Were that to be true.

Israel, Iran and the risk of nuclear escalation

Erik Townsend: If the US becomes greatly constrained, it seems that Israel no longer has a partner in this war. Does that end the war? Does it leave Israel and Iran fighting a different war that the US steps out of? How does that evolve?

Michael Every: Well, again, remains to be seen. It's a very fluid situation, but it can, on one level, if you look at a rough spectrum of outcomes, it can see the ultimate TACO, which I've always threatened could be the whole enchilada of the US saying, well, we are done with the Middle East because if they're done here, they're done in the Middle East.

Full stop, which obviously changes the global energy complex, obviously changes the great game that's being played between the US, China, and others in terms of control of regions and resources and supply chains, and really tells the region that you're on your own now.

And power abhors a vacuum. So either Iran could fill that vacuum, and of course they would be holding hands with Russia and China and North Korea. And that changes the world quite dramatically. Or you could see them attempt to assert themselves. And as you said, Israel say, well, we're having none of that and step up again without the US helping them. And the question is, would the US not just not help them, would the US potentially even hinder them with the Democratic Congress? Is that possible?

And/or Turkey stepping up and saying, well, actually, here's our opportunity to expand our Middle Eastern footprint. And where do those clashes— Yeah. Occur were all of those or some of those scenarios to transpire.

So in other words, you either end up with a region which is pretty much being bossed by America's geostrategic opponents, which obviously comes at a cost for America Inc. and Americans back home, whether they recognize the reality of America Inc. or not. Or it's a region which is being destabilized by rival powers trying to fill that power vacuum that used to be held by the US. In neither case, at least short-term, does that make an argument for lower energy prices.

Erik Townsend: It seems to me, at the risk of bringing up the awkward topic, that Israel is a nuclear state. If they no longer have the support of the United States in a conventional war, it sounds to me like there is a risk of a nuclear escalation because without the assistance of the United States, they can't win the war any other way. Is that a risk?

Michael Every: One doesn't rule anything in or out, but I have to say, I still think that's an extremely fat tail risk and nothing more than that. And there's a good reason for that. First of all, to cross that red line, particularly as a small country rather than a great power, would have enormous implications for Israel. So that would really be a last moment life or death option.

And secondly, the heuristic is such that back in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which in the early stages saw genuine fears within Israel that it was going to lose and be wiped off the map, even at that stage, Prime Minister Golda Meir didn't reach for the red button.

So I'm not saying it's impossible. I'm not saying that the increasingly common possibility of Brandishing it about as a threat couldn't happen, but it's certainly not something that I think we need to lose too much sleep over, at least not for the moment.

Erik Townsend: Is Israel believed to have tactical nuclear weapons, the equivalent of dial-a-yield where they can use a limited nuclear strike, or is it kind of an all-or-nothing thing for them?

Michael Every: I don't believe they have tactical nuclear weapons, and I still think that would open the same can of worms for them as a smaller economy. Particularly because just to show how muddy these waters get, if we are going to see an aggressive decoupling of the Israeli and American military going forward, which by the way is not the face of legislation currently still working its way through the old Congress, which would actually link them up at the R&D level.

But if we are going to see a geopolitical parting of the ways, which is hypothetical, but it's certainly what recent tweets have been pointing towards, were that to occur, Israel is going to look for other allies, and one of them I would imagine would be India, which offers obviously far less technology, but a very large population and the ability to produce at scale and a desire for Israeli tech.

And India would not be too thrilled with Israel starting to brandish nuclear weapons. So I can think it'd be easily boxed in before it even began to think about doing something like that.

Data-center pauses, AI and the nuclear/uranium selloff

Erik Townsend: Let's come back to much more realistic and likely outcomes, including one that I think is pretty darn certain at this point, which is data centers are going to be paused in a bunch of states. Some people are actually using the phrase regime change in Texas to describe what's just happened there. So why don't we do a quick summary of that and what are the implications of these data center pauses that have been announced already by Democrats as obviously a remedy or a mitigation for high electric bills?

Michael Every: Sure. There are a lot of kind of conflated points that come into this, which is, first of all, there's still a wall of money being thrown at that sector. And at the same time, the US at the highest level for now, and I would imagine after they've been briefed, even the new Democratic Congress are going to be told that certain individuals still see this as a national security issue rather than just an economic issue. And as such, China can't be allowed to get ahead in this Sputnik style or Manhattan project style race. So that dynamic may still play out in the background. If it doesn't, you also still have the issue that were the goods needed to build all those data centers from the ground up? We're talking water, we're talking copper, we're talking chips, everything you need and the electricity. Was it actually there or were they fantasy to an extent? So there are lots of reasons to suspect that maybe some of this was going to be washed out anyway.

But if that's not the case, if everything was locked and loaded and ready to go, and if it really was and is crucial for national security, and nonetheless a more understandable Luddite stance kicks in saying, well, we don't want this, then you have to ask yourself the question, is it genuinely national security? And if it is, then the US is throwing that lead away to China and we don't know what the long-run implications are. But if it is what it purports to be, it would not be good for USA Inc. And China may pick up that ball and run with it, and then the world looks very different.

Erik Townsend: Something I've been fascinated with just in the short time since this outcome is despite the fact that the stock market broadly is up pretty darn hard, back up to the 50-day moving average as we're speaking here, it seems to me like you would think if the problem that Democrats are concerned with is electric bills and we need more energy, that the part of President Trump's strategy, which is dominance in energy and therefore the nuclear buildout, would still be viable. But actually nuclear and uranium stocks took a much bigger hit. They're still down even as the rest of the stock market is recovering. And it seems that they're getting pulled down with the AI trade in the data centers, despite the fact— Right. that they're the solution to the problem that is causing this whole pause on data centers. What do you make of that?

Michael Every: Well, I know this is an area that, you know, you are particularly specialist in. I would say that as someone who's not, your logic is sound in that whoever has power, electricity has power, and obviously China has lots of power in that respect. And there's widespread recognition that this needs to be done. And there are lots of issues to do with AI anyway, in terms of rising income and wealth inequality, what it means for the political economy, et cetera, et cetera. Those need to be separately addressed, not just in the US, but everywhere. And no one has a good answer for them yet.

But if you do have the ability to at least provide abundant, cheap power, which as you said, would logically have to come from some new nuclear kind of mechanism, that speaks to me for a necessity which isn't going to go away. So yeah, I can see what you're saying.

Gold, a weaker dollar and the fiscal outlook

Erik Townsend: Now gold has performed extremely well. A lot of people are saying that's because of market expectations that there will be a lot more spending and probably a weaker dollar going forward. Is that your take? How do you interpret the reaction of gold?

Michael Every: Well, we've already got the weaker dollar slightly just on the back of the uncertainty, which is real because previously, for all the volatility that we saw, you could narrow down to a certain range what the most likely outcomes were from a Trumpian policy going forward. Now we have no idea because, you know, it could be pulled in wildly different directions. Gold obviously is volatile like everything else.

I'm not sure what will transpire specifically on the fiscal front because you can make a very credible argument that it's going to be complete gridlock for 2 years.

Absolutely. Obviously that cannot continue indefinitely. You have debt ceilings that get hit, et cetera, et cetera. And at some point spending bills are going to be put forward by Congress. And I think they're going to be quite generous given that the Democrats will be putting them forward. And it remains to be seen if Trump is finally going to be a fiscal hawk when it's the Democrats asking, or if he'll actually indulge some of them. So we really don't know, and the outcomes will be determinative of whether those particular trades are correct or not. It's very difficult to project all the futures that could now transpire from the very limited information set that we have so far.

Gridlock, lame duck Congress, Russia-Ukraine and a war-powers showdown

Erik Townsend: Now, a lot of people had predicted that if we had this outcome, there would be essentially a gridlock in Washington. President can veto anything, so nothing gets passed, and it's good for markets. I think something you've been pretty outspoken on before is, well, wait a minute, there's another side of that, which is what if this is the beginning of just a massive confrontation where everything in Washington is not gridlocked, but is totally focused on impeachment hearings and the next round of Democrats versus President Trump. How do you think that plays out? And also, let's tie that into this lame duck question, which I know you were just quoted on the radio today as commenting on. Is there such a thing as a lame duck Congress, and what can they do between now and when the new Democrat-controlled Congress takes over?

Michael Every: There is a lame duck presidency and a lame duck Congress, and obviously that tends to kick in just for the last few months. So for. we're already in the lame duck Congress phase. A lame duck presidency, we're a long way away from that. Trump still has 2 years. He's got veto power. He can still issue executive orders left, right, and center. And for now, and for as long as the court composition doesn't change, the Supreme Court may actually continue to support him. Quite a lot of that.

So one's a lame duck, the other isn't. Congress can still pass legislation, although of course it would have to decide whether it will overcome the self-imposed filibuster, which may or may not last under a Democrat Senate, to whether it will or won't act on that in the near term. In terms of what legislation it will pass, it still then comes down to how it's actually implemented by the executive. And that's always open to question whether people will Vigorously enforce a statute or look the other way on it.

But I do think that there's broad agreement from both DC insiders and those who are looking at it in terms of like, you know, the global implications that if Washington gets caught in a navel-gazing kind of finger-jabbing, self-destructive cycle of both sides trying to out-lawyer and crush the other one rather than finding any way to collaborate, It's obviously bad for a great many people, and it's particularly bad, if I may, to pivot back to the geopolitical argument for a world which may not have liked much of what Trump represented, but which now faces the prospect of an even more isolationist US, as we've said about the Middle East. But that can apply on other fronts too.

For example, Russia-Ukraine. You know, we've got Russia-Ukraine negotiations supposed to start in the next few days, led and brokered by the US. Is Putin seriously going to try and take a deal now if he thinks Washington, DC is going to be in complete turmoil and Trump can't get anything through and he can't get an armaments package through Congress to fund the Pentagon going forward?

Is he really going to back down or is he going to escalate? And if he escalates, is Ukraine going to escalate in turn? And if it does, does that mean that more oil refineries get hit in Russia? And does that mean that diesel prices, even though crude prices have come down hugely in the last 2 days, believing that Middle East peace is imminent, and I've just said it may well not be, what if Russia-Ukraine peace isn't imminent either and you actually get an escalation on both fronts and the markets are pricing this completely wrong because of potential gridlock and weakness in Washington?

Erik Townsend: Well, let's imagine that scenario of an escalation on both fronts. And I think President Trump's personality is such that he would likely respond fairly aggressively in that situation. If Congress is trying to stop him, it seems like there's a potential shock in markets if we suddenly realize that not only was the expectation of gridlock wrong, but the conflict is going to be of historic proportion. And there's never been a greater conflict where a Congress is trying to stop a president from prosecuting a war. And we finally get to a resolution of this question of congressional approval for wars.

It seems like that could be a huge, huge upset.

Michael Every: It could. Again, not a base case, but it would certainly go to the Supreme Court and we don't know how they would rule because it's difficult to predict exactly what their interpretation of precedent and statute would be. But just imagine, and again, that's one way of looking at it. Just imagine the potential outcomes on either side. On one hand, they say executive has complete power, carry on. Okay, well, that certainly clarifies the question, but it raises a lot of issues. And on the other hand, if they say no, Congress absolutely can stop this happening.

As I said, just imagine a US world policeman, as it's often dubbed, where you have a domestic polity clearly expressing the fact that they don't want any more wars, regardless of the fact that this war in Iran is a fraction of the length and a fraction of the sacrifice that we saw in previous never-ending wars in the Middle East, sending the signal to Washington, DC, we don't want any more of them. And as a result of the world realizing this is now a 100 years ago, very isolationist 1920s US rather than 2020s. And that means that power abhorring a vacuum, you can expect other people who don't have Congresses that can slow them down like that to say, what gaps can we fill with our power and where?

And the US not being able to do anything about it. So yeah, the potential geopolitical shock here is enormous.

And that's above and beyond The genuinely quite serious risks of Middle East escalation with Trump saying, I'm going to do something in this lame duck congressional period to try and shift, move the needle before everything changes in January, and Russia and Ukraine doing exactly the same thing. So that could be the short-term shock. Then you potentially get that congressional showdown, and then we see where we go on the other side of it. It's very hard to price these things in, but the potential volatility I'm describing should be pretty clear.

Dollar index and the 2027 debt ceiling

Erik Townsend: Michael, as we're speaking on Wednesday evening, the dollar index is just about 101.18, almost at the lowest point it's been in at least a couple of months. Is this the beginning of a new downtrend, or would that escalation that you described— you know, normally if you see a geopolitical escalation, it's dollar up, but there's so many other reasons with, uh, with what's just happened to think dollar down— how would you see that one playing out?

Michael Every: Purely hypothetically, because I'm not giving any kind of FX forecast here, you are absolutely right. Traditionally, any kind of geopolitical tensions would see everyone running back to the dollar, and we have still seen that. But earlier in the year, that didn't work in quite the same way because we had questions over the US political framework from excess Trumpism, if you will, against that geopolitical risk. And now ironically, you could have geopolitical risk coinciding with an absence of potential Trumpism, and the market's still saying we don't like that either. So remains to be seen.

But again, the potential moves that we could be looking at are really quite notable.

Erik Townsend: Now, the 2027 debt ceiling is a potential lever that the Democrats could use to try to constrain the president. What would the market implications be if they used the debt ceiling as a negotiating tactic, if you will?

Michael Every: I don't think on that front, if that's happening purely in isolation with, you know, without any other drama alongside it, we know pretty much how that plays out. So I don't think there'll be anything particularly new in the trading handbook there. And it's always a question of how long until someone blinks and everything goes back to normal. And it can be days or weeks or, you know, at worst months.

And then we return to normal. So I don't think that's a playbook which is going to challenge people too much.

Oil, Iran escalation, refinery strikes and crack spreads

Erik Townsend: Michael, let's talk about what this means for energy prices. Something that I'm fascinated by really is that so far as of Wednesday evening, we've seen straight down on oil prices, presumably because President Trump said that he was not likely to strike Iran right away, although he was very clear in saying that he might. It sounds like the market is betting that this blue sweep is going to in some way constrain the president. Is that your view? I had frankly thought that another escalation was likely after the midterms. I think you had said at one point it was not likely until after the midterms. So is it likely now? And if so, what's going on with oil prices?

Michael Every: I alluded to this. So to spell it out clearly, for months my base case has been that on the other side of the midterms, which I don't think anyone expected to be as much of a blue tsunami as they have been. Trump would escalate with Iran because he would have that window before a new Congress to try and get the job finished.

And that would likely happen with far more forces in place on the ground in the region, in countries like Saudi Arabia. For example, the French and the British have both got jets there now to try and protect Yanbu and Riyadh, et cetera, et cetera. To allow that action to transpire.

On the other hand, you have to say, while that dynamic is absolutely still in play because Trump is obviously licking his wounds, and while he's just been given a kicking for this war, he's already received the kicking. So if he can now manage to flip the script, now whether that's likely or not is a different question. One has to put oneself in his mind rather than discussing every potential outcome of that scenario itself. But if he's thinking, let's roll the dice and see if I can double down on this and win, then yeah, you're going to get that escalation.

And you have to consider, as I've already mentioned, then saying the alternative is we just go home is very, very bad. And then saying we just continue the blockade, which is what they have been saying up until recently, is also bad because you know that doesn't really provide you with an out.

2 years from now, eventually you may get a new president as well as a new Congress. So that's not really going to solve any problems, even if there's no guarantee that escalating does. But there is obviously now, I think, a higher chance than previously that Trump does this TACO slash the whole enchilada and says, okay, here's a token action, and then I just retreat. But I have to emphasize, or reemphasize, I don't think that is going to bring energy prices down sustainably the way that the US would like to see. And I don't think it's better for the US geostrategic position, much unlike the position that many of the people who voted in the election would like to see.

So there is a common understanding, and if I were American, I would feel very much the same way. Don't get me wrong, that if we just vote no, we don't want any more wars, we won't have any more wars. Well, unfortunately, being anti-war doesn't prevent war. You know, the old Latin phrase is si vis pacem, para bellum.

If you want peace, prepare for war. And I say that as someone who's certainly no neocon before anyone tries to ascribe a belief system to me, and who was passionately opposed to the Second Gulf War, by the way, just over 20 years ago. So that's my track record on that. But The theoretical framework of just saying we don't want war, therefore you won't get it, isn't how the world works when you are hegemonic.

Erik Townsend: Well, let's imagine that the US did pull back or not escalate. It seems to me that that really probably means that Ukraine would continue to strike Russian oil refineries because it's the US that's been trying to restrain that. And although I feel like I've been misunderstood by a lot of our listeners sending angry emails. I'm not rooting for Russia in the conflict. I'm just saying if you strike oil refineries anywhere in the world, you're reducing global refining capacity and crack spreads will stay elevated, dramatically elevated for years after the war is over. So let's imagine that there is kind of a pullback in terms of participation in this war, what does that mean in terms of the refinery strikes and crack spread outlook?

Michael Every: It can only be bullish for that particular crack spread. And therefore you have to ask yourself, how likely is it? And again, we've already touched on this, but in order to get the de-escalation deal, even if it's just a frozen conflict, North Korea, South Korea style, which I think is the best you're going to get, to get that done, you need obviously the US standing behind it and you need Russia and Ukraine to both agree. Otherwise, the war goes on. So Ukraine, seeing Trump is weaker, may or may not think now's the time to make a deal.

But Russia almost certainly will look around and say, well, why now? Trump will be even weaker 6 months from now, so maybe he'll have to come back to us You know, on far, far weaker terms and we'll be able to strike a harder bargain. So in that particular way, the logic suggests to me that while any outcome is still possible, the probability is more likely that we get more escalation on that particular front. And potentially, as I just said, at the same time as we get escalation in the Middle East, at which point, yeah, crack spreads stay high and frankly, so do energy prices until there's some kind of resolution.

Now that doesn't mean, of course, the Middle East war rages forever. It could be that the US Manages to succeed in what it's doing, at which point, you know, they would come down sharply on that front, or things are destabilized to the point where other players are getting sucked in and you have a, you know, a long-running destabilizing rolling conflict there, similar to what we have now to an extent, but slightly different partners or slightly different players playing in different ways. And again, that supports energy prices. So I'm not pooh-poohing any of the trading-based fundamentals that we've seen recently. They make a lot of sense. And we are seeing, you know, really historic headlines which deserve historic price swings. But I don't see the dove of peace, you know, flying through the air with an olive branch in its beak at the moment. Unfortunately,

Grand macro strategy after the midterms

Erik Townsend: a lot of your framing of everything has been around economic statecraft changing everything and the old playbook being dead. It seems like the new playbook is probably dying as well. So is there a new playbook?

Michael Every: Well, there's going to have to be. And the first thing I want to say on that front is that what I dub grand macro strategy, which is grand strategy, the old international relations concept, and macro strategy, which is obviously market-facing stuff. So that's where the portmanteau of grand macro strategy comes from.

That was something that I certainly believed and continue to believe was something that the White house was Utilizing. But that doesn't mean for a moment that every grand macro strategy is guaranteed success in every aspect of what it's doing.

And that doesn't mean there can't be inherent contradictions, just as there are in any political platform, whether it's international or domestic. And you can certainly see that the lack of the focus on affordability, the lack of the ability to get this war done and dusted very quickly, like Venezuela, because as an aside, the message is yes, the US doesn't like war. The US didn't have quite such a problem with Venezuela, the special military operation, because that was over in 2 or 3 days with absolutely minimal bloodshed. So it's not the interjection into other countries perhaps that's the problem. It's doing it and not winning or not winning quickly. But if you're not going to win quickly, then you need to pivot. And clearly over the past couple of months, there hasn't been a good plan B. For what to do next to make sure you don't get a shellacking in the midterms.

And from these midterms onwards, that grand macro strategy will have to change again. Energy is going to have to be looked at, but again, you won't get lower energy prices just by saying, guess what? I don't want war and I'm sorry. If that were the case, it would be wonderful and we really could de-escalate everything very quickly. But to do it, you have to give up so much geostrategic advantage in other areas that there is a very serious cost across the entire economic and military-industrial complex going forward that's pretty hard to recover from. That's why I argued all year up until recently that Trump wouldn't do a TACO. That still holds.

So we have to consider that very strongly.

Food and fertilizer via Hormuz; the future of tariffs

Erik Townsend: Let's touch not just on energy, but also on food and fertilizer flows through Hormuz. This is something we've talked about before, and I've been quite surprised You know, it's at least so far the food price, you know, the looking at grain prices and so forth, we haven't seen that transmission of fertilizer affecting grain prices or even, you know, the term structure of grain prices. That expectation I was thinking would get built into the market of much higher grain prices doesn't seem to be materializing. What do you think's going on there?

Michael Every: Well, it's a complex picture. Rabobank is fortunate to have some of the world's leading experts on that particular field working for them. And I'll profess I'm not one, so therefore I don't want to take too much of their work in vain. All I will say is that it's been complex and to do with the timing of agricultural seasons and expectations about how long this will or won't last, stock depletion and demand destruction in some cases. So it's It's an interaction of all of them. But if we do continue to see sulfur prices where they are, and were we to get further sustained disruption of the energy complex globally, obviously with a lag, things could still change on that front.

What I would like to do actually, if I may, is pivot to something that I think is a good kind of middle ground between what you've just asked there and what I was just alluding to in terms of grand macro strategy and possible shifts in it. And one of them is something else that's come up. in the post-election appraisals, which is tariffs.

Now, they were controversial in 2025, if you remember. And at the time I said, wait for 2026, things are going to be a lot wilder. And they are. I think this could, and I stress could, be a potential window for a change in the tariff regime, but not a removal of the concept of the tariff regime. Because if we do what I just did on the geopolitical front, which is to say, What happens if I put up my hand and say, let's reverse this. No more of this. I want the easy out. Do I get the answer that I want? And the answer is no, you don't. You don't get the solution or the resolution that you want. Does it work on the geoeconomic front?

If America were to say, Trump's tariffs are a disaster. Let's say Congress passes anti-tariff legislation or new tariff legislation that changes the powers that Trump currently has. Some Republicans help. And he has to decide whether to veto it or not. And they managed to even overturn the veto. Let's just imagine that, which is not totally impossible, but it's unlikely.

What does that do? Well, okay, let's say you remove the tariff regime. First of all, obviously you remove some income from a government that's already struggling to raise it and you reduce the cost of things short term. Absolutely you do. Undeniably, removing tariffs will lower costs. You also remove any leverage you have to try and reindustrialize.

Because frankly, unless you're going to throw subsidies at industries, which is just as expensive but in a different way, tariffs are historically, as neo-mercantilist history shows, pretty much the only way alongside other aspects of industrial policy that you are going to reindustrialize.

And if the US isn't going to do that, with or without AI helping to keep labor costs down, how is it going to maintain a resilient economy and an economy capable of supporting the vast military-industrial complex that it needs to be global policeman, global hegemon? And the answer is, over time, it isn't.

We already see that now. That wouldn't happen in 5 minutes, but if you project the dots forward, you are accelerating the decline of America as global hegemon. Which I can tell you again is not a painless exit through the gift shop where you get to basically be an isolationist, you know, peacenik just making, you know, the peace sign at everybody and enjoying a nice way of life, you know, with far more affordability. Quite the opposite. Again, the zero-sum nature of access to some resources would mean that America could likely be much, much worse off.

Even if there are high economic costs to support the military-industrial complex the way that it has been done over the past 40 years, the two are not directly opposite to each other. You know, there are other ways of doing things. So I don't necessarily see how that's going to work either.

Therefore, what I think could be logical, and I'm hypothesizing, is you could see some kind of bargain being struck where Trump says, look, I don't mind removing some tariffs, but I want to keep the ones on China and I want to keep the ones for transshipment on China.

And I want to therefore offer the same deal to other parties. For example, Europe, which is very close to introducing aggressive new tariff legislation against China. Why don't we have the same external tariff and we'll tariff each other less?

So in other words, what I thought Trump was trying to do with the USMCA, where Canada is the holdout, and with the Americas where now Brazil obviously is the big holdout. But extending that potentially to a far broader bloc, which not only myself but others have been postulating would be a logical endpoint for where we were going under Trump grand macro strategy anyway.

But we try and cut to the chase. And if we get that, hey, we've cut to the chase. We were in 2 blocs, fairly quickly. And if we don't, well then things get really interesting and really messy.

The US pulling back as global cop

Erik Townsend: Michael, extending that analogy of the US acting as the global cop or the police force of the world, when the cops go on strike, the criminals come out and start doing more crimes. What can we project, if anything, in terms of economic consequences of that US pullback from the cop role? What markets would be affected? What scenarios would play out?

Michael Every: The geopolitical flashpoints are pretty well known, but you'd be surprised how many new ones may emerge because you would pretty rapidly find out if there is no cop on the beat, which households in the international sense are believers in the Second Amendment and which ones aren't. And the ones that aren't, that don't also have aggressive guard dogs or very high Fences and/or CCTV are the ones that are not going to sleep well at night.

And it's deeply unpleasant to consider that. I don't say it with any kind of glee whatsoever, but a core argument of mine that I've been making for years, and I'm making on the road now again, is that the world system is crumbling. And, you know, the backlash to which has itself just sustained a big crack. But nonetheless, the world system, which is crumbling, was built by US military power in world War II and US military power and financial power in the Cold War.

And once that goes away, and ultimately it will go away if the US is deindustrialized and therefore can't maintain its military-industrial complex to maintain that role going forward, and that's exactly where we are now, that system will crumble away. And when it does, there's a power vacuum. And yeah, international crime rates soar.

Erik Townsend: Meanwhile, the chief of police, the president of the United States, as you say, is being constrained a lot in some of his power, and presumably that means he's going to gravitate toward the things that are still completely within his control, executive orders, tariffs, and so forth. What are the other things that we could expect President Trump to turn to if he's losing some of his power because of conflicts with the Congress?

Michael Every: It depends how ambitious he wants to be and what kind of markers he's putting down for whoever succeeds him as the 2028 Republican candidate. Because I think we can clearly say now he's not going to try and wangle a third term constitutionally. Somehow that's simply not going to happen. So therefore it depends. And that will say much about what the philosophy is. You can make a convincing argument, and many people already are, that MAGA has had its day. Okay, fair enough. Does traditional, what MAGA call RINO, traditional Republicanism, does that really have any solutions to where we are now? I would argue no. But then equally, without being party political, does any traditional party framework that doesn't take the 3-dimensional top-down geopolitics down to local politics approach, does that have all the answers? No. So something's going to have to be reinvented.

But if Trump wants to be really ambitious, and again, this is purely hypothetical, I'm just throwing darts at a board, but I'm throwing darts that were handed to me by the Trump administration over the past couple of years. Was there not a plan a few years ago when he first came into office or a promise of it to allow free land via lottery on federally owned land for young families to move to, to start townsteading again and just create entire new Communities.

I distinctly remember that idea being floated in the Magaverse. And potentially, if you want to talk about affordability, how about instead of squeezing yourself into these overpriced cities here and here, we're just going to start 10 new cities on federally owned land and lottery style, you get a plot of land and let's go build your house.

Now, of course, there are still issues with labor. There are still issues with inputs, et cetera, et cetera. That's where you've got to link up all your tariff network. That's where you've got to link up all your You know, potential bloc that you want to be working with, you know, with the carrot of something juicy to grow from.

But that's how you can square the top-down geopolitical circle down to the affordability agenda to try and actually get people to vote for you again. And it's just one dart of many that I'm throwing at a board there.

Third parties, 2028 and a wider range of outcomes

Erik Townsend: Now, based on what we've just seen, if the current sentiment holds for the next 2 years, it would be very difficult for, let's call it, the old school President Trump's version of the Republican party to win the presidential election in 2028. Some people have suggested that actually is an opening for a third party to be established, perhaps by the many people who were President Trump's allies that he had alienated, that stepped away from him. You know, the Marjorie Taylor Greene's and the Tucker Carlson's and the people who were behind President Trump that are now very outspokenly against President Trump. Is there a realistic scenario for them to start a third party that would have a realistic chance of actually taking the 2028 presidential election?

Michael Every: I'm not an American political scientist, even though I studied American history and American politics decades ago. And obviously you have to follow it closely in this profession. But I think that the historical track record is abundantly clear that there's a very clear possibility of that kind of third party emerging, and there's a 0% probability of that getting anywhere near any power.

Erik Townsend: So you think that party, if it was created, would just be a distractor? It wouldn't go anywhere.

Michael Every: One could argue quite vociferously it already was without existing in the election that just happened.

Erik Townsend: Well, certainly in this election, it seems that there were a lot of former supporters of President Trump who were casting an objection vote. So I guess it remains to be seen what happens in the next 2 years.

Michael Every: It does. And I think that's again, The key point that we had what looked like a glide path with a certain range of most likely or most probable outcomes. And now we have a glide path with a vastly wider range of probable outcomes. And energy prices over the last 2 days have shown exactly what that can mean in just one very narrow aspect of it. And yet, as I hope I have underlined, I think there is an enormous amount of optimism rather than realism in terms of what that short-term move has done. And no one right now, and no one will for a while, have a really clear view of what that new trajectory is until we start seeing what Trump does over the next day, hours, days, and weeks into this lame duck congressional period.

How to follow Michael Every

Erik Townsend: Well, Michael, as always, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview. I always enjoy our conversations. Before I let you go, tell us a little bit more, as you already mentioned, Rabobank is, I think, the world's largest food and agricultural bank. What else is going on there, and particularly in your department, what services are on offer and how do people follow your work?

Michael Every: Sure. So food services and energy, I would add there. And we're obviously the leading bank in the Netherlands too. So lots of good things there for Dutch consumers in particular. Where you can see my work is, first of all, if you're a Rabobank client at the Rabobank Knowledge website, it's all available there if you're already with us as a client. If not, have a look on LinkedIn and I post a lot of stuff there frequently, as do many of my colleagues.

And lastly, just to maintain the conversation flow, because this is all about the conversation to me in that there are always interesting data points from interesting people all around the world. On X, look for me and my handle there is @themichaelevery, all one word. And yeah, please come and have a chat.

Erik Townsend: I'll look forward to following up with you in a few months for another update.

Where's the trade: Marathon Petroleum and refining margins

Erik Townsend: Now it's time for our MacroVoices market Desk segment with Patrick and Massil. But Patrick, before we get into where's the trade, I heard that you're running some free options masterclasses, including one that digs into Nancy Pelosi's insider trading in Congress. What's the story there and where can people find more information?

Patrick Ceresna: Yes, I'm doing a 4-part live options masterclass featuring famous options trades. The first one digs into the Pelosi trades. It is scheduled for Tuesday, November 10th at 4:00 PM Eastern. Register for free at BigPictureTrading.com and bring your questions because I'll be answering them live.

Erik Townsend: Okay, Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. Michael's argument is that the markets may be too quick to translate political pressure to end these wars into lasting improvement in energy supply. Continued attacks on refineries could keep refining capacity contained even if crude prices retreat. That creates a potential opportunity in Marathon Petroleum, symbol MPC, where refining profitability depends on the spread between crude costs and the selling price of gasoline, diesel, and other fuels. What attracts me here is the magnitude of the recent correction. Over just 16 days, the stock has declined approximately $116 or 23% peak to trough, returning back to its September lows. The opportunity is to express the view that this sell-off represents an overshoot. Recovering even half that decline would create a substantial tactical rebound without requiring a return to the highs.

With MPC trading around $392.68, I'm looking at the December 18th 2026 $390 to $450 bull call spread with approximately 43 days till its expiration. Now, by buying the $390 call around $30 and selling the $450 call for about $10, it produces a $20 net debit per share for a $60-wide spread that commits $20 a share for a maximum profit potential of $40 a share, or a 2-to-1 profit-to-risk ratio. Expiration breakeven is $410, approximately 4.4% above the reference price. Now, of course, selling that upper strike reduces the premium committed by 1/3 while capping participation near our recovery objective. This is a tactical mean reversion trade supported by the refining margin thesis with a defined window for a rebound to develop.

So to put this into context, we're pairing a potentially excessive correction with a business that could continue to benefit from constrained refining capacity, committing a defined amount of capital to participate in a partial recovery. That's where's the trade.

Midterm rally, AI trade correction and oil overshoot

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick, what a week in markets with the Democratic sweep we got during midterm elections. Now equities went from an election night sell-off to a sharp rally during market hours yesterday. How are you assessing these 2 reactions together?

Patrick Ceresna: Listen, the Democratic sweep was the most probable outcome, and it even started with some overnight selling like many actually expected if that was going to be the election result. But there was a substantial recovery by the market. But what's really interesting is the divergence beneath the index. What we saw was a huge breakout in a number of the hyperscaler and Mag Sevens, particularly Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon. The 3 of them made substantial 5 to 6% gaps higher in all of this. Now, with that kind of a move in hyperscalers, one would think that could have been a turnaround in the semiconductors and the AI story, but that was farthest from the truth.

What we ended up seeing is that many of the AI infrastructure trades, including semiconductors, were all breaking down and selling on such a big update. In fact, they were not just breaking down, but they were breaking to fresh new multi-month lows. And so we have an index that basically is heavily weighted into these Mag Sevens, and breadth is improving as a lot of the initial reactions were that the oil coming off means inflation expectations are coming off, and all of these assets that were hurt through higher rates would suddenly get a huge new bullish tailwind. That's a lot of what-ifs that are developing here. For me, what we can clearly conclude at this moment is that the AI trade continues to correct. And the question is, do the hyperscalers have enough juice in the tank to keep the index elevated?

I would turn everyone's attention to the Nasdaq, which did not participate in this reversal at all. And I would view that it would be meaningfully bullish if the Nasdaq was able to reclaim its 50-day moving average and resume its trend, which is simply not the evidence right now that we're seeing. So the thing to watch going into next week was that, was this just a one-day kind of recalibration of the political outcome, or is this actually going to turn into new meaningful trends?

Massil Beguenane: Well, if anything caught anyone by surprise, it would be oil with its sell-off yesterday. Has the underlying outlook changed that much to warrant this big move?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, that's the question everyone is asking, and a great conversation with Erik and Michael on that topic. Listen, from Friday's peak to this decline that happened on day after the elections, we saw an $18 peak-to-trough correction in oil. Now, this is almost entirely risk premium as there really has not been any meaningful changes in where things were before the elections. What is clear is that the electoral defeat now puts stronger pressure to end the war. But like that conversation that Erik and Michael had, the concessions require meaningful settlement and political desire for an agreement. may not be equal on both sides. And so we're going to obviously be seeing how this develops. But in my mind, this is a big overshoot.

The way I assess this is that this has a lot of similarities to what Liberation day was for equities. When the tariffs were coming out, the market got shocked and assumed all the worst. And then after a few days, the market realized that the situation wasn't nearly as bad as what they were pricing and everything rebounded. The question here is, are we going to see something similar with oil as when the dust settles and everyone realizes that the situation in the Middle East hasn't changed that much, then will some of that risk premium return back to oil causing a bounce? It's certainly going to be very interesting to see how this develops going into the weekend.

Dollar, yields and gold's oversold bounce after midterms

Massil Beguenane: Now, the dollar also gave back some of its recent advance. Do you believe this could be the start of a meaningful change in trend?

Patrick Ceresna: When you really step back and look at the dollar's response, I think that this is a big tell, and we'll talk about it when we're discussing yields in a moment as well. Overall, one would believe that if this was a deep and meaningful change in the macro environment, then it should not have just impacted oil, but we should have seen responses in both the dollar and in the interest rate markets. And at least as of this moment, that has not really come around. Overall, we're seeing a dollar that's pretty much still settling down in levels where it was trading even before the elections. And so, we're not seeing a big meaningful reversal that would suggest that the dollar bull trend has now been somehow reversed.

Overall, this still has all the characteristics of a buy on dip. And the only meaningful reason why the dollar could actually break down here is if this oil breakdown was correct and a big peace deal was imminent.

Massil Beguenane: On that same note, bonds caught a bid in the last few weeks. Is it confirming the macro shift that stocks and oil seem to be pricing in?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, this is the interesting part, is that whether you're looking at the 10-year yield, the 30-year yield, or you're even looking at 2-year Treasury yields and/or shorter term SOFR, what we've basically seen is that the bond market did not move in any meaningful way.

In other words, bond traders are not convinced that something has dynamically changed. And this to me is a big tell. Usually if such a big event like what we saw with this election upset was actually changing the macro regime and we're going to change how things are going to be playing out in the months to come, there should have been a response in the dollar and yields. Now listen, we are 24 hours off of the elections, and so at this moment, things may still develop in the days to come that may start to move the bond markets. But at least as of this moment, the fact that they remain within the ranges they were before the election, that to me is a big tell.

Massil Beguenane: And gold finally got a pause from the midterms as it bounces back above $4,000. What would need to happen on the tape for it to convince you that a meaningful bottom is

Patrick Ceresna: Gold traders clearly are optimistic that this is an inflection point. When talking about gold, what we have to really put into context is where gold was prior to the elections. We were going through a 2-month, close to $900 drop, close, just under 20% decline, and gold was in an incredibly oversold state.

And it, all it really needed was some sort of a trigger to create some sort of a retracement and bounce. Now we're getting that. The elections clearly were enough of a catalyst to begin some sort of a countertrend as we're now taking a stab at approaching the 50-day moving average.

Now look, it was oversold and we got a bounce, and the macro environment of a weak dollar and lower rates and central bank easing and all the things that typically are the backdrop from which robust gold bull markets run are not there. And so, in my mind, this is an oversold bounce, and I would still be suspect that even if we get another $100 or $200 on the upside, which is a great short-term trade, I would be skeptical of it not following through.

It may very well be a déjà vu of the August move where we got from a very oversold state that quick rip on Bessent's news of the operation Twist. And after a few weeks of running, the sellers came right back in. I'm not saying that the gold run is already over, but I don't think that there's any evidence here that a new bull market has started, I'm gonna be a little bit skeptical, even if there's a few more hundred dollars to go on the upside. So that does it for this week's trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. See you next week, everyone.

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David Rosenberg — Rosenberg Research founder (as introduced on the show)

Cold open and housekeeping: Unplugged episodes and interview length

David Rosenberg: Historically, when a one-party power swings to a two-party system with gridlock, 80% of the time the economy slows, 80% of the time inflation goes down, and 80% of the time bond yields go down in that 2-year period after a national election.

Erik Townsend: That was Rosenberg Research founder David Rosenberg. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 552 was produced October October 1st, 2026. Listener response to our MacroVoices Unplugged bonus episode that gave you a double dose of Michael Every last week was overwhelmingly positive. So before we dive in with Rosie, a quick housekeeping announcement. Going forward, we'll consider adding MacroVoices Unplugged bonus episodes for guests like Michael and Anas Alhajji and others who just have too much to say for one episode. But out of respect for both your time and our production budget, quite frankly, we're only going to do that when the circumstances warrant. The next likely one would be when we bring Dr. Anas Alhajji back, and you can expect that before the end of the year, certainly, and maybe even before the end of this month. We've got to work that into our schedule. That would come complete with an Unplugged bonus episode.

And get this, if you want to influence the content of that Unplugged session, be sure to follow Anas on X because he's going to reach out to his audience for questions and topics that they want answered when we bring him back for that Unplugged session. Now, it's still a few weeks away, so you've got time now to make your requests known to Anas by tweeting them. Don't send them to us because Anas is collecting that information. He's going to assimilate it and we'll figure out what you guys want us to discuss in Anas's first appearance in an Unplugged session, which we'll do after a regular format. Another thing I want to announce as I have this opportunity is we are definitely committed to keeping the flagship podcast interview length to a target of 45 to 55 minutes and not more. That's out of respect for your time because we know you're busy. If you want the extended content, we'll always put it in a separate episode.

So what you can expect when we bring Anas back is a fairly tight update on the market and what's going on in the Middle East, and then a much broader discussion in the follow-on, which will probably come a day later again, but that one will be content that you've requested by tweeting it to Anas. Now let's dive into Rosie's latest interview. interview, which covers secular inflation, why Rosie doesn't buy the popular narrative, the AI boom and what could bust it, midterm elections as a setup for economic slowdown, as well as Washington gridlock, and much, much more. That's all coming up in today's episode of MacroVoices.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

Why inflation is overstated: tariffs that never passed through

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is David Rosenberg, also known as a bestselling author, new book coming out called Bear in the Bull Ring. That's October 6th, already available for preorder on Amazon, new ETF, ROSE ETF. Boy, perfectly named. We'll come back to the book and the ETF at the end of the interview. But David, I wanted to get you back on the program for one specific reason, which is it's hard to find anybody that is not flipped to inflationist and maybe even inflation alarmist because, well, it's in vogue right now. If there's anyone I know in this industry I can count on not to be an inflationist just because it's in vogue, it's David Rosenberg. So is inflation the thing we need to focus on? And if not, why not?

David Rosenberg: I'm never going to say that we shouldn't be watching inflation because that would be an irresponsible comment to make. But if you're going to ask me, is inflation the risk that the media and pundits on the business cable shows and Wall Street research reports Is inflation the big threat that it's made out to be? In my opinion, it's not.

And what I find interesting is that the same people now talking about inflation because of energy and specifically crack spreads and diesel were the same people that were yelling about inflation back in the spring, summer, and fall of last year because of the Trump tariffs. And we were going to have a mountain of product inflation, imported inflation.

And you know what? That never really did happen. It's not as if we didn't get a temporary bump in inflation from the tariffs, but you really have to strain your eye to see it.

And if it was going to show up in any persistent way, it would show up in the core goods CPI index. And what's interesting is that a year ago, the year-over-year trend in the core goods CPI was running at 1.5%. Today it's running below 0.7%. It's at a 4-year low.

So I would just ask the question, if we didn't get the big inflation from the big tariffs, and when you look at what the net effective tariff rate did, I mean, it went up a whole lot, the biggest increase since the early to mid-1930s, but there was never a sustained pass-through to final inflation where you think it would hit the most, which was in the core product sector.

And in fact, it's been decelerating over the past year. Somebody must have eaten the tariff increase. Was it the exporter who didn't want to sacrifice market share? Was it the importer at the border? Did it show up in profit margins in the affected sectors along the way? Or maybe all 3.

But the proof of the pudding's in the eating. And I asked the question, and we could extend the conversation further, but I would ask the people that think that because of a one-trick pony, which was, which is energy, why will that cause the sustained inflation that the Trump tariffs haven't managed to do?

Refinery damage, diesel and energy as a rate of change

Erik Townsend: Well, you make an excellent point, and I think it's also echoed. I had Harley Bassman on a couple of weeks ago. He says, boy, the inflation narrative sure does sound good, easy to talk to, but the data says it's not happening. And he had a couple slides up talking about what's going on with breakevens and CPI and so forth and said that the numbers just don't support this narrative. And so that definitely confirms what you're saying. But here's why I'm a little bit stuck on this.

I think the people that are worried about crude oil prices spiking, that's probably going to be shorter term. But what we need is finished products. And when they blow refineries up, a lot of them around the world, we didn't have enough of those already and they don't come back when the war ends. It takes years to rebuild that stuff. So what I see as a potential inflation driver, and I don't know how it gets balanced out against other stuff, is if you keep blowing refineries up and you can't make the diesel fuel out of the crude oil, you end up with plenty of crude oil and no diesel fuel.

Is that a potential inflation risk that we wouldn't be able to mitigate?

David Rosenberg: I see that as a risk as to why we're not going to get a whole lot of price relief. So this won't be a case like you had, for example, in Gulf War I. I mean, I have to go all the way back to 1990 when probably most of the listeners were in grade school, you know, and you went from $20 to $40 on WTI and then quickly reversed right back to $20 once the war ended. So I would say that, no, I don't think that your thesis leads to continuously higher refined product increases in energy. I think that will just stay at an elevated level.

And the reality is that even though the conflict is ongoing between the US and Iran, We are seeing traffic flow through Hormuz that we haven't seen since the beginning of the war, and we're seeing exports in the Gulf region starting to be ramped up pretty significantly, especially in that very critical Saudi Arabia East-West pipeline So I think that the relief won't come from prices coming down significantly. They'll stay elevated.

But remember that inflation is not a level. Inflation is a rate of change. So even if diesel stays where it is, if gasoline prices stay where they are, maybe they come down a little bit in 12 months' time, it still falls out of the data. You're not going to get as big of a push down in inflation as you would obviously arithmetically if energy prices, you know, were to even reverse half of the big run-up.

David Rosenberg: But all you need to have the momentum stop is to just have energy prices peak out, which is what I think is going to happen.

The other part of it is how we want to look at inflation, because it's not really a moment in time. The problem is that, you know, we live in the here and now. We're inundated with news, social media. We have our Bloomberg terminals. We could see the tickers every second, but inflation is a process.

Now, the reason why we had 18 months of non-transitory inflation in, say, 2021, 2022, into 2023 is because it did feed into wages. That is necessary for this to become truly a sustained inflationary development as opposed to just a shock that lasts a few months. Now, the reason we had the wage-price spiral And it lasted 18 months. It really wasn't transitory when all was said and done, but then again, it wasn't the 1970s either.

You gotta remember the 1970s, we had repeated oil shocks, but the economy was unionized and everybody had a COLA clause. So the labor market had bargaining power. Now, for a period coming outta COVID, because the government through its endless stupidity Not just decided to give people $2 trillion of stimulus checks to spend just as the economy reopened, but the government was paying people not to work for 2 years and paying them more.

So then the business sector, when the economy reopened, had to pay up even more to attract labor back into the market. So you had this wage-price spiral. This is what's critical. Prices have to feed into wages because if the price shock doesn't feed into wages, It hits the wall in the labor market and all you end up with is negative real wages that then trigger an environment of negative real consumer demand, which means that yes, you will get inflation in, say, fuels and possibly in the food as well. When you look at fertilizer and the wholesale market for grains, yes, that's true. There's stuff we still have to fill our cars and we still have to eat. But the other, call it 80, 85% of the pricing probably ends up coming under downward pressure because you get demand destruction in the more cyclical parts of the economy in services and goods. So the stuff that you don't need, the discretionary stuff, those prices come under downward pressure.

So it's a relative price game. For it to become sustained inflation for us to be worried about, you have to see it enter into the labor market, and we're not seeing it right now. And it's very interesting for anybody that wants to see a Fed official that may be pushing against Kevin Warsh, who says wages don't matter. John Williams of the New York Fed just gave a speech on September 29th talking about, we see no evidence that these price shocks are entering into wages.

Therefore, the inflation situation is unlikely to become self-reinforcing.

Now people say, well, Williams was part of the transitory crowd. The thing is that where he got it wrong was that it fed into wages. It was a different labor market. The labor market was heating up dramatically coming outta COVID. The quits rate was surging. The hiring rate was surging. The job opening rate was surging. Labor demand was outta control.

We don't have that environment today. And in fact, in nominal terms, wages are decelerating. So to me, that is going to be the catalyst. for whether this turns into something more sinister than just an energy price shock. Because if the labor market is not strong enough to cause wages to play catch-up, and it's not happening, then all this ends up being is almost the same thing as a tax shock. It's really akin to a tax increase. Would you consider a tax increase to be inflationary?

Well, it would be if you go to your boss and you say, hey, my taxes went up, I want higher wages. But this is a tax increase and it is not sustainable unless the labor market plays ball. And that was the missing link last year. We don't have to go back 5, 10 years. We had the tariff shock.

Where was the inflation? Where was the inflation from the tariff shock? It was small and now it's totally reversed. It's faded into the rearview mirror.

Erik Townsend: Why?

David Rosenberg: Because it didn't filter into wages. That's the key. Besides the fact that we could sit here and talk all day long about diesel, the filter through to transportation, freight, that's about a 5% inflation impulse. I mean, because forecasting inflation, it is a complex process. Labor is 30%, 30% of the cost at the retail level.

It's 6 times more powerful than energy, but we don't see labor costs minute by minute on our Bloomberg screen. We see what energy is doing. So I will say that I will reserve my judgment until I see evidence that we're seeing bargaining agreements, collective bargaining agreements start to escalate. We start to see wage trends escalate. We'll see nonfarm payrolls.

I think average hourly earnings will be the most important number. Until that happens, until I see the labor market respond, I'll take the other side of the bet that this is going to be a major sustainable inflationary problem for the economy.

Why real rates are rising: hyperscaler capex and Fed regime change

Erik Townsend: I saw another quote go by my screen that I'm pretty sure was attributed to you that I thought was really insightful, which is everybody's talking about, but the 10-year yield. And I think it was you who said, The rise in yields is 90% real rates and only 10% inflation expectations. I thought that was a brilliant quote, but okay, let's go the next level. Why are we seeing right now such strength in real rates?

David Rosenberg: Well, we have 2 things going on. The first, of course, is the fact that we have these hyperscalers dramatically increasing their CapEx commitments, and now 3 of the biggest of the 4 are now net free cash flow negative. So they're going to the bond market and they're going to the long end of the bond market in multiple currencies to fund their CapEx boom. So what's changed is that this is no longer being funded out of their cash flows.

So now you're having corporate credit demands bumping against government credit demands. And that's one of the reasons why the real rate's gone up is because The demand for capital is going up. People like to point to, you know, $40 trillion of government debt.

With all due respect, when the 10-year Treasury note yield was last below 4% in February, the national debt was $39 trillion. Now we're at $40 trillion. Oh, so this last trillion is, we have a debt crisis on our hands. So we added it. We went from $38 trillion to $39 trillion. From last October to this February.

And nobody talked about that. And the 10-year note yield went below 4% after adding $1 trillion of debt from October 2025 to February 2026. At $39 trillion, nobody was talking about it, but now at $40, because it's a zero, everybody's talking about it because what people do, and I imagine they do this on your show, and I see them do it on CNBC and Fox Business, And on Bloomberg TV.

What's been the biggest change? Because the AI spending boom was going on back in February when the 10-year note was below 4%. Government debt deficits, is that really new? I started in the business in October 1987 when we all, we talked about were the twin deficits.

Let's focus on what is the elephant in the room? What's changed the most? is we have regime change at the Fed. So let me be emphatic, and I can't prove it, it's just an opinion, that if Powell were still in charge, most of this— I'm not going to say all of it— most of this would not be happening. I can't say all of it because when Warsh took over in June, the 10-year note was barely around 4.4, and we're up about 90 basis points since.

But I think Powell carried through a different monetary policy. Powell never said, I'm focused on headline inflation. To most central bankers, it's always been core. Warsh's headline and his new framework, which isn't even a framework, I don't know what to call it, but everybody's latched onto it, is the share of the PCE deflator that's rising more than a 3% annual rate, as if that's a meaningful statistic. So basically, so what if a bag of peanuts is going up 10% and auto prices are going down 5%?

In his statistics, they're both equal. A bag of peanuts to Kevin Warsh is equivalent to an automobile. Think about how insane that is. And he's not giving guidance. He's really not giving much of a framework. He has sounded hawkish, but then when he was vying for the job, he was dovish. Interesting that when he was applying to be Fed chairman, he was open about his favorite inflation statistic, which was the Dallas Fed trimmed mean inflation measure, which last I saw was 2.3%, 30 basis points above the beloved and ballyhooed 2% target. Wow, that's really a big deal. He doesn't talk about that anymore.

So he's been tight-lipped. But that means his words carry more weight, and he has come across as being very hawkish. And he managed to cobble together a consensus to hike rates at the last meeting.

Now, remember that back in February, the markets were priced for 1 or 2 rate cuts, and then the Fed switches to a tightening bias. Then they raise rates, and now the markets are priced for 3 or 4 more tightenings on top of what they already did. So when you look at the arithmetic, how did we go up well over 100 basis points across the Treasury curve is because the market has reset from an accommodative Fed to a tighter Fed. The Fed has taken the cost to carry away.

Where are you going to hide? Well, you're going to hide at the front end of the curve, or you're going to go to the Treasury bills. Why would you want to take on duration? with such a flat yield curve. So that's really what the story is. What has been the biggest change? The biggest change has been the reset of Fed expectations.

That explains most of the run-up in yields we've had from the lows in late February and has explained almost all of the increase we've had since Warsh took over back in the middle of June.

Warsh, Bessent and the rookie-chair pattern

Erik Townsend: I think you hit the nail on the head with the phrase regime change at the Fed. I think that's exactly it, and I think it's even bigger than that. What I would say is it seems like between Warsh And Bessent and the Trump administration, they've got an agenda to basically say, we're going to take both monetary and fiscal policy in a different direction than it's been taken before. We're going to do this differently. We've got our own plan. I can't figure out exactly what that plan is. It feels to me like there is a grand plan though that's bigger than just Fed FOMC policy. Do you agree with that? And if so, can you figure out what the big plan is?

David Rosenberg: No, I can't figure it out. I can't figure out anything coming outta Washington. And there's no doubt that Warsh has done a giant pivot. He was not talking about, when he was applying for the job, he wasn't lamenting about the fact that inflation's been above target for 5 years.

But now he is in control of the Fed and his character has changed. Now he's got a lot of support. In some sense, he's following the historical script because, you know, if you go all the way back to all the rookie Fed chairpeople, I say chairpeople because Janet Yellen is a woman, but all the way back to Miller in the '70s, the first move by the rookie Fed chairperson was to raise rates at the first opportunity.

Remember I mentioned Greenspan when I started in the business? And he was raising rates pretty aggressively. Now, well, we know what happened next on the day I started on October 19th, '87, but the last Fed chairman to cut rates at the first meeting was Arthur Burns in 1970, and that's because the US economy was entering into a recession.

So that's the first thing. It's just a pattern that the first thing the Fed chairperson does, and Janet Yellen, who people thought was a puffball, Her first move was to hike rates in December 2015. Here, a Democrat, a labor market expert, historically a dove, raised rates at her first opportunity.

And so he just fit the historical bill. I guess the central bankers feel they have to flex their anti-inflation credentials right away. So maybe that's part of it. I don't like the fact that he really has not unveiled a framework as to what's going on.

He doesn't want to do that. He wants to leave all the guesswork up to the market. And so the market is reading every syllable as hawkish. I mean, if you noticed, whenever Warsh opens his mouth, the 10-year yield goes up 6 or 7 basis points. It's incredible. So they're interpreting whatever it is he's saying, and he's not saying much. As being hawkish.

Now, it is interesting that Williams looked like he pushed back a little bit on that in his September 29th speech, but we'll see what happens. But I think that Fed policy, and it's amazing to me that everybody's coming out thinking that Warsh is great and this is just a great Fed and they're going to crush inflation.

Everybody thinks inflation's a big problem and everybody is begging They're begging the Fed to raise rates. You have almost a record level, you said before, a record level of net speculative short positions on the CBOT when it comes to the 10-year note. It is sexy and fashionable to hate the bond market right now.

You're viewed as a hero, the so-called bond vigilantes. Well, they're not really bond vigilantes. They're just basically looking at how the Fed is going to be influencing The cost to carry in the Treasury market and the same Treasury market that was pricing in a couple of rate cuts 6 months ago, we're now pricing in 4 more rate hikes. And we'll see how that changes.

Midterm gridlock and the November 4 Treasury refunding

David Rosenberg: But no, Fed policy has me confused and the administration's policy has me confused, totally confused. I mean, how can you go onto an affordability program ahead of the midterms, and then you want to engage in a trade war with your principal trading partner north of the border. How does that make any sense?

And offering $5,000 as a dividend to voting citizens if the House and the Senate stay Republican, that's a trillion dollars. How does that solve inflation? That sort of giveaway Was one of the reasons we had inflation. The Biden followed by Trump giveaway, the $2 trillion fiscal stimulus checks that accounted for more than half the inflation we saw going from 0 to 9% from, say, call it 2020 to 2022. So there's not much I can say that I fully comprehend.

You know, Bessent says, I'm the house. You want to bet against the house? Bet against the house. Well, people are betting against the house. Maybe A comment he shouldn't have said. Doesn't show too much humility, but we'll see what happens after. There's 2 dates we should circle on the calendar. One is November 3rd. That's the midterms, and it looks as though the Democrats take the House. There's now in the prediction polls more than 50% chance they take the Senate.

But if they take the House, that's where the rubber meets the road for fiscal policy, because that's where the spending bills get passed. So we're going to get fiscal, we're going to get policy gridlock. This is what's going to change after November 3rd is we're going to go into a period of gridlock. And people always said in the bond market, gridlock is good because the executive branch and the legislative branch typically are at odds with each other and nothing gets done.

And I say if nothing gets done on fiscal policy, because look, well, one of the reasons why you could argue The economy has done fairly well this year, and it's been equity wealth effect on spending at the high end on luxury goods and services. It's been the AI spending boom, although a lot of that has been offset by rising imports. But the one big beautiful bill, right? That never would have been passed had Trump not had Congress being dominated by the Republicans.

And so it's amazing what you can accomplish when you have one-party power. The one big beautiful bill was huge stimulus for the economy this year. The depreciation allowance, the huge income tax refunds. You can't extrapolate that into the future. These were one-offs and they come to an end. Basically, there's no more fiscal stimulus in the economy after November 3rd. Have the bond bears factored that into their analysis?

People don't realize that 80% of the time historically when a one-party power after a national election swings to a 2-party system with gridlock, 80% of the time the economy slows, 80% of the time inflation goes down, and 80% of the time bond yields go down in that 2-year period between the time of the midterms where you get the gridlock to the next election, which will be in 2028. I'll take those 80% odds. And that's because we get the fiscal gridlock. The Democrats aren't going to work with Trump.

And even if Trump wants to work with the Democrats, he used to be a Democrat way back in the day.

I can only talk about what I have confidence in. I can only have confidence in the calendar. November 3rd's the midterms. I think we have a good idea how that's going to play out. And I think that's going to end this past 6 years of insane fiscal stimulus.

That's been great for the economy. But it has been, you could say, a source of inflation from an aggregate demand perspective, but it certainly has also been a positive for the stock market. But that comes to an end.

Then November 4th is the Treasury funding announcement, and I'm sort of thinking that if his buyback program got a lot of press, but I mean, whatever, $6 billion into a market that turns over by a trillion dollars a day is not going to have a big impact. But the Treasury does have a very big impact, not on the demand for fixed income assets, though that's the Fed. The Fed can do that through its balance sheet, but the Treasury Department has a huge influence on the supply. They are the suppliers of the debt. They can choose what maturities.

And so I am thinking, in answer to your question about the bond market, what might happen that could come as a surprise is what happened back in early November of 2023. When Janet Yellen was Treasury Secretary and at the Treasury funding announcement, she dramatically cut the supply issuance of bonds and notes and flooded the market with bills.

And you had an enormous rally in the 10-year note. The 10-year note from late October to the end of December went down 100 basis points.

Is anybody talking about that? Your first question to me was about diesel and about inflation and labor market. Nobody's talking about the Treasury funding. On November the 4th. When I speak in front of a group of people and I ask them if they can tell me what November the 4th is going to be, why it's important, everybody says to me it's the midterm elections. I say, no, that's the day before.

November 4th is a Treasury funding announcement and that could be a very big deal. Just remember how powerful that influence was on the yield curve back in the fall of 2023. We may well see a repeat of that.

So I'll reserve judgment about Bessent, but I think that's what he's going to do. It's not really an operation twist. It's just influencing the shape of the curve by cutting back on long-dated issuance. And that's really where the big problem has been. And when you think about it, the economy is priced off the 10-year note.

Nothing else really matters as much.

Why markets ignore the midterms; Rosenberg's 2-year note position

Erik Townsend: David, I couldn't possibly agree more. And I think what you've just said about the midterms is the insight that seems to be missing from the market. We're pretty darn close to all-time highs here. There's not a whole lot of volatility in stocks. As we're a month away from an election where the polling is telling us, and I'm not taking any side on who's right, left or right, who's wrong.

That's not what MacroVoices is for.

But if the polls are telling us that the political party that's impeached the current president twice before and doesn't like him is about to take at least one and maybe both houses of Congress, that seems like a pretty darn big risk factor that I would expect the market's fear of uncertainty to just be going on steroids right now, but seems like nobody's really talking about it. I don't get it.

David Rosenberg: I think because we're still fixated on what's happening with energy. We have a new Fed chairman. There's a debate as to just how strong the economy is. So there's so many moving pieces, but there is talk about the midterms, but they're in the marketplace, not a lot of talk about what are the implications of this political shift on the stock market and the bond market.

Now look, when you go back, for example, and this is why, you know, people get a little upset with me when I talk about politics and I never really take sides. I will be critical. I was as critical of Obama and Biden and Trump almost equally when I thought that it was necessary, but I'm more into trying to help people wade through how the politics could influence the financial markets. That's what consumes me. For example, when you go back to early November of 2024, the last election, did you see in the days and weeks after the election, the stock market surged?

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

David Rosenberg: And the Treasury market got spanked, spanked like it is today, actually. Today for a different reason. Back then, it's because, not because Trump won the election, it's because it was a red wave. It was a clean sweep. The Republicans took the House, took the Senate, and you had Trump in power. And you knew at that point, the one big beautiful bill was coming and The bond market and the stock market acted accordingly. Stocks surged on the implications for profits from depreciation allowances and income tax refunds, no tax on tips, all the stuff he campaigned on.

And so that's really what was important about one-party sweep. And bond yields soared.

When you go back to when Trump won in November 2016, Trump 1.0, and he campaigned on tax cuts, which he got through. Do you remember how the bond market, the bond market puked in November, in November 2016 election? Stock market surged after a pretty tough year. And then when you go to the midterms and you get the split government, not typically good news for equities, and bonds tend to like it because of the gridlock.

You know, the same thing happened. You can go all the way back if you want to. Remember like yesterday when Clinton got elected in 1992? Clean sweep. And people thought he was a borderline socialist. And then look what happened when we had Newt Gingrich's Contract with America and we went to split government in 1994 and we had the mother of all bond rallies.

So the politics matter. I agree. Nobody's really talking about 2 dates. Now, basically, I'm probably early like I usually am, but I've started to dip my toes into I've already owned a lot of 2-year notes because I don't think the Fed's going to be raising rates 4 times. They didn't even signal that, but the market thinks they did because there's really ineffective communication coming out of the Fed. The market thinks the Fed is going to— inflation's such a problem, the Fed's going to have to raise rates aggressively. I don't have that view, but the market's got that view.

But I think that there's going to be 2 things. November 3rd midterms, And people will realize that we are exiting finally the fiscal insanity. Maybe we have to thank the Democrats. I don't, I don't, I don't, I mean, I see it both ways. I think that we just have moved to an economy and a financial market and a political spectrum that is just extreme.

But the Republicans have not proven to have been good managers of fiscal policy.

The good thing about split government is that nothing gets done. And that's what we need to at least not have the deficit rise any further. And that also means that's going to have incrementally a depressing impact on aggregate demand because government's part of the economy. So I think that's good news for those of us that want to see the economy cool off. I want to see bond yields come down because I'm one of the few that have not thrown in the towel. And then November the 4th, the Treasury funding. And there's been 3 other times in the past where the Treasury did something like what Janet Yellen did in 2023. And you can shrug your shoulders and say, yeah, I don't really care. Well, let me tell you something.

When people try and figure out what the hell happened in the fall of 2023, coming off the mother of all Fed tightening cycles, we had ChatGPT. At that point, the AI trade was taking off. Okay? This is the fall of 2023, out of the blue, 100 basis point rally in the 10-year note in barely more than 2 months.

Why? Because of what the Treasury did at the refunding announcement. And of course, Janet Yellen did that after a very pernicious increase in long-term rates. And it wasn't intervention, it was just a shift in emphasis on where they were going to issue across the curve.

And I have a sense that if Bessent wants to do anything along the same lines after a similar run-up in bond yields, he'll do something very similar. It's much more powerful than what he's doing on the bond buybacks. That's really a drop in the bucket. What the Treasury can do on the supply side is where the power really comes in Scott Bessent's office.

AI bubble risk and Chinese open-source competition

Erik Townsend: I want to go back to something you mentioned earlier, which is the AI bubble. And obviously it's going strong, and I was really thinking it has to continue going strong because it's obviously the Trump administration's big priority is to focus on it. It's kind of an arms race with China, I think, and I kind of thought it had to continue. But I had Matt Barrie on recently who said, look, what people don't see coming is these Chinese open source, that's the free AI models, which means you got to buy your own hardware to run it on, but you can get something that's basically just as good as the best frontier models were 3 months ago. Just a few months ago. You can get that for free, open source, run it on your own hardware. And there's an extra advantage of running it on your own hardware, which means you're air-gapping yourself from Anthropic or OpenAI's cloud.

So they're not using your proprietary data to train their next model. Matt thinks that could potentially result in a trend where a lot of people, particularly corporations that are sick of having their data mined, say, look, we're going to run on our own hardware. We're not going to use any more OpenAI anymore.

Anthropic, we're just going to use this free Chinese stuff. Well, boy, knock-on effects from that in terms of the Trump administration policy, I can't even imagine what would happen. I mean, is that the risk, the AI bubble popping because maybe there's an alternative we don't realize?

David Rosenberg: I think that it's a great point, otherwise known as global competition. And in the final analysis, we are seeing in real time that, you know, there are There are no real barriers to entry. And one way that I think China will once again, as it's done in the past, exert itself as a source of global disinflation.

And that's again why people are saying, well, look at what AI has done with memory chip prices, source of inflation, semiconductors, so on and so forth. When push comes to shove, and this is not even including the future productivity benefits, which will be disinflationary, but that's out in the future.

Under-owned bonds, housing deflation and weak market breadth

David Rosenberg: But I think what you're describing is another reason why I've not thrown in the towel on the bond market despite how painful it's been. But, you know, anybody who was in January of 2009 that said, you know what, this is ridiculous, the banks are priced for zero. You went from the beginning of January of 2009 to the March lows.

The S&P 500 was down like 40%. That was the last cataclysmic. And of course we didn't know if TARP was going to get legislated or not. But those people in January of 2009 that bought the S&P 500, blocked their nose, bought it, could withstand the next 30 or 40% down to the lows, made out like a bandit that year when you look at what happened from March to December.

And when people were buying the stock market in January and February of 2009, they were viewed as idiots. Now, by the way, I was bearish. I was cutting my bearish call at that point. I can't say I was turning bullish, but I was, I thought I, even at that point, I thought there were all sorts of signs of capitulation. There was fear and disdain about the stock market, much like you had in the summer of 1982 when the multiple got down to 8.

And so I'm looking at the bond market right now the same way. I mean, it's been terrible, but it's under-owned. There's so many short positions on the Board of Trade and futures and options pits. And I think that everybody is just focused on inflation. And I'm not going to push back and say that, you know, that they're deranged. I just think that inflation is always and everywhere a very complex item to forecast. There's hundreds of variables that go into it, but there's nothing I'm seeing that's telling me that we're entering into a pernicious inflationary environment. What you just said about Chinese competition, perfect example.

Build it and they will come. And you're right, there are other cheaper sources. On top of that, as I said before, there's other things people aren't looking at. How come nobody's talking about the housing market in the United States? Can you tell me that? And do you know that Kevin Warsh at Jackson Hole talked about the economy being resilient, strong, and solid? It's his 3 favorite words. And he mentioned AI 8 times.

He mentioned housing once. So like, I'll ask you, do you live in a data center yourself or do you live in a house?

Housing is in a recession. You look at the home building stocks, you think we're in a deep recession. Look, we just got the new home sale numbers. The home builders are discounting their product like it's nobody's business. But we still have 8.5 months' supply of inventory, and new home prices on average are down 8.5%.

I say that to people, new home prices are down 8.5% over the past year. Is that a source of inflation to you in this $50 trillion asset class called residential real estate? It's deflating. Nobody's talking about it. And residential rents, are still deflating.

Nobody talks about the fact we still have a hugely overbuilt apartment market in the United States because all these, all the multifamily construction plans from a few years ago were built on a certain level of demographics. And now we have no population growth in the United States because of all the outmigration.

And so we still have excess supply of residential units. in multifamily, downward pressure on rents. New home prices are now negative 8.5% year over year. If you plug those numbers in, the rents and the home prices in real time into the CPI, it'd be close to zero. The core would be well below 2%.

And I think with lags, we're going to see that coming through because shelter is far more important than energy in the CPI numbers. I'm digressing a little bit, but you're bringing up something that I think is disinflationary, not being discussed.

I'm bringing up the labor market. We got the ADP numbers. No acceleration in wage growth whatsoever. It was a nice headline number, up 90,000. No acceleration in wages. That's very interesting to me that we have a hot labor market apparently, but no acceleration in wage growth. That's an interesting dichotomy.

And nobody's focused on the housing market, which has emerged as a source of deflation.

And you mentioned the stock market. Yes, the stock market, There is so much pain out there in wide swaths of the stock market. So we can talk about the Mag Seven, the AI, Nvidia. Great. Sure. Apple stock. Great. But look at, look at the regional banks. They've been terrible. The homebuilders, terrible. The retailers, terrible. Look at what restaurant stocks, consumer cyclical services like hotels and the cruise lines.

And the theme parks, they look terrible. The small caps. So people talk, they look at the S&P 500 where 50% of the market cap is 20 stocks, but nobody talks about the fact that the average and median stock in the United States is down 15% from the 52-week highs. They're in a correction mode. The average stock is doing, you know, people say the stock market's holding up so well.

Despite what the bond market's done? No, no. There's part of the market, the big caps that seem to be impervious to interest rates. Yes. But there are wide swaths of the stock market that are hurting a lot.

So the bond market is actually having an impact, especially when you're taking a look at the areas of the S&P 500 that are most closely tied to Fed policy. They're already down 10% from the recent peak. They're in a correction mode. So for people saying to me that the Fed's having no impact, no, I think you're not looking in the right places. You have to dig beneath the surface to see what's going on.

Gold: corrective phase, secular bull intact

Erik Townsend: Speaking of places that you can dig and look for something going on, let's go to gold as a final topic. Boy, the increasing real yields have sure clobbered gold. I don't think the fundamentals are any worse, Where's this headed?

David Rosenberg: Well, you know, I wrote my first gold report when I was at Gluskin Sheff back in February of 2010, and gold was $1,000 an ounce. And, you know, the fundamental low at around $250 an ounce was back in 1999 with the signing of the Washington Agreement that ended a decade-long period of central bank gold selling globally.

And there's been probably a dozen big corrections along the way. Nothing moves in a straight line. Bonds definitely don't, stock markets don't, and the gold market doesn't move in a straight line either. But you're quite right that the run-up in real rates has been a serious crimp this year, and it's happened alongside the fact that A weak US dollar turned into a strong US dollar. And so anything priced in US dollars except oil, for obvious reasons, it's been a tough year.

Gold is priced in dollars. So those 2 important correlations, the dollar and real rates, has caused gold and silver, precious metals in general, to have an off year after a great year last year. I think that this is a— we're in a corrective phase. But is the secular story over? No. Now, like I said before, I started in the business on October 19th, 1987.

The stock market was down 22% that day. And in fact, from the August peak, because of Alan Greenspan, who we ultimately called the serial bubble blower, but the maestro, may he rest in peace, came in guns a-blazing, just like people think Warsh is going to be. And the market was down 30% from the summer of '87 into the fall, down 30% in a matter of months.

You look at the chart today, the S&P 500, you can barely see it on the long-term chart. The cyclical bear market didn't end for till 1990, '91. It went on for another 3 years. So yeah, I think we're in a corrective phase. And I did cut our gold position in our model portfolio. Earlier this year, and then I started adding again in this corrective phase.

The secular bull market really will end when the fundamental factor ends, and the fundamental factor is the key source of demand, which is central bank reserve reallocation from U.S. dollars into into gold bullion. And global central banks continue to diversify into gold. That hasn't changed even in this period. It's been a rough period for gold for most of this year. That hasn't changed. That's the fundamental positive story.

The 10-year bear market in the 1980s was nothing more than the central bank shifting to Treasury bills and out of gold, you know, to a point where the share of FX reserves in gold in the vaults at the world's central banks went from a high of 70% in 1980, got as low as 10% in 1999.

And now we're basically about 30%. We haven't even undertaken the full mean reversion trade yet. The day I see that the central banks say we're done in this diversification, that'll be the day that the bear— the bull, the fundamental bull market ends. And we're not there yet.

The Bear in the Bull Ring and the ROSE ETF

Erik Townsend: David, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview, but before I let you go, I do have to push back on one thing. You gave our listeners a list of important dates in the market. You left out a couple of really important ones. One, September 10th, which already happened. That was the launch. of the ROSE ETF in Canada on the TSX. I'm sure our listeners want to know if there's any plan to eventually launch that in any US market. And the other date is October 6th. That's if you order right now, when you will receive your copy of Bear in the Bull Ring, your new book. So please tell us about those.

David Rosenberg: The book is called, as you said, The Bear in the Bull Ring, and it's just really a collection of ideas and themes convictions reflecting my life as an economist in the financial markets for the past 40 years. So it's really all the collection of all those experiences and how it's shaped my philosophy, not just on the markets, but on life till this very day.

Let me just say that I had a eureka moment in late 2002 to 2022 when I kept on getting asked how I would grade my career, and I was always too scared to respond. I, my standard answer was that if I make it to Cooperstown for economists, it'll be for at-bats, but probably not batting average.

When people stopped chuckling at that, that quip, I realized I had to do something maybe a little more concrete. So I said, well, why don't I just put my money where my mouth is and create a model portfolio? ETF-based, because, you know, I have 2,300 clients in 40 countries and from all different walks of the financial markets.

And so our research mirrors our diverse client base. And I said, well, why don't we create a model portfolio that mirrors the depth and the breadth of our research?

So I did that and it's done extremely well. And it's not correlated with anything except the quality of the research at my firm. So it's diversified across all asset classes and all geographies. It's unconstrained. And my own client base, the same client base that pushed me to start my business in 2020, which I should really thank everybody for because it was the best decision I'd made professionally, were the ones telling me to start this, to actually get this listed.

as an ETF. And I found this platform, Corton Capital in Canada. They're an ETF provider. They are the portfolio managers on the fund. I am the economic guru on the fund, and really the Raoul portfolio feeds into this ETF. So Corton Capital provides the registration, the compliance, the back office. And so it's really a great marriage where The fund is based off of the research at Rosenberg Research. And so yeah, launched a few weeks ago on the TSX. There is a Canadian and US dollar version, and I am in the process now and getting the ball rolling on getting it listed on the NYSE.

And my legal counsel tells me that the timeframe should be sometime January, February of next year.

Trade Desk: SPX put as left-tail protection

Erik Townsend: Well, we'll look forward to having you back for an update in a future episode. Time now to bring in Patrick and Massil for our MacroVoices Trade Desk segment. Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. David's argument is that the energy shock could ultimately do more damage to growth than creating lasting inflation. If wages aren't keeping pace with necessities, households have less to spend everywhere else. Add higher borrowing costs, and that squeeze is already showing up in housing, retail and other economically sensitive parts of the market. But the major indices remain supported by a handful of very large companies. How long can those leaders hold up if the weakness underneath continues to spread? That creates a reason to consider protection against a broad equity correction. 3-month volatility is still near the bottom of its 1-year range, yet the 4th quarter brings Full earnings season, 2 Fed meetings, midterm elections, and potentially greater clarity about the Strait of Hormuz. Carrying reasonably priced protection through the calendar looks like an attractive trade-off.

So here's the structure. With the S&P 500 trading around 7,653, we're looking at buying the January 14th, 2027 SPX put option at the 7,430 strike with about 105 days remaining. The strike is about 3% out-of-the-money, carries roughly a 30-cent delta, and is quoted at 136 index points. The out-of-the-money strike reduces the premium commitment while targeting that left-tail risk. With implied volatility near the lower end of its recent range, I prefer owning the put outright, retaining the positive gamma and vega to capture both equity downside and potentially Volatility repricing.

This insurance costs just under 2% of the index notional, with the risk limited to the premium outlaid. The expiration breakeven is near 7,300, roughly 4.7% below our reference level, although a sell-off and volatility expansion could offer the opportunity to monetize well before the expiration. It's a defined premium hedge against left-tail risk through a consequential 4th quarter. That's where's the trade.

Erik Townsend: Patrick analyzes and trades the markets every day over at Big Picture Trading. MacroVoices listeners can sign up for a free 2-week trial at BigPictureTrading.com. Now back to Patrick and Massil.

Bond sell-off and equity breadth divergence

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick. Last week we discussed the significance of the 10-year Treasury yield breaking above 5%, and looking at it today, the bond sell-off just continues to be the story as yields now reach 5.25%. Now, just yesterday we got a softer than expected inflation report, which offered relief to the short end. but really didn't move the long end. What would the market need to see to stop the bleeding?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, the bond market continues to be the epicenter of where all the chaos is happening. Now, a few weeks ago, we were talking about how crude oil was in the driver's seat driving higher inflation expectations, which was certainly pressuring the entire bond market. But since then, oil has backed off and the bond market continues to decline as yields are pressing some unprecedented levels that we haven't seen in decades. We have basically a 10-year yield that this morning has traded above the 530 basis point level, a 30-year yield that's now gone above 560 basis points.

But it's not even the level alone, it's the rate of change that can't be ignored. We've seen an acceleration in the selling, which is creating an incredibly large amount of anxiety about this move. What's interesting about this is a lot of people are speculating that the oversold condition of these bond markets was going to warrant a bounce. But when you have a $30 trillion freight train moving this way, it needs some form of a catalyst at some juncture here in order to stabilize. And clearly, at least as of this moment, we haven't seen any messaging from central banks that is at least providing any sort of a catalyst to turn this. Now, obviously, this is sending shockwaves throughout all risk pricing, and we'll talk about that. But these bond markets are right across the entire curve continuing to be under substantial amounts of stress.

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, I definitely want to talk about those effects because when we talk equities, last week we highlighted the divergence between the strong headline indices and weaker market internals as we experienced high dispersion in stock returns. Now, up until now, we've seen that stocks continue to absorb the bond market pressure, but my concern is whether that resilience extends much beyond the mega caps. What are you watching to distinguish a market that can withstand higher yields from one that is simply delaying the risk of turning lower?

Patrick Ceresna: Let's be clear that the S&P 500 is not actually a very good indication of what is actually happening under the surface. We have actually seen a substantial correction happening in risk assets. As an example, right now, the median stock in the S&P 500 is 16% off of its 52-week highs. When we're looking at the breadth in terms of the number of stocks in the S&P 500 that are above their 50-day moving average, it just hit 20%, which basically means 4 out of 5 stocks in the S&P 500 have broken trend on the downside.

This is at a time when we're seeing sustained selling on the equal-weight S&P 500 index, the Russell 2000 breaking down. There's substantial stress on this equity market as the The S&P 500 market cap weighted index is simply not reflecting this. It continues to hold along 52-week highs, giving a perception that the equity market hasn't started to care about this.

The real puzzle to solve here is can we have the Apples, Metas, and the Nvidias of the world continue to diverge and continue to trend to mask this, or are they eventually going to succumb to the pressure? and inevitably cause a break. This is significant because the S&P 500 has a very large amount of systematic trading done around it, and this market cap to weight index is staying above a lot of very key sell triggers.

And the interesting part is that if the S&P, for whatever reason, was given a catalyst to drop even 150 S&P points, we become in a sell zone where you have a gamma flip occurring. It would potentially see rising implied volatilities, which would start to impact vol targeting funds, and of course trigger many CTA sell triggers that could create tens of billions of dollars of sell flow that could change the tide. The bottom line is right now the cash index is holding up and there isn't an immediate concern. The question is, is how long can we see funding stresses in the dollar and in the rates markets continue like this before the stock market has some sort of material impact.

Now, let me give a glass half full way to end it. If for whatever reason we see the bond markets stabilize and a catalyst is given before this breakdown happens, the broader equity market is getting oversold enough that if APE bounced, that could actually spur a rally in the S&P. So which one will prevail? Will it be this oversold market being impacted by rates will bounce, or are we going to have these mega caps join the selling? That is going to be the puzzle to solve in the week to come.

Dollar breakout and euro downside

Massil Beguenane: All right, let's turn to the dollar because it emerged as one of the biggest winners from this bond carnage. So cash may actually be king here, especially when we look at it against across all major currencies. I mean, the dollar just remains in a clear breakout, but do you believe that the dollar could keep pulling higher, or will changes in rate expectations undermine the move?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, here we have the US Dollar Index breaking to 52-week highs, and the currency cross that it is doing it against is the euro. The euro broke to 52-week lows, and we clearly have momentum building in this trade. The big question here is that what is driving this? Well, obviously, the rate differentials are a factor, and they have in the last few weeks been widening, which is contributing to all of this. But when looking at the countries that are most dramatically impacted by terms of trade and the stresses coming from the Strait of Hormuz, well, Europe is being disproportionately impacted by this. So that continues to only add further fuel for this breakdown. Now, with the euro breaking down below the 113 handle, we have a situation where the euro could head down to 110 or even 108, which would only accelerate this US dollar strength overall.

This, with the rates rising and the bond markets under stress, this really could be a sign that there is genuine funding stresses happening around the world and certainly only builds further case about the growing macro stresses that are existent here going into these midterms.

Oil: 50% retrace, waiting for a catalyst

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick, let's talk about oil because right now we've seen volatility driven by headlines. What's going on in the market?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, mid-September we saw crude oil trading north of $100, and there was certainly a lot of concerns about that. Things have really stabilized and we've now mean reverted, giving back half of those gains. And we're sitting down in the $90-plus area and doing about a 50% retrace of the prior advance. We basically now have an oil market that is waiting for the next catalyst. Is there going to be a peace deal? Is there going to be more flows through the Strait of Hormuz, or does this situation escalate? Obviously, there's a political driver for trying to keep this situation stable going into the midterms. It would be Very interesting to see whether or not some accelerated move happens before the midterms or whether this trade range will prevail throughout the month of October.

Gold gives up $4,200 and eyes $4,000

Massil Beguenane: All right. Last week we asked whether gold could withstand a stronger dollar and higher yields. Well, we got our answer this week because gold gave up the $4,200 area. Now, what do you make of this recent price action in precious metals?

Patrick Ceresna: What is clear is that gold is being impacted by these macro stresses. We have higher real rates, A rising US dollar, and clearly the macro backdrop that we thought we were seeing in July, August, where there was a potential Operation Twist and easing messaging from Bessent that basically drove many gold investors to believe that we were at the inflection point. Well, that simply never materialized. At this stage, gold is giving it back. We're pretty much back to the summer lows at this stage. It will be very likely that we can even retest the $4,000 level along a support line. The bigger question here is that, is this just gold now establishing its trade range and basing formation until the macro conditions favor a gold bull run, or will there be tight liquidity conditions that basically create the selling pressure that could still have one more leg down and wash it out temporarily down to $3,800 or something like that?

At this We were bullish gold, and still long term the bull case is quite intact. The question only now is: Is that how long will it take for the macro conditions to lighten up to allow the backdrop from which gold would be most responsive to?

The key here is that the technical levels would require gold to sustain price action north of 4,500 to pivot the technical trend back to the bull side. There's a lot of work for the bulls to do to turn this trend back up. At this stage, I'm anticipating. anticipating into the elections that gold will be far more range-bound and consolidate in the weeks to come.

Positioning pulse: speculators flip long the Nasdaq

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick, for this week's positioning pulse, let's go back to equities, and more importantly, let's hone in on the Nasdaq because the latest report shows a substantial increase in speculative net longs, but most of that change actually came from traders covering the short positions instead of new bulls entering the market. Now, when we're looking at that net positioning over open interest chart, we haven't seen the Nasdaq leaning this bullish since 2017.

Now, with the technology sector still carrying much of the bullish weight, what does it mean for the tech-heavy index as we move into year-end?

Patrick Ceresna: We already talked about the fact that these mega-cap tech names have been holding this market together. But when we look at the Commitments of Traders reports, this story is fascinating to me. We just saw the large speculators go from the 80th percentile to the 100th percentile in just one week, and that's on a 1-year, 3-year, And 5-year lookback. Just to put that in context, a month ago we were at the 57th percentile. So there has been a huge positioning pivot to the long side of the Nasdaq. Week over week, we saw almost 8,000 contracts added to the gross longs and almost 12,000 contracts gross shorts covered. And so that was almost a 20,000-contract swing week over week. So this continues to show this divergence because we're at the 36th percentile on the S&P and at the 7th percentile on the Russell. So, there is a clear flip to being aggressively long exposed to the Nasdaq on a relative basis.

It's one of the most interesting flips that we saw in the COT reports. And if anyone wants to see that for themselves, check it out at cotssignal.com because this is fascinating to see how aggressively this flip So that does it for this week's Trading Desk.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Patrick Ceresna: I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. See you next week.

Erik Townsend: And a reminder, as a MacroVoices listener, you're entitled to a 2-week free trial of Big Picture Trading, where you can watch Patrick analyze and trade the markets live every single day at BigPictureTrading.com. No credit card is required to sign up, and there's nothing to cancel. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices. We'll see you next week. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Michael Every — Rabobank's Global Strategist (as introduced on the show)

Michael Every: Do you really think the US is going to accept a Canada which drifts away from it geopolitically, starts doing deals with China maybe, or with Europe, and then who knows where Europe goes in the future, and have a long, open, undefended border with it? That doesn't make any sense geostrategically.

Erik introduces the bonus 'overtime' episode format

Erik Townsend: That was Rabobank's Global Strategist, Michael Every. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is a special bonus overtime episode of MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. If you were expecting to hear our regularly scheduled weekly podcast. It's probably second on the list in your podcast player because Michael had so much insight to offer this week that we literally had to schedule a second podcast episode to capture it all. So this is part 2 of Michael Every's September 24th MacroVoices interview. Part 2 was recorded a day later, which is actually a day earlier, so it's really September 24th still. But boy, we've got a whole bunch of new news to tell you about in part 2. You're going to want to listen to part 1 first. So if you accidentally found your way here because it on the top of your player list. Go listen to part 1 first. You'll find that in MacroVoices episode 551, released on September 24th.

Now, before diving back in with Michael, I'm going to take this opportunity to tell you that in response to your feedback on X and elsewhere, we're going to begin experimenting with this new format. So when we have a guest whose views don't quite fit into our usual time budget, we know our audience are very busy people who don't have time for a 3-hour podcast. So we're going to structure this.

Michael Every: Okay.

Erik Townsend: We're firmly committed to keeping our feature interviews in the flagship podcast to our target length of 45 to 50 minutes. That won't change, but it's— and that's out of respect for your time. What will change going forward is that when we have a guest like Michael, who's obviously got more to say than fit in the time allotted, we're going to just record a bonus episode after the fact.

And that's what we're doing now, one day later. So I'm going to ask for your patience, especially on this inaugural overtime episode, because we hit our production team up with this at the 11th hour. We don't have a budget. for this. We didn't have a plan for this. And so we're going to relax our editing standards. Please bear with us. You'll probably hear a few editing glitches on this one because we asked our team to put it out really quickly in order to get the content to you. Don't expect this every week. We're going to experiment it for special guests like Michael, Anas Alhajji, people who have so much to say that it doesn't fit in an hour.

MacroVoices Unplugged ground rules and agenda

Erik Townsend: Michael, let's dive in. Well, wait a minute. I was going to say where we left off on part 1, but so much news has happened In the last 24 hours since we recorded part 1 that I want to just dive into what's happened since then.

I want to reset our ground rules a little bit. Let's call this MacroVoices Unplugged, that we're doing this extra session here. And I'm going to say, let's just say normally we try to avoid unconfirmed rumors and speculative theories. Let's say they're fair game because frankly, last time we avoided those, neither one of us could figure out what the heck is going on in the world because it's a It's a complicated picture. So let's just say it's okay to go into speculative theories, not quite conspiracy theories, but let's not apologize for questioning the mainstream narrative and trying to figure out what the hell's really going on here, as we might do in private conversation.

And as I alluded at the end of part 1, boy, unverified rumors are a target-rich environment right now between the South China Sea incidents, North Korea reportedly testing hypersonic weapons, Xi Jinping's possible designs on invading Taiwan, as part of a campaign to repatriate Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China. There's no shortage of topics to fill this bonus session before we just got hit this morning with 3 more news items. So I'll come back to those things, and I really want to connect the dots because I think they all connect back to China somehow. I just haven't quite figured it out.

Iran's reported one-week ultimatum and Hormuz oil flows

Erik Townsend: Let's start with the 3 stories that have happened. The first one, according to Ole Hansen, our good friend over at Saxo Bank, Axios reporting this morning, That Iran has essentially given the United States a 1-week ultimatum to either lift the military blockade or they will resume asymmetric escalations. And that spiked crude oil this morning. Oh, off— I'm only

looking at WTI. I don't have a Brent chart in front of me, but that first spike was a good $3, $3.50 just on that news. It seems to me like this was kind of predictable. What do you think, Michael?

Michael Every: It was predictable because you are also seeing stories at the same time that actually the Saudis are starting to follow the UAE's lead and have been successfully shuttling more and more oil through Hormuz, which of course is still seeing live firing. It's still seeing the odd ship being hit.

And yet with the pressing importance of trying to get that crude flow going, The Saudis have been prepared to go ahead with it anyway, which just means that oil is that much more expensive from a security perspective. The cost involved in getting it out and insurance, et cetera, et cetera, but it can still flow. But Iran was never just going to sit there. This is an economic war and a physical war at the same time and say, oh, well, you've foxed me there. There's nothing I can do. So now they are saying, yeah, okay, whether there is a fixed deadline or not, we don't know.

But the implication is that not only will they keep striking in Hormuz, not only can they escalate the way they already have, via the Houthis in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, but they're now talking about the Indian Ocean too.

Now, whether they can or can't strike that far remains to be seen, but you wouldn't want to rule it out given that one of their missiles got as far as Cyprus at one point earlier on in the year, which would mean that you could potentially disrupt energy flows much further afield. And it'll more likely also hit those ship-to-ship transfers which are happening off the coast of Oman, at which point, yes, not only do you have all the other problems we have, you then have potentially lower crude flows too.

Proposed 90-day US diesel export ban and the Wright-Trump rift

Erik Townsend: We could probably do an interview on that alone, but let's go to the second of our 3 stories before we get into the full interview that we had planned. The number 2 story, Politico reporting that President Trump is apparently committed to at least a 90-day ban on export of diesel. And something I find really interesting is Energy Secretary Chris Wright has in the past just been almost the first word out of that guy's mouth is always under the leadership of President Trump. He's the most loyal and obedient subordinate in the president's entire world. And he's coming out on the public stage saying, no, that's a dumb idea. The markets don't work that way. Let's not do that. So he's directly disagreeing with the president and it seems he's losing that fight. The president says, no, we're moving forward. Anyway, with a 90-day ban on export of diesel fuel from the United States. I think most of our listeners already understand this, but very quickly, why don't you start with why that's probably not going to have the effect that President Trump is hoping for?

And then let's get into the background of why this is happening and why we're seeing, I think, a breakdown of trust between Secretary Wright and President Trump.

Michael Every: We discussed that in the first part, but just to reiterate, Obviously in a complex integrated global energy system in which different parts of the US interface with other countries and the whole world relies on counterparties, if you suddenly stop the US exporting diesel, it doesn't just solve one problem, it creates lots of others in equal measure. And the blowback can be more expensive crude, which of course then ends up with more expensive fuel prices anyway. And it can be shortages obviously internationally and major geopolitical problems. But it can even be shortages and problems in the US.

But what I did say, and I would like to just reiterate again here for those who maybe didn't hear me say it the first time, is when you look at that particular nexus of problems and that network, it is operating on the basis that we do have that integrated one-world global economy energy system. And I am still deeply cynical that that is something that actually strengthens the US relative position. Vis-à-vis China, vis-à-vis others over the longer term. It would not surprise me at all that if this 90-day ban does go through, which isn't confirmed yet, it's a Politico rumor.

And it wouldn't surprise me at all if once it goes in, you get complete chaos and market meltdown in different locations. And then you see the thing refined and they decide, well, okay, we're not going to do it against everybody. We're only going to do it against ABC or XYZ. And then gradually you get other supporting policies brought in as well. For example, as I said, in refineries to say you don't get to make a choice over what your refinery runs look like. Or the government starts saying, well, we're going to pay for extra storage so you can keep refining it and we'll provide you with subsidized storage somewhere so that we can at least have like an SPR for diesel, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

So I think we're opening the door to all those loads of things, all those kinds of things if we go ahead with them. But obviously if you are a product of the private sector in the energy sector in the US and you understand how it works, you would be opposed to that measure as a headline act.

Erik Townsend: Well, it sounds like the setup from what you're saying is that we pass this 90-day rule, you end up cutting off nations whose ability to deliver food to their people literally depends on having diesel fuel, and then it sets the stage for the administration to say, oh, you don't like that, huh? Which world leader wants to kneel and beg first? And I'll consider on an individual basis issuing exemptions to this blanket ban. I mean, is that what you're suggesting we could be heading toward?

Michael Every: I don't think it'll necessarily be done in quite such, if you'll excuse the pun, crude terms, but I do think that's exactly the underlying dynamic. Because if you have something that is vitally important to others and they're not doing what you want them to do, economic coercion is a tool as old as time. It's certainly been used by lots of others. It's currently being used by lots of others at the moment. And most other countries that aren't doing it would do it if they had the ability to do it. When you are in a Cold War, a geopolitical clash with other countries, the very last thing you want to do is to turn around and say what I always say flippantly, well, because markets, this is best for markets.

Markets are not necessarily best for national security. Now, neither is irritating everybody, neither is driving away your allies, neither is seeing people being plunged into poverty. There is a fine line between the two. And what I'm saying is, again, it wouldn't surprise me if this does happen. It wouldn't surprise me if we then have exactly that kind of negotiating process that you're talking about, but towards other goals. And one of them, I think, would be to make sure that those who the US works most closely with and trusts the most are at the top of the priority list for fuel. And those who aren't and who refuse to kiss the ring are at the bottom of that list. And welcome to 2026 and '27 and '28, et cetera, et cetera. That's the way the world now works.

Carney's invasion war games and the Canada-US relationship

Erik Townsend: Well, surely we can't really think that all of the news is going to go that badly. So let's move on to number 3. Oh, wait a minute. Maybe it can. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney apparently has directed the Canadian military to do war game simulations and so forth and to assess how Canada should respond if the US were to mount a full-scale military invasion on Canada. Did that really happen?

I feel awkward even having set the rules for this MacroVoices Unplugged to say we're going to go ahead and do unconfirmed rumor. Are you sure that really happened and I wasn't dreaming it?

Michael Every: It's in the Canadian press, it's in the New York Times, and it's Mark Carney saying it, so I take it as read. All I can say is, first of all, a little bit of history. When Canada was still under British Empire rule, they had a plan to invade the US. Of course they did. It's very well known. You can Google it. During that particular era, like 100 years ago, the US had a plan to invade Canada as well. This is well known. So this is not new. It's just new in recent history. And most militaries around the world do have, you know, what-if scenarios in dusty desk drawers that they can pull out. in wild situations. So that's not a complete surprise. And that was also happening at the time when you had all those histrionic, and I stress histrionic headlines about the US getting ready to invade Greenland and Europe pretending it was going to send armed forces there, which of course we again discussed in the first segment here.

So it's not a complete surprise it's happened. What I think is important to me in that is, A, it's being revealed because he didn't have to reveal that. But B, when you have the regular discussion about what Canada is or isn't doing with this elbows-up campaign, which is very popular under Mark Carney within Canada, and I get why, I'm not trying to make any value judgment or be normative, you obviously have an economic trade-off saying, well, we are incredibly deeply integrated with the US in a way which many people fail to understand, but we are going to try and distance ourselves from the US. And try and basically join the European Union or come as close to doing that as possible.

If you look at just the economic side of that argument, it doesn't make any sense to anyone except the most starry-eyed Canadian and European optimist because Canada produces high-end value-added industrial goods in a few key sectors, which are completely integrated with the US and are often sold to the US.

And it produces raw materials. That's what its tradable goods are. Now, Europe would like to get its hand on the raw materials, Europe can buy those raw materials from Canada right now. There's no need to have any kind of new trading relationship to deal with those. Europe does not want to buy Canadian cars. Europe does not want to buy Canadian trains. Europe does not want to buy Canadian jets. It has enough of its own. So Canada would be facing an economic future in which it disentangles itself with an economy which is just about 2 hours drive for most Canadians going south where 90% of its population lives. To trade more with a bloc on the other side of the Atlantic, which doesn't want to buy its high-valuated goods and only wants to buy its raw materials. Great. I don't think that's much of a sensible strategy, no matter how much one dislikes what Trump is doing and saying, but you can model that as an economist and it's not pretty what comes up.

What Carney has just shown you is exactly what geostrategists like myself and others, when we've been having conversations about this, let's walk away from the US, national strategy or grand strategy have been saying sotto voce, which is this has staggeringly bad fat tail risks on the downside. And where's the upside? Because if you are saying, okay, maybe things can work out with Europe in the long run, maybe it's worth 5, 10 years of pain to get there, but we know it's going to be very painful.

Again, I don't think the math's there, but let's say that's possible. If you then say as a national strategy, we move from having complete peace and security on our southern border, Like absolute complete peace and security. And of course we've got problems potentially with Russia in the Arctic, maybe in the future. And again, how are we going to fight Russia when you've got no real military?

And of course China might start coming through that space with Russia at some point in the future. And again, that's going to cost a lot of money to confront. It'll cost a lot more to do it without the Americans. But if they then say, well, maybe we've got the Americans as an actual enemy south of our border, And/or they might invade. And I stress, the Canadian Army, when they did that exercise, came to the conclusion the best response was to run to the hills and fight like the Afghanistan Mujahideen, as in running into town and shooting things and then running back up to the hills again.

Is that really an upside-downside? Here's where we could be in the best of scenarios. Here we could be in the worst of scenarios. Does that make any real sense? geostrategic sense. And I've been saying the same thing over and over again, and it's very unpopular in some circles, and it's not trying to be normative and it's not trying to offend anybody, but it seems to me really bizarre in the same way that if Brexit for the UK had had the downside that maybe we end up with a war with Europe, I think the rationale for having done it one way or the other would shift dramatically from just the economic argument. But that's potentially, given that Carney's carried out this exercise, what in the long run Could be on the cards because in the same way that the US is going to insist Canada has to have the same external tariff as it versus China, and that's what this is about really, and why maybe we'll come to that in a moment.

Do you really think the US is going to accept a Canada which drifts away from it geopolitically, starts doing deals with China maybe, or with Europe, and then who knows where Europe goes in the future, and have a long, open, undefended border with it? That doesn't make any sense geostrategically. And so The games that are being played here are for the very, very highest stakes possible, but I think there's a lot more to be lost than won.

Erik Townsend: Well, and you are a geostrategist. I'm just a simpleton. I would just dumb that down further to, I know lots and lots of American civilians and lots and lots of Canadian civilians, and none of them hate each other. They're all fine. It's only the governments that seem to think that we should be at odds with each other.

And it's amazing to me that this is happening in my lifetime.

US-China Cold War: constellation of blocs and Taiwan risk

Erik Townsend: Growing up, I really didn't expect it.

We should probably move on now. We're 15 minutes in and we haven't even got to the beginning of what we said we would cover today, which is all of these things that are happening in, I'll call it the eastern half of the world, whether it be the South China Sea incidents that have happened, North Korea testing hypersonic weapons, a lot of speculation that Xi Jinping has designs on invading Taiwan for the purpose of repatriating Taiwan as part of China, which of course China has said that They think Taiwan has always been part of China. The Taiwanese have a different opinion on that one. It seems to me these things are all important topics, but if I step back from it, I think the modern-day equivalent of the Soviet-US Cold War is the US-China Cold War. And just like Vietnam, if you were smart enough to understand it, all played into a much bigger picture, I think all these things play into US-China Cold War somehow.

I just am not smart enough to figure it out. Am I on the right track?

Michael Every: You are bang on the right track. That's exactly what almost everything is about in one way or another. And having grasped that, you're already halfway to the answers. And then one just has to join dots between different things.

So let me just do a little bit of that dot joining for you. So it leads back to everything, including Russia-Ukraine, including the war we have in the Middle East. Because it's not just the US versus China. It's not. It's the US with a constellation of countries around it who are themselves involved in various different open and closed negotiations with the US over where they will sit within that bloc or whether they want to sit within it at all. So literally the Canadian example I just gave you, obviously the US needs Canada by its side.

But it needs a Canada that's reindustrialized, remilitarized, spending a lot more on defense and prepared to actually join it in terms of whatever adventures the US is going to get involved in and will necessarily have to get involved in. That cannot be a Canada which runs its own independent trade policy because it might say, great, we want to do a deal with China when the US doesn't. Well, then you can't do a deal with the US.

It's as simple as that.

The logic has been crystal clear for years to me, and I've expressly put that in print. So that's part of it. But then that of course means Canada loses sovereignty because effectively it's within an EU-style structure within North America where the US gets to set the external tariff and then everyone benefits underneath that umbrella. And it's underneath the US security directive, which it kind of is within NATO anyway.

So that's just one example. Europe also sits within that. Europe's flirting with Canada. There's a lot of tension between Europe and the US as there was over Greenland. And then of course we get that Greenland deal, which we spoke about in the first part, Which by the way, removes sovereignty from Denmark, as I said, and Canada approves of. So Canada, this country that's saying it has to keep its sovereignty, doesn't have a problem with Denmark losing military sovereignty over Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, provided that there's now security in North America.

So all the Western allies are themselves jostling to get into the US camp. But on the other camp, it's not just China. China has made abundantly clear that it works very, very closely with Russia. And Russia cannot lose the war with Ukraine. That's an open statement from China in various different circles. And everyone can see that in terms of the support that it's providing to Russia in various different ways. But it's not just the two of them. Iran has a very, very close relationship with Russia. The drones which are currently striking Ukraine are originally an Iranian design. The Russians have improved them and put jet engines on them, and they're now much faster than Ukrainian drone interceptors. And Russia is really, really hitting Ukraine hard and it's not seeing a response that Ukraine can match at the moment.

Those drones with Russian engines may soon find their way back to Iran to be fired at the US, Israel, and other forces in the region. So there's already deep collaboration going on there. Then we can bring in North Korea, which has had periods of frosty relations with some of those other powers, but at the moment is again being at least supported by them in the same way that, you know, you might have a really angry dog in the neighborhood that you throw red meat to so that it doesn't bite you.

And we are seeing North Korea developing hypersonic missiles. We are seeing North Korea looking around and thinking how we can help the others. And in particular, it's rumored that it will send 50,000 men on top of any others that it may have already sent to fight against Ukraine with Russia and lots of munitions, which it's also selling to Russia.

So it's not just one country, the US, against one country, China. It's a constellation with rough and smooth edges and variable margins, if you will, on both sides. And so when you look at North Korea firing hypersonic missiles, they are attempting to put pressure on South Korea alongside China, which is saying, well, look, South Korea, we have a great economic relationship. Do you really want to ruin that by being with the US?

And every country is being pushed and pulled between the 2 different blocs. On the other hand, by the way, just very quickly, and then I'll shut up for a second.

We've just seen in the last 24 hours too, almost every country bar a few in Central and South America join a Monroe Doctrine declaration saying that they all want to basically move towards economic security together and fight narcoterrorism together. And I would imagine in brackets, fight Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence together. So the US really is doing a grand job of rallying the troops, Canada aside, Nicaragua aside, Brazilian election aside, in the Western Hemisphere. And in Asia, it's much more contested territory.

So everyone in the region is being squeezed in different ways. The South China Sea is a potential flashpoint too. And there, the Philippines is working very, very closely with Japan and with the US. And of course, the US has a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. But you are seeing China gradually try and squeeze Philippine possessions in the South China Sea, mainly through Coast Guard vessels ramming up against each other. And there, Taiwan has just sent a Coast Guard vessel to the Philippines, so you can see which side they take.

Now, were we to get a flashpoint there, the US would have a choice. Do we stand by a treaty ally and have to move forces against China in the South China Sea, or do we salami style say, okay, well, we'll let that ride. At which point we understand completely that that defense guarantee doesn't stand up for very much. You can salami slice away in exactly the same way the Russians are talking about doing against Eastern Europe. We've just had today also, by the way, a Russian suicide drone has crashed in Romania, not near Romania, in Romania. Now, I don't believe anyone was killed. Technically, that's a NATO Article 5 violation. Russia has used military force against a NATO member. Are NATO immediately going to attack Russia? No, they're not. So we are already seeing this chipping away.

So that's happening. But I think a far larger argument, which you alluded to, which is really important, is this. There are serious discussions taking place in national security circles, and you can see some of them from time to time in the national media, and they appear briefly, then they disappear, that Xi Jinping is deadly serious about past statements he's made. And that he would consider moving on Taiwan next year. Now, the concept of China moving on Taiwan is something that's not new.

You brought it up and it's hardly a topic that is so left field that no one could imagine it.

No one knows if that's true or not. And what we can say is if it were to happen, no one knows what the outcome would be, but the worst case scenario would be that you then have the US and China involved in a shooting match in Asia. On top of the fact that Ukraine and Russia would still be on one, and you'd still have the Middle East in flames. And that's really starting to look like at least a small-scale world war in the worst-case scenario.

But here's where it links back to some of the other things that we are seeing. If you suspect that's going to happen and you are the US, and this is where you have to hypothesize after having structurally put forward the framework that I already have, that there is a reason why these things are happening.

If you are the US and you think, you know what, this is not beyond the realms of possibility. We can see the risk that could happen. Maybe it's 70-30, maybe it's 50-50, maybe it's 30-70 the other way. We don't want to run that risk because the war against Iran has already exposed that we actually don't have enough interceptors.

We don't have enough bunker fuel in Hawaii anymore for the Pacific Fleet. There are lots and lots of areas that we are short of what we would need to fight that sustained war on the other side of the Pacific, and China is going to have home advantage.

What can we do between now and then to try very hard to persuade China not to do that? And you've got 2 options, haven't you? If you think logically, one of them is you do some kind of deal. Now we have a Trump-Xi summit taking place at the moment, and all kinds of things are on the table and being discussed there. No one knows exactly what, but it has very much a Tehran Potsdam, Yalta, end of World War II feel to it to an extent. Let's wait and see the news headlines that come out.

But if you don't do a deal, then the only other option is you have to make that unviable in terms of being a strategic option for China to consider.

Now, how do you do that? Well, on one end of the spectrum, you can say, well, okay, these are nuclear weapons and this is what they do. Nobody wants to think about that because that immediately takes us to the 10 seconds to midnight scenario. Where if the other side says, okay, well, I think you're going to blink, we really are in an incredibly dangerous world. And I don't want to even think about that, but I'm putting it forward as a logical possibility.

But if you're not going to do that, at the other end of the spectrum, how about if the Russia-Ukraine war continues to drain global energy resources and keep Russia very occupied? How about bringing peace to that particular war, were that to happen as a US strategy, Might be some kind of lever to try and bring Russia on side with the US against China to kind of do a reverse Nixon, which is I think very unlikely, but I think the White House is still open to that suggestion.

And how about if the Middle East is so destabilized in all kinds of ways that anybody contemplating sustained military action in Asia without having any oil— now of course you can have your reserves of oil, but you might not be getting any flows of oil. How about that as the backdrop to then saying, how confident are you that you can manage to make that work with markets in total chaos and oil prices through the roof?

So that is the larger picture that I'm describing.

Is the US being drained by Ukraine and Iran?

Erik Townsend: And I'm just in a bit of a state of shock. If I really step back from all of this, Michael, I see a picture that scares the hell out of me, which is, look, go way back to the idea of don't listen to what they say, just watch what they do. And figure out their intentions from that. And I look at, okay, we had to have this conflict with Ukraine and Russia, which as Barack Obama said, Ukraine is a vital interest to Russia and will never be a vital interest to the United States. A lot of people, myself included, just could not understand why we had to do this. The so-called unprovoked invasion was one of the most provoked events in world history. It started in February, not of 2022, but in February of 2014. And the people doing the provoking were not Russian, they were American. They were Hillary Clinton, they were Victoria Nuland, they were Jake Sullivan, and they were Joe Biden.

And that's where this all started in 2014. It eventually escalated. We had the CIA doing things, but we had to somehow give this assistance to Ukraine and we had to ship all of these weapons to Ukraine. Then for a separate set of reasons, supposedly we just had to come to Israel's assistance because supposedly Iran was just 2 weeks away from having a nuclear weapon, which is nonsense, but they were. And so we had to do this. It seems to me if you step back and apply the, what are they doing as opposed to what they're saying, it seems like somebody's trying to disarm the United States of America by tricking them into using up all their weapons and resources and giving them to other people.

Michael Every: Okay. I mean, that's a viewpoint. There's some logic to it. I agree with you about the background to the Russia-Ukraine being far murkier than it's presented because people like simple narratives, particularly in geopolitics, and particularly when you want one side to win. It is complex. It is muddy. No one has clean hands. That's far from absolving Russia for what they're doing, to be abundantly clear. Okay?

Erik Townsend: Oh, I did not mean to absolve Russia from anything, but to say it was completely unprovoked and Putin just woke up one morning and was in a mood to invade somebody and there was no explanation. There was no encroachment of NATO. There were no broken promises from the West.

That's not telling the whole story.

Michael Every: No, and it's a more nuanced story at the very least. And within the Middle East, well, look, I can't think of a region that's more volatile than the Middle East. And the specifics of that, as we've discussed before, was that you don't want Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Now, whether that was or wasn't true, none of us will ever know.

But if that was even a 10% chance of that happening, And the Middle East with all of its oil reserves then moving out of the US camp into another, that's not a chance you can take. Now you can, as I said, then put those together and make the argument that you are, that somebody wants to try and disarm the US and have it use up all its forces ahead of time.

US overstretch, the Trump-Xi summit and the trade truce

Michael Every: And that's up to people to listen to and to accept or not.

But my viewpoint is somewhat different, which is the US already had far fewer resources than it liked to think it did. It didn't realize how out of shape it was. It was like a— and so this is painfully realistic for me, like a guy in his mid-50s suddenly waking up and realizing, you know what, I'm not 30 anymore, even though mentally you still think you are, and actually trying to get fit and realizing, my God, this hurts and I can't keep up with everybody. When mentally, because you look reasonably good in the mirror, you hadn't realized how far you'd slipped. And that's pretty much where the US is.

And against that backdrop, could the US take on a China with an industrial complex as strong as it is that can build a new ship in 5 minutes rather than 5 years, et cetera, et cetera?

And if not, how do you then slow that down? Now, on one level, as we've already discussed in the past, you flip Venezuela effortlessly, relatively, right? Venezuela's mine. Venezuela's oil is mine. That's not always going to work out well, but if you can at least make sure that other regions which provide key inputs into the Chinese industrial machine, are destabilized whilst ring-fencing everything you have at home from Canada all the way down to Argentina, which again, with one or two U-turns left to go, is on the cards. And one key election left to go as well.

That puts you in a far stronger position to then sit down and talk with China. Because to give one more example of that, you've just seen just before the Trump-Xi summit that whereas last time, China was coercing the US with rare earths, which it has total domination over the refining of.

And the US agreed to this trade truce where tariffs on China are actually lower than they were before, and they're not being punished by the US in quite the same way one would expect. And indeed, other countries are also being hit too. So it doesn't look quite as narrowly against China as it might otherwise be seen as.

They agreed that trade truce last time, The last summit. And this time China asked to have that trade truce extended all the way through to the end of Trump's term. And Trump turned around and said, no, we only want to do it until early January. So why are they not extending it? What do they know about what's going to happen over the next few months that tells them they don't have to have a trade truce with China, or they're prepared to at least signal to China that maybe they have a card to play? whereby China won't have quite the same whip hand over them. Is there something happening with AI and mineral processing and some new miracle technology? I don't know. It's well outside my wheelhouse, but AI certainly seems to be doing many remarkable things above and beyond making very convincing videos of people doing silly things.

So all kinds of things are shifting and changing. All kinds of stories can be misleading or hidden away on page 17, but be of relevance to varying degrees. And yet the underlying dynamic is the US plus or minus others versus China plus or minus others, and who's in the relatively stronger position to do what if both sides are afraid that they might be marching towards some kind of clash and how you work to either prevent that or put yourself in the best position to benefit from it if it were to happen.

An AI arms race and SALT-style limitation talks

Erik Townsend: Michael, The Economist just had an editorial about AI and how it has essentially become the new Cold War with China. And they said, if Trump really wants to have his Nobel Prize, what he ought to do is figure out how to have SALT talks. And for listeners who are not old enough to remember that, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties way back, I don't remember if that was '70s or '80s, but a very long time ago when I was a lot younger than I am now, that was just all the news was US and Russia talking about limiting the number of nuclear warheads. And what's being suggested now is Trump needs to have a big negotiation with Xi Jinping about how to stop an AI arms race where we literally get into using AI for military advantage, and it has the same effect as trying to amass the largest number of nuclear weapons. We spend all of our resources trying to out-AI each other.

What if we could come to some kind of truce and cooperate rather than work against each other? Does that make sense? Is AI really going to be the next arms race? And if so, does it make sense to try to have a limitation talk about it?

Michael Every: It does make sense. I believe that is happening. And again, there are different ways to look at that as a lens through which to then read all the other headlines that we see about it because Ostensibly, that argument has already been put forward by the US, but not by Trump. Trump has pushed back. Now that can be good cop, bad cop. It might be that he genuinely disagrees with other people around him, but there have been many key players in the AI industry in the US saying, hey, yes, we want to see that happen.

China's response initially to that was nobody tells us what to do because they believe that by the US saying that they want to move towards some kind of regulation, They're actually attempting to raise the drawbridge and say, we already have the Manhattan Project moment. We've already created AGI, artificial general intelligence, you know, which is Skynet effectively, which will just get smarter and smarter. We already have it. You don't. So now we want regulation to make sure others can't get there. That's China's paranoia. They may or may not be right. And I'm sure there, again, there are people infinitely closer to this who would have a, you know, a far more granular view of it, but that appears to be one of the interpretations.

Equally, it would be great if both parties could come together and say, yeah, we want to make sure that there's a level playing field, that neither of us will use it or weaponize it against each other. I think that's desperately naive because in exactly the same way that we talk about that, and China is no fan of, for example, nuclear weapons, China is massively expanding its nuclear arsenal at the moment. So rather than saying to the US, we'll keep a small one and let's talk about what else we can do to reduce yours and build bridges, they're throwing everything they've got at actually trying to build up their nuclear warhead count to keep up with Russia and the US. So this isn't a backdrop, sadly, within which one can expect many of those kind of 1970s détente era policies to stick. But that doesn't mean people won't try, and that doesn't mean there aren't parties within the US that would like to see that, and there aren't parties within China that would like to see that.

But that doesn't necessarily mean that they are the decision makers because any polity, whether it's a red in tooth and claw democracy like the US or whether it's the Chinese system, does still have different viewpoints and different parties, if not political parties, who think a different strategy might be preferable at different times. That doesn't mean that they're always the one actually setting the agenda.

Matt Barrie's Chinese open-source AI thesis and Every's rebuttal

Erik Townsend: As you said, there are experts who know more than either of us about some of these topics. So I'd like to take a minute to summarize what Matt Barrie told audience a couple of weeks ago about a development that he predicts in AI that's very, very close to this issue in China. What Matt is saying is, okay, everybody's focused on the frontier models, particularly Anthropic, and Claude is kind of the leader. And now, of course, OpenAI says their ChatGPT-6 is better. They're neck and neck, and we're in the lead. And we are in the lead in the sense that those American AI frontier labs, are producing the very best models. And guess what? They're very expensive and they're underwritten by a huge amount of investment, and it's not clear where the payback is.

Meanwhile, in China, what's happening is open-source AI models that you don't get the server, you can't just connect to it like go to Claude.ai and it works. You have to actually buy your own hardware and install the thing and run it on your own hardware. But when you do, You get a massive advantage that Matt Barrie thinks is going to completely upset the market. And that advantage is you can air gap your enterprise from Anthropic's cloud so that they're not mining your proprietary information that you're getting Claude's help with in order to train their next model. And what Matt is saying is there could be a revolt where, yeah, these frontier labs in the US are making the best AI, But guess what? The open source models that you can get from China, if you're smart enough to know how to hook up your own hardware and do fancy stuff that's above my head, but Matt does it in his sleep.

If you can do that stuff, what you end up with open source for free out of China is a model that's about as good as the Frontier Labs in the US were delivering 3 or 4 months ago. It's really catching up quickly.

So Matt thinks we get to a point where People get sick of having their data mined and Anthropic is training on your— the fine print says it's okay for them to keep all of your personal information that you shared with Claude in the middle of the night about your strategy for your business, and they're going to train the next model on it. Matt thinks eventually that blows up and everybody says, I'd rather just get these Chinese models that are free and put them on my own hardware.

What if that happens? What does that do to the US AI industry? And what does Trump say about that one? I don't think he's going to respond too positively to that.

Michael Every: Let's just consider this in its entirety. It's a clever argument and there are far cleverer people than me in the AI industry. But let's just be very cynical, take a step back and look at this within the context of what I call grand macro strategy, which is markets and grand strategy on a national perspective and national security perspective altogether.

As the backdrop. Just run that past the smell test for a second, right? The argument is that China, as in state capitalism, we know what you're doing, CCTV cameras everywhere, Chinese EVs record everything. The Norwegians reportedly recently put a Chinese EV bus in a quarry and found out that even when it wasn't plugged in with the engine on and nothing was running, it was trying to transmit data back to China.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Michael Every: That China is happy developing an AI where you can air gap it and have your own proprietary little genius model doing its own thing without the state knowing what you're doing. But America, land of the brave, home of the free, is going to be all about Big Brother leaning over your shoulder and watching what you're doing and telling you what to do.

Now, I'm not ruling that out. I am saying it's highly unlikely given the prevailing political cultures and political economy in each country. Well, Over the longer term. What I would say therefore is I have seen suggestions, and again, if someone's got a better argument, feel free to just immediately email Erik or dive in, that actually a lot of the Chinese open source performance has been because they're effectively standing on the shoulders of the US models, that they're always 3 or 4 months behind because they're effectively just cloning them or just a shell where you effectively use one website to try and do something for you and it just goes and asks the American AI to do it for it. Now, I don't know whether that's true. It may not be true for all of them, and I'm not an expert in the field, but if it is, I don't think that China doing that is anything other than an attempt to try and undermine the model that American AI is working on because they're afraid that actually it might keep moving so far ahead that it leaves them behind.

And seeing the AI industry crumble before America gets its hands on Skynet, or whatever genius intelligence it's going to need to run factories for it, to run the military for it, to do all kinds of things in different dimensions we can't imagine, to come up with technology to get around China's rare earth refining monopoly, et cetera. You name it, they want to blow that up using financial markets by just saying, well, you know, you as a company, you don't make enough profit, you're going under before you get there. That would be absolutely how Beijing runs its strategic book. And how I would do it in their position too.

But on the US side, just to finish off, I have argued repeatedly on podcasts and in print that if you really genuinely think there is a Skynet at the end of this, this superintelligence within which you can then solve all problems because it can basically create a superintelligence better than itself, which will come up with new ways to do all kinds of things at the edge of the scientific frontier, get around all the kind of limits that we have.

Does it matter that the company blows up? I would actually argue it's a genius strategic move by the Americans to say, look, we can't afford X number of trillion dollars borrowing on top of the deficit we've already got to develop this technology, which is a one-and-done thing if we can.

But we'd be very happy to have international capital, including Chinese capital, people all around the world buying shares in these companies, allowing them to do it. And when they get it, we swoop in, take it, say it's national security, and let the market do what it wants to do, which is bye-bye, good night.

That wouldn't surprise me. It's not a forecast, but it's a realpolitik acceptance of the fact that if the US had had to outsource the Manhattan Project and nuclear weapons to private labs in Silicon Valley because they couldn't afford to do it, they wouldn't have let them keep nuclear weapons at the end.

China's AI strategy, closed science and tech restrictions

Erik Townsend: To be clear, I did not mean to suggest that China had altruistic intentions to deliver the world free AI because they just wanted to be nice guys. I think it's exactly what you said. I think that if you're China, And you realize that you cannot realistically outcompete the frontier AI labs in the United States, which I do not think they could do, then what you do is say, let them spend all the money. And this is kind of what the Soviets did in the Cold War is they let the Americans spend more of the money and engineer all of the stuff. And in terms of designing their own spacecraft and so forth, there were documented cases where all they did was paid off and bribed Americans to, you know, leaked plans of American designs and copied it.

I think that if you're China and you're running an economic war, you let the US spend all the money on the research. And as you said, you just try to copy their stuff and release it for free in a cycle that eventually does appeal. And yeah, I think it probably could be designed to send information back to China. But if Anthropic stuff all runs in a cloud, And the stuff you can get in, in open source models from China can be run on air-gapped hardware of your own.

It gives you more flexibility and it potentially could be China's intentional strategy to upset and crash the US AI boom. Since Trump has, after all, said that, you know, his big thing is going to be leadership in AI and dominance in AI as a national strategy. If you're trying to attack that, what better way to undermine it than what Microsoft learned in the '90s, which is give stuff away for free. to put your smaller competitors out of business.

Michael Every: We're on the same page on that. But the important thing is to see it not just in the market terms, which matter to the investors who are listening, of course, but to understand the reasons why that might be happening, which is national security, on which I've got a couple of little related anecdotes I want to throw your way. And they're all directly related to it, even if they kind of a little bit— First of all, talking about technology, I remember a fantastic anecdote about the Soviet space program where apparently a Soviet astronaut was up in space and he And he met one of the American cosmonauts, they were called, and he met one of the American astronauts, I think on the International Space Station at some point.

And the American astronaut was writing with that brilliant pen, which can write in zero gravity, which infamously was on that Seinfeld episode, if you remember, Take the Pen, one of my favorite episodes. Anyway, so he was showing it off and explaining to the cosmonaut, well, our scientists spent ages getting the right nib and the ink flow. that can work in zero gravity, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. What do you use or how did you do it? And the Soviet cosmonauts said, we use pencil.

Erik Townsend: Exactly.

Michael Every: And which you couldn't. Yeah, exactly. So that's one. The second one is this. I lived in Moscow when I was much younger, much younger, a different world, different time. And one of the areas of Moscow that I used to go and visit from time to time, because there was a good Georgian restaurant there, was called Zelenograd. Zelenograd at that point was a closed science city. So it had internal passports above and beyond the internal passports you needed within the Soviet Union. And the people within it couldn't meet foreigners at all. And I think there were even restrictions on how many ordinary Soviet citizens they could meet because what they were doing or what they were thinking was so important that they weren't allowed to just suddenly meet other people. We still, as we were alluding to earlier with energy, when I'm saying we have a one-world because markets energy system in a world in which we are attempting to get the upper hand over each other.

And some countries have energy and some countries don't. So why does it make sense to share it, one world with everybody, if you have it and they don't? If you have cutting-edge technology, why the hell are you allowing people to fly wherever they want internationally? I'm not being normative. I'm just thinking out loud, looking at past examples, projecting dots. That's my methodology. How long until people at Harvard or other leading universities, where I can assure you from knowing people who work at top universities, You know, a huge swathe of these academics are either so apolitical, they don't understand China, America. What are these? These are just concepts. I don't mind. Or they're so naive, they don't realize when someone rocks up, um, you know, from, from another country with a very suspicious CV and they say, can I work with you on top secret project? And you say, of course you can. Come and work next to me on the bench.

And others openly politically are quite anti-American or anti-Western because that's very fashionable now in circles, as you know. Um, and some of them frankly are not paid very much and can be bribed very easily. You put all that together and that's an absolute liability. How our national security thinking hasn't realized that you can't have, like, you know, because markets operating in science in the same way you can't have it operating in energy if you're in a zero-sum competition, which we are, eludes me. And then the final point on that is Chinese EVs.

They're great. Okay. I'm not anti-Chinese EVs. How many can you buy in America? None. So if that model is already existing, which is, this is a threat to us, We don't like it. It's better. Can't have it. Why isn't that going to be extended to open source stuff from China too imminently? And then potentially even to American universities, et cetera, et cetera. If you come in to work with us, you can't go home, et cetera. None of that would surprise me. But then some people are surprised we've got a potential 90-day diesel export ban being discussed. Who thought that wasn't possible? And that's always been on the cards for me too, for the same kind of reasons.

Zero-day AI scenarios and why arms limitation is unlikely

Erik Townsend: As you were talking, I couldn't help but think more about the AI thing. If you see this as a long game and you really think that where we're headed is a US versus China Cold War that eventually culminates in a major World War III kind of conflict—

Michael Every: But by the way, I don't— sorry to interrupt. I don't think that. I think they think that on some sides. And that's what some players are Some people may be in favor of that. Some people may be opposed and trying to do whatever they can to prevent it. I'm not saying I see that. I want to be abundantly clear, that's not my forecast. I'm recognizing that other people who wear epaulettes might see that. Please carry on.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's suppose that some people in China are thinking that way. What could possibly be a more clever strategy than to say, let's let the US AI labs do all the hard work. We'll copy their models, we'll open source them, We'll also have people that are actually working for us that abliterate these models. So they take the safeguards off so you can do much more with them than you can do with the US models. So they're more capable. You trick people into thinking, well, we'll run it on our own hardware and we'll air gap it so it's not going to send anything back to China. But what you didn't know is that it has a zero-day hack in it where on some certain date that China has planned 10 years in advance, because China's really good at planning things long-term in advance.

There's a day when everybody's AI that they got for free blows up and stops working and creates a crisis, and that just happens to be the day that they launch the military offensive. I mean, there's so many ways, and I'm making up science fiction. I'm certainly not suggesting, oh, this is what's happening. I'm just saying there's so many possibilities here. We have no idea what's going on. And I think the idea of an arms limitation negotiation with China to say, Let's not go to war over AI models. Let's not make that the next nuclear weapon. Seems like kind of a good idea to me.

Michael Every: Again, in principle, yes. I'm just saying in reality, history suggests that isn't going to happen. And what terrifies me just as much as the science fiction stories you're telling is that large parts of the US, and I've already mentioned cutting-edge universities in science, et cetera, And Wall Street, their attitude is, brah, what about next quarter? What about results?

And how you can square because markets as a philosophy versus the tail risk of that kind of national security threat eludes me above and beyond the fact that there's a dyed-in-the-wool, almost religious ideology at play, which is somehow everything works out okay if I make money next quarter.

And I work in financial markets. Financial markets are essential for pricing things and to avoiding long-run expensive mistakes in the allocation of capital. So I completely understand why we have them. I do not understand why we think that they will continue to operate as untrammeled and freely as they do now when we see door after door being slammed in our faces and window after window being slammed shut. I'm sure there are many more doors and windows to be shut. Yet.

Capital controls, exit taxes and unrealized-gains taxes

Erik Townsend: When you talk about doors and windows to be shut, do you mean things like capital controls that suddenly lock? You know, you got your investments all over the world and guess what? Now you don't anymore because you can't repatriate them because they changed the rules. Is that the kind of thing you foresee?

Michael Every: That's already happening.

Erik Townsend: It's happening in slow motion and it's happening at a rate where you could anticipate it and get out of the way before it happens. It's not overrunning anyone and catching them off guard yet.

Michael Every: No, not yet. Not yet. But then once it's caught you off guard, you're too late. But I mean, there are many jurisdictions where you already have Ruinously high exit taxes. They're talking about, a couple of them are bringing in unrealized capital gains taxes as well. So we are going to tax you every year on what we think that's worth, even if you haven't actually sold it. It's just, you have to pay us every year. And if you leave, yeah, half of what you have to stay with us. There are more and more countries bringing that in, and I expect that to be extended and extended because governments are so cash-strapped everywhere. Now, is that a capital control? No, that's just pretty high taxation. But for people who have significant capital to invest, it's something to consider. But I do think, again, we are not going to be able to live in a world where national security is to the fore, where key commodities like energy and diesel are being fought over in zero-sum contests.

And we're at the same time, you say, well, you can move your money wherever you want at the click of a button and we don't care where you put it. That does not make any sense at all when governments are cash-strapped and looking for funds. To fuel what will be necessary in terms of AI infrastructure if you don't have any, and most countries don't, or defense infrastructure, which most countries don't have enough of, or energy and key commodity stockpiles, which most countries don't have enough of. It's going to cost a lot of money. How are you going to get it? Make sure the money doesn't go wherever people want it to go, but goes towards the social or political good that you think takes priority. And I'm not saying this is a happy outcome, And I'm not saying this is something that's going to have me lying in bed peacefully at night rather than tossing and turning.

I'm just saying that history shows you that's the overwhelming likelihood. And we are seeing more and more elements of that emerging already. And just those headlines that we have just discussed just in this part 2, more than enough evidence to me to say that I expect that process to accelerate going forward rather than slow down.

Tactical nuclear weapons: Iran, Russia and market risk

Erik Townsend: Michael, final topic. It was an awkward moment in part 1. I started to allude and didn't say the word first strike nuclear offensive. It is possible, and we certainly have several US politicians, including Lindsey Graham, openly calling for the US to make a first nuclear strike against Iran. When I started to allude to that, you kind of said, well, I think I know what you're talking about, Why are both of us afraid to say something that's in the news that elected officials in the United States are openly advocating as if it's taboo? Why are we both afraid to say this on a podcast?

Michael Every: Well, I think to an extent, and excuse the black humor because people don't like thinking about following Lindsey Graham, who of course is no longer with us. But I would say that it is a very uncomfortable topic, but you are quite correct. It is mentioned even in mainstream press. On the front pages. And what I will say is, going back to that now, and let's use the terminology, I don't actually think we are heading for a nuclear war. I want to be abundantly clear because people sometimes listen to what I'm saying. They listen to me talking about economic statecraft and realpolitik, and they think, they see mushroom clouds. The complete opposite. That's the very last thing that I think anybody rationally wants. And everything else I'm talking about is a way to avoid that.

But, and here's a big caveat, but there can be situations, and it's possible the Middle East is one emerging whereby the foe that you are dealing with, and here is the Iranians, are so entrenched, so capable of causing absolute chaos along supply chains that the strategy that you would like to employ, which is let's keep the Middle East destabilized in order to make sure that something bad doesn't happen next year in East Asia, is too painful for you to carry.

In that case, you have to try and pivot back to your primary objective. Let's flip Iran like Venezuela. So I'm sitting pretty in terms of that key commodity complex. And one of the only ways that that might happen, particularly in terms of Iran's own nuclear program, which is deep underground, particularly underneath Pickaxe Mountain in particular, where they may or may not be doing very nefarious things, The only way you might be able to do that is to drop a tactical nuclear weapon or a series of tactical nuclear weapons on them. Now, that opens an absolute Pandora's box.

You are going to be public enemy number one if you do that, and nobody wants to start thinking that tactical nuclear weapons have been normalized. So once you've crossed that threshold, we really are doing it, as they say in Southeast Asia, you kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.

So it'd be very, very terrifying to see, but I wouldn't rule it out if, for example, Iran does now escalate, start hitting tankers off Oman, start hitting tankers in the Indian Ocean, start escalating more via the Houthis. And we get to the point where even the disruptive action that the US is talking about doing with the diesel export for 90 days isn't enough to normalize things within the US economy such that yes, they do have to then rely on that particular option. And equally Russia, lots of rumors That if Ukraine were to keep damaging the Russian economy as much as it has been, at some point Russia could say, okay, we're going to use a tactical nuclear weapon somewhere in Ukraine.

Maybe, hopefully not against a major city, maybe just in a field somewhere just to demonstrate that it can be done. But just to show you that Rubicon has been passed or crossed. And I don't think we can rule this out, even if it's not something I've got flagged in my 2027 forecast table. But the risk of it and what it would do to global markets in terms of the panic, what it would do in terms of global insecurity, just how much people would have to spend on defense afterwards, just how quickly it would make people take sides and stick to them.

It could be an accelerant that could be seen ahead.

Wrap-up and where to follow Michael Every

Erik Townsend: I certainly will cross my fingers that that does not happen, but I agree with you that it is plausible and it's really striking to— I didn't think in my lifetime that would be plausible, but I think you're right. We've already spent an hour now, Michael, just filling in the extra stuff that didn't fit in the first hour. And I think every bit has been absolutely fascinating for me. I do want to tell our listeners, we didn't have a budget for this. We didn't have a plan for this. We just did it 11th hour. It's an experiment. And if you want more of this, you're going to have to let us know. And you'll also have to let us know what you liked and what you didn't like. If there's no significant Twitter reaction, then you're not going to get any more extra content like this. We're only going to do it if it's something that you tell us you want and you make some noise about out on X because frankly, we need the promotion.

So tell everyone, retweet this episode when it comes out if you liked it and tell us what we could improve if you want to continue this format. Michael, before we wrap this up, let's just hit it, although we did it at the end of episode 1. Tell us about how to follow your work, what you do at Rabobank or Rabobank depending on which language you're speaking and how people can contact you to find out more.

Michael Every: Sure. So what I do is what you've heard on this program, discussing the bigger picture themes and how they flow back down to financial markets for financial clients, for CEOs, for CFOs, and for anyone who's interested, who's obviously thinking about their own finances appropriately. But I don't deal with retail audiences and I don't give financial advice, to be abundantly clear. I'm just looking at this bigger picture backdrop and trying to project the dots forward. Where you can find my work, if you're a Rabobank client, you can look at Rabobank Knowledge and you'll find our research team works there alongside mine.

If not, you can look for me on LinkedIn and there's certainly some of my stuff there. And if not, you can also look for me on X and it's one word handle @themichaelevery.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: And that's a wrap for our first MacroVoices Unplugged bonus session. And we'll be back, of course, next week with a regular episode. For MacroVoices and on behalf of Patrick Ceresna, we'll see you next week.

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Michael Every — Global Strategist in Economics and Markets for Rabobank (as introduced on the show)

Michael Every: The joke at the moment is if you're an interest rate trader or an FX trader at the moment, you have to be an oil trader. You've got to look at that to understand what bond yields are going to do.

Host intro and format-change teaser

Erik Townsend: That was Michael Every. I'm Erik Townsend. This is MacroVoices, and boy, this episode's going to be a doozy. We're going to talk about the entire world of geopolitics, all the way from what's going on with Iran to what just happened with this escalation in the Ukraine conflict and the strikes on the Russian diesel refineries, and what happens if we have a a diesel crisis, diesel exports from the United States, China, Greenland, Denmark, stablecoins, and much more. So put your seatbelt on and stay tuned at the end of this interview for a special announcement that you're really gonna love, 'cause we've been listening to listener feedback and we're gonna do a format change to make sure you get a double dose of Michael Every this week on MacroVoices.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

Iran escalation, oil's reaction and the US election

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Michael Every. Global Strategist in Economics and Markets for Rabobank, or Rabobank, or something like that, depends on which language you're speaking. Michael, it's great to get you back. Boy, geopolitics is your specialty. There's no shortage of that. So let's dive in. The Iran conflict is probably first on people's minds. Something that is surprising to me in the news flow and just other people I talk to, seems so clear to me that a major escalation campaign. You started with Trump saying that he was making threats, then Iran says, we're not going to escalate symmetrically anymore. And then you see East-West Pipeline, then you see Yanbu, then you see Bab el-Mandeb. Wait a minute, when the first airplane hit the World Trade Center, you weren't sure what happened. When the second one hit, the question was, how many more planes are coming? So it seems to me like we're beginning a big escalation. But oil straight down because of why again?

Because it's like 38th time that we're declaring victory. I'm not buying it. What do you think?

Michael Every: The movement in oil in the last day and a bit has a couple of different drivers, but I think hope, which is not justified by the reality around us, is one of them yet again. To add my 2 cents worth to what you just said, I'd argued that when you looked at the economic blockade that the US was imposing on Iran, finally after having experimented with other formats. If it worked, Iran's incentive would be to escalate militarily elsewhere. And that's exactly what you've seen, whether it's either direct or whether it's via proxies with an element of deniability, but we all know who is really behind it.

And boy, has it worked. If you see the kerfuffle around the Red Sea, the Houthis in Yemen, that east-west pipeline, Yanbu, et cetera, et cetera. Oil was up to $110 Brent a while on the back of that. But I think the really important point is what you just made clear, that we now have a situation where Yanbu can be attacked all the time. Riyadh can be attacked all the time. Aramco can be attacked all the time. And that East-West pipeline, having already been hit, is imminently hittable. What makes anyone think that can't be repeated again and again and again? So unless We are now pricing for peace in our time, which is as true in the Middle East as it is in Russia with Ukraine.

Unless you have discrete and distinct knowledge of when these wars will end, you are just hoping if you're going to try to start to price in the fact that everything is going to get better.

Erik Townsend: Now, we recorded this interview before markets opened on Wednesday, so day and a half or so before our listeners will hear it. The latest thing from the Trump administration was, look, it's pretty darn clear after meeting with Iran, that they're going to agree to a peace agreement right after the US election because it would be foolish of them not to, and it only makes sense. I'm missing the logic, Michael. It apparently makes sense after the US election, but not before it. Help me with the math here.

Michael Every: I think what we are seeing there is that the American administration is finally starting to understand how to mirror the Iranians in the absolute BS that they come out with internationally. Because that doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Our view, or my view specifically, has been the complete opposite, that once the election is out of the way, if Trump's won, fantastic. If Trump's lost, well then he still has to escalate anyway, whether it's via executive orders at home or military action abroad.

That is our base case, that you will see escalation once the election's out of the way. Of course, if Iran escalates more in the interim, you can see the US have to strike back. Even before then. And if diesel prices are going to be where they are right now, you could even argue that the distraction of saying, well, at least we're bombing them, might play better with some voters than saying we're doing nothing, but we promise you there'll be a peace deal 5 weeks from now when you've just been suffering at the bowser for the past 5 weeks.

So it doesn't make any sense. It isn't what we expect. That doesn't mean that there's zero possibility of suddenly some miraculous deal being struck. But if you look what the starting position and what the finishing position of both the US and Iran are, we are still where we were in the very early days of this, which is saying that there are 2 irreconcilable positions and that blockade is working well for the US. And I'm sure you are as cognizant as I am that in the background we have lots and lots of wheels turning to make sure that if and when we get a US escalation, it's going to have a lot more people attacking alongside it. It won't just be the US. It's more likely to be the US and Israel and a coalition from the GCC to try and really finish the job. So that's what I expect instead.

Erik Townsend: It seems to me, Michael, that if you are any of President Trump's enemies around the world, whether that's Iran, whether that's Putin in Russia, anyone who is not wanting President Trump to stay in power, You have an incredibly strong incentive to do everything possible to keep oil prices elevated through the US election, because if you can somehow cause the US election to not go in Trump's favor to the point that the Republicans lose both houses of Congress, then it's very likely that most of what Trump wants to do next is probably going to be interrupted by yet another impeachment trial and so forth. So Am I right to think that there's a lot of people, obviously people who are Trump's allies would have the opposite, but it seems to me like there's a lot of motivation around the world to escalate and make this worse through the US election.

Michael Every: Yeah, I agree completely. And that's something one needs to be cognizant of at all times. All I will throw in on top of that is something which is an adjunct to it, but it's very important to consider. That we have in the past spoken on this issue, and I've said that obviously Trump went into Iran hoping it would be like Venezuela, which it wasn't, which has been in geopolitical terms and oil terms a fantastic success. Let's be clear. So he was hoping to replicate that. But I said to you that if that were not possible, it isn't necessarily the disaster that it looks for him. And I'm including that even within the context of what you just said, which is correct, that it's painful for the US.

It's painful for him politically because if you look at the US Inc. rather than just the current occupant of the White House, and if you look at global energy as a strategic asset rather than a market where you buy and sell and trade, whose energy production and refineries in their totality would you want to hold if you were an alien looking down from outer space about to invade the Earth? Well, it would be the Americas, plural, and it would be the Middle East.

And I'm sure you have those numbers or those data immediately to mind when you're thinking about that. It's nobody else. Everyone else is important in different areas, but they're not the whole story. So if Trump goes into the Middle East and can manage to defeat Iran, as we've spoken about before, which is why I think he will escalate with others, then he's got both of those in hand and that gives him a fantastic amount of leverage Over everybody else, China and others.

But, and here's the real takeaway, and I know Anas Alhajji has said similar things from very early on, and I was always open to the idea. If he goes in and he can't manage to topple Iran, rather than retreating and saying, oh dear, energy prices are higher, right? Okay, here are the keys to the Middle East. All that energy block now shifts towards China, towards Russia, towards North Korea, towards Iran, et cetera, et cetera.

You just keep at it one way or another. You ensure that one way or another, the Middle East remains destabilized, which isn't hard to do. Because there were a lot of people who were very keen on destabilizing it. And at that point, the collective energy in the Americas still looked really, really good from outer space. And you still have, in relative terms, a very strong hand and leverage against others, even if in nominal terms and in electoral terms coming up to the midterms, you suffer.

Erik Townsend: Is there a risk that if this does not go the president's way and we get to the point where the Election is rapidly approaching and it seems like there's just no way to get the cost of energy prices back down. Is that then the opening where the Trump administration throws the Hail Mary pass to say, okay, we're going to massively escalate and send the message to the voters that, okay, he really did end it this time. He did the big thing and we had the gigantic—

Michael Every: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: escalation militarily that both reignited some patriotism among the American people to support the president and also created maybe a better claim he could make that he finished it.

Michael Every: I would not rule that out. You were very, very judicious in your choice of vocabulary in terms of what you were implying. I think I get your drift. And all I would say that serious people who take this matter seriously, are having serious discussions about the serious likelihood of that happening.

Ukraine strikes on Russian refineries and Trump's warning

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to that other war that is going on. It's particularly interesting to me that it almost seemed scripted for Hollywood, that President Trump was unusually vocal and publicly vocal in issuing a warning almost to President Zelensky saying, look, The world needs diesel right now. Go ahead and have your war with Russia, but do not hit their refineries because it's going to shock the global market. Don't do that. It was days later that Ukraine did exactly that, almost seemingly in an intentional— I mean, the way I read it was an intentional act of defiance. Like, no, Mr. Trump, you're not going to tell us what to do. Maybe I'm reading that wrong. How did you see it?

Michael Every: No, I think that's a very valid way of reading it. All I can say is that there are different ways to interpret it depending on whether you look at this first order, second order, third order, et cetera. And I'm not implying that the other views are correct. I'm just saying that you have to look at a matrix of potential outcomes and possibilities. So one of them is that yes, Trump says things and people just defy him now. That's not particularly good for the global security order. It's good if you don't like Trump, you know, which It puts a smile on some people's face and a scowl on others. But it's not good in terms of global security, and it's certainly not good in terms of diesel prices for the global economy. That's one.

The other one is if you think second, third order, that if that's going to happen, you are starting to see record diesel prices, not just in the US, which is of course where American voters are looking at it, but right the way around the world. You are seeing serious signs of political stress, economic stress, and even social unrest. in some countries on the back of that now. And the longer this goes on, the worse it's going to get.

Now, as an adjunct to that, and maybe we'll open that discussion in a second, you have had Republican politicians and now even Trump himself and Bessent investigating the idea of ceasing US diesel exports. And before we unpack that and how that may or may not play out, were that to happen, and again, this is purely hypothetical, were that to happen, What do you think the impact would be? Russia, Ukraine, and Europe.

There are different ways to look at it, but one of them is that Europe, which is potentially in the firing line to not get as much diesel in that particular environment, would have to be the ones who clip Zelensky's ear and say, we've told you not to hit Russian oil refineries. Didn't you listen to the man?

Talking about Trump, because they would be the ones who suffer more. So then that would actually Force them to be tougher with Ukraine and actually get them to try and force some kind of settlement rather than an escalation, which seems more likely at the moment between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe behind Ukraine. So that's one very cynical second-order way of looking at it.

Equally, and the data on this are not conclusive, but some of the whispers that you hear and the stories that you hear from oil traders, don't rule out the fact that there's actually arbitrage happening. And some refined products are still flowing from Europe to Russia itself. And by that happening, you would then put pressure on them to stop doing that. So there are different ways to interpret it.

But as is often the case when we're looking at geopolitics and the intersection of geopolitics and geoeconomics, don't always fall for the first order Trump-related headline.

And just as an adjunct, one last point before we go back to the diesel thing. Just a few months ago, for example, we had panic after panic in Europe that Trump was going to invade Greenland. Serious people were saying, well, there's a risk that we'll actually be at war with America. And I think 9 of 13 soldiers from Europe actually went to Greenland. He's just signed that security agreement with Greenland and Denmark, which is pretty much everything that he wanted from the beginning. And so there's been an enormous climbdown from the European side on that, despite the fact that all the first-order headlines were doom, gloom, catastrophe, and very much a simplistic way of looking at it.

Is a global diesel crisis coming?

Erik Townsend: I promised to come back to the diesel export policy in a minute, but before we talk about diesel, Let's talk about diesel because I want to talk about just the global shortage aspect before we even get into US policy. In the escalation of all this, a lot of us were really talking about blowout $200 crude oil prices. Our friend, Dr. Anas Alhajji, who you mentioned earlier, was the voice of reason saying, guys, you're misreading it. Yes, there is a spike. It won't be in the benchmark products. There will be $200 oil prices. There have already been $200 oil prices in local markets. But it's not going to come to the benchmarks. The same guy who was Mr. Voice of Reason is in the last couple of days post the Russian strike that I think took out something like 40% of Russian diesel refining capacity.

Anas, who is the never escalate man, is saying diesel is the crisis. He's tweeting all over the place. It seems like we really do have a very serious risk of this thing mushrooming. So to what extent is that risk?

And I want to make sure we put it in perspective for people that when you run out of diesel fuel in a country, it means your farmers can't deliver food to people. It means that the rest of things, whether it's groceries or necessities, if the trucks can't drive down the road because they can't refuel, nothing gets anywhere. So a diesel crisis could be a really big deal. It could lead to rationing and so forth. Are we headed to— that extent of potentially a global diesel crisis, or is this just a bunch of propaganda that's been exaggerated on X?

Michael Every: Well, first of all, I have to reiterate again, as a global strategist, I have to look across asset, across geography, and frankly, cross-disciplinary. But that doesn't make me an energy expert. I speak to many of them, and our own energy expert at Rabobank, Joe DeLaura, who does a fantastic job on oil, he's deeply concerned. If you look at the supply demand, if you look at where inventories are, if you look at the fact that in most parts of the West in particular, we haven't built a refinery for a very long time and have been busily closing them down. And if you look at the disruption happening in the Middle East, which is easing for the moment, but as I said, could come roaring back in again alongside what's happening to Russia, you can make a realistic prognosis that a genuine, really serious diesel crisis It's possible.

But at that point, I have to steer it back to something I said early on, and which I've said repeatedly in the past couple of weeks and even the past couple of days to people, which is when we are looking at these things, the joke at the moment is if you're an interest rate trader or an FX trader at the moment, you have to be an oil trader. You've got to look at that to understand what bond yields are going to do, for example. Fair enough. I think that's a valid comment.

But the oil traders, Okay, they tend to be much more realpolitik because of the way the market is and the industry is. You've got to understand global strategy. You've really got to understand who's more likely to win the war, who's more likely to escalate or de-escalate, who's bluffing, who isn't.

That's a very, very different set of skills that you are having to bring and a very different set of lenses you're having to look through to determine this.

And by the way, that goes all the way to central banks. If you want to talk about what the Fed's going to do, What's the ECB going to do? What's the Bank of England going to do? We can understand or try and guess what the reaction function is, but it's all a reaction to the geopolitics.

So steering back to that, you look at Russia-Ukraine, are we close to escalation or peace in our time? Between the two, if you're going to make it binary like that on a buy-sell basis, we're far closer to escalation than we are to peace in our time. In the Middle East, are we closer to another escalation to try to get through to the other side of it? than we are to, we're all friends and we're going to toast marshmallows around the fire singing Kumbaya. We're far closer to an escalation. And in fact, both of those wars are closer to a conflation and a conflagration where we see that actually they are the same war, albeit being fought by slightly different people. So on that basis, yes, the risk is there if we don't get the right geopolitical outcomes and the right reactions from policymakers of a diesel crisis, the risk.

Zelensky's motives and why the first-order narrative misleads

Erik Townsend: Michael, I think you're really onto something about it being all the same conflict. And the question that comes back to my mind that I just can't shake is what possible motive could anyone who was influencing Zelensky have had in order to want to bring on a global diesel crisis? Or why would Zelensky— maybe Zelensky felt that his war wasn't getting enough attention and he needed to do something to draw attention to it. But it seems to me that If Zelensky is the guy who just very flagrantly disobeyed Trump's direct order not to hit the diesel refineries, he took out something like 40% of their refining capacity. I may have that number wrong, folks. I got that off of X and I haven't verified it. But if he did that, and I mean, it seems like he would've pissed the whole world off and they're all going to blame him for escalating at the wrong time in a way that caused a diesel crisis that's affecting the safety of countries around the world.

Zelensky's not that stupid unless there's a bigger picture that I'm not seeing.

Michael Every: I don't want to get into conspiracy theories because X, social media, is full of them. And there are some fantastic ones and some fantastically awful ones out there. And I think we can all admit it's fun to dabble in that from time to time, just out of interest to hear what people are saying. That's not the world that I live in. I live in the real world.

But what I will tell you is in the real world, as I already said, the mainstream view that you're seeing from the mainstream press, and I mean the mainstream financial press as well, about what's going on with a given story, Trump's going to invade Greenland, et cetera, et cetera, are very, very, very wrong most of the time.

And they don't see that there is often, as I said, a second or a third order or a second or a third layer that's taking place. And historically, you only find out afterwards. I mean, let's go all the way back, for example, This is one that's well recognized now. The Gulf of Tonkin incident with the Vietnam War, the nominal trigger that the US used to really escalate and get involved in the war, completely fake. It's a thunderstorm as far as I'm aware, unless that's a conspiracy theory that I've fallen for, at which point I apologize to everybody.

But you have false flags, you have multi-layered reasons for these things to be happening. And I do think there is some logic to Zelensky trying to keep the world's focus on this war because frankly, the West gets bored really quickly and loses its focus really, really quickly. But that doesn't mean that there can't be other motives out there. And I very rarely avoid the topic, but I don't want to go too deep into all of them because they lead us to some places that we'd need another hour to discuss just in terms of unpacking all of it.

But I suspect that there is Far more to this than we see above and beyond just trying to get attention. And one tell, just one tell on that is apart from Trump, nobody else is angry with Zelensky. So we have a global diesel crisis. We have Europe suffering terribly, even though Europe's pro-Ukrainian. And yet all of this gets pinned again on Trump. Now, I'm not saying he's blameless in any way, shape, or form. Clearly this war in the Middle East is a large, large part of it.

But it's not as if the blame is being apportioned 70/30 or 80/20 or 50/50. It's very clear where the mainstream narrative is going and it's unidirectional.

Erik Townsend: Well, I think you said it best, Michael. On one hand, it would be irresponsible of us to try to venture into conspiracy theories and speculation about what is going on. But boy, I have an overwhelmingly strong feeling that we are not seeing the whole picture yet and that there's more to this than meets the eye. And I guess we'll just leave it there because I can't offer a credible explanation. I don't have any evidence, but this whole business of Trump makes a threat, then the very next thing that Zelensky does is defy it, and then all the people around the world that ought to be pissed off at Zelensky aren't.

US diesel export ban and an energy-statecraft bloc

Erik Townsend: Something doesn't add up. But let's move on. We already talked about the diesel crisis. Now, the Trump administration policy response proposal is, well, let's just put America first. And I shouldn't say it is Trump personally.

I think it was someone else in the administration who—

Michael Every: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: actually escalated this idea of let's put America first and outlaw diesel exports from the United States.

And what they apparently believe is that will cause diesel prices to stay low in the United States, even if they're high elsewhere. I don't know many people in the oil business who think that that's how the global market works, but what do you think?

Michael Every: I don't know anybody in the global oil business who thinks that's how the market works either. But I have one really important caveat to add to that. And again, it's something that we've discussed in the past, which is this. I think you can agree, besides the fact that we have 2 major wars happening in the background, both of which look more likely to escalate than de-escalate. I think we're on agreement there.

And we have a generalized trend, even though we have a Trump-Xi summit coming up imminently, we are still on a generalized trend towards Tariffs, protectionism, decoupling, and fragmentation of portions of the global economy across various different sectors, particularly the US-China. Europe now increasingly talking about a trade war with China as well to try and protect its industry.

We have those together, and yet because of the legacy structures that we have for the global energy market, it's still a one-world market. It's fabulously integrated. across geography and across countries regardless of politics, and it operates as a relatively efficient global system.

Now, my hypothesis is this, given how important energy is to everything, you were talking about diesel and how important that is in agriculture and industry. It's the lifeblood of both and of logistics, right? So it's vital. What makes you think, or anyone think, we're going to have a polite Queensberry rules boxing style agreement where the rest of the world is killing itself in different places. We have mixed martial art, eye gouging, ear biting, scratching kind of wars being fought in different places.

And yet when it comes to energy, we're going to have this polite gentleman's agreement that everything is going to operate as it did before, despite the fact that some countries have energy and therefore have the advantage and other countries don't. And are therefore strategically disadvantaged. And to me as a cynic, that just isn't viable.

And so whether the Trump administration does or doesn't do something imminently on this, it seems completely logical to me and consistent with what we've seen so far for the US in particular to move towards, and we've discussed this in the past, my joke about NAPHTHA rather than NAFTA, the North American Petroleum and Hydrocarbons Trading Hub Association, forming some kind of closed-loop bloc with a like-minded group of countries who have the same tariff on China that the US does, that are in the same defense bloc that the US is providing, saying, we have enough energy to trade together across all the different grades of crude and refining capability, and the rest of the world can come and knock at the door and beg.

And that more or less, I'm putting it very rudely and crudely, is where I think we are heading. And if so, All the energy experts who know 1,000 times more than I do about how the system operates now are wrong to the extent that they're basing all those views on the fact that it's an integrated global system and will remain so when actually the US can use economic statecraft like the Defense Production Act to tell refineries what to do. It can build or use the Defense Production Act to order more storage to be built for diesel.

It can order that to be stored floating on ships. It can store it regionally. It can get far more involved in energy as a national security area than it has done so far.

So if we're talking about it as a business sector where every discrete segment wants to make its own return as its own independent business in capitalism within a global market where many people are not actually capitalists or free market capitalists, then those critics are absolutely correct. And if we are not, and if realpolitik and statecraft and coercion through energy is where we are heading, and what do you call blowing up oil refineries in Russia? I think it's exactly what we're just talking about. What do you call blowing up the East-West Pipeline? It's exactly what we're talking about. Then I think we shouldn't rule it out.

Knock-on effects of a diesel export ban: Brazil, the Netherlands, Europe

Erik Townsend: Michael, let's imagine that what happens next is somebody decides that for right or for wrong, what's going to play best in this election season is to outlaw export of diesel from the United States for the purpose of assuring the American public that the president's doing everything possible to put America first.

What are the potential unobvious knock-on effects of that? Who doesn't get the diesel? How pissed off do they get that they didn't get the diesel? And what are the consequences of their not getting the diesel in terms of future foreign relations?

Michael Every: Geopolitically, you would burn an incredible number of bridges were America to turn around and say, right, nobody gets any. Because even though, of course, America wasn't even exporting crude between 1975 and 2015, which people forget because Who remembers something as far back as 2015? It would leave a lot of people in the lurch, and America then attempting to try and use energy dominance in terms of exporting to them would fall through. People would look for other options where they are available, and I stress where they are available. But that doesn't mean it has to be a binary of we keep it all for ourselves or we export as normal and say, what are you going to do? Markets. Which is not the Trump style, and I don't think it's anyone's style going forward. In this environment.

So there's got to be some kind of halfway. You could say, well, we're not going to give it to X, Y, or Z. Let me just give you 2 examples. Okay? 2 examples. And I already mentioned one of them, but I'll repeat it. So the first one is Brazil. We've got the Brazilian presidential election coming up, and that's hugely significant for Brazil, and it's incredibly significant for the world because Brazil is a vast economy with enormous resources in both energy and particularly in agriculture. And were it to go the Bolsonaro direction and operate more friendly with the US, that only leaves Canada and Nicaragua to be basically brought in line. And Trump has the Monroe Doctrine, which again, people were kind of mocking a couple of years ago, and it's pretty close to being achieved potentially. So if Brazil goes the other way and it's Lula, and Lula's like, okay, China, Russia, here we come, maybe Brazil would be the country who doesn't get diesel, just as one example.

And that would be quite a lot that gets cut off. And maybe that can be used as a signal ahead of the election.

Equally, on the other hand, the other really big export market is the Netherlands, which of course then sends it onto the rest of Europe. And well, Europe and the US are clashing over lots of things, including the potential for Canada to try and pretend it's in Europe rather than the Eurovision Song Contest.

And suddenly showing that, well, okay, we're not going to export to you anymore would leave them in the lurch. And as I said, that would then leave them maybe saying to Ukraine, well, you've got to stop blowing up Russian oil refineries. We can't get by without that Russian output one way or another, even if Russia sells it to somebody else and it comes back to us via the back door.

So there are lots and lots of potential carrots and sticks that can be used here if you think of it as being an analog process rather than binary.

And I just very hurriedly rolled out some of the processes that you can use domestically in terms of economic statecraft to again, take markets and say, no, you think you operate in an environment that looks like this. I'm shaking the box. The box now looks completely different. Do what you do within that framework or don't do it at all. And I don't think we can rule either of those out, even if they're not something you can definitely say is going to happen in the short term.

The Greenland-Denmark deal and geostrategy

Erik Townsend: So as we come back to this picture, seems like it's more complicated than we've managed to understand so far. The things that are open in my mind is I don't get what happened here is the Greenland-Denmark deal. I mean, as you said, they were sending soldiers to defend Greenland and then all of a sudden, maybe I missed a negotiation that was publicly announced, but it came across to me as just all of a sudden there was an announcement of, oh, by the way, we did a deal and that whole Greenland thing's wrapped up. We made a deal with Denmark and it's a security agreement and it's all set.

That came seemingly out of nowhere. And at the same time, the big question mark in my mind is how does China's ongoing much higher level strategic competition, Cold War, whatever you want to call it with the United States, potentially explain some of these things? So let's cover the China angle, but also is there a tieback to all these other things that are going on?

Michael Every: Of course there is a tieback to it. And Let me just very quickly unpack something to do with that Greenland thing, because as I said, the headlines were really histrionic and hysterical a couple of months ago. They've all gone quiet now. They're not really covering the deal except some of the ones that are, are saying, well, people are mocking the fact that Trump signed a deal to give himself what he already had.

That's just not true. It's not true.

If you look at this deal, the previous one that was signed was tied to Greenland being part of Denmark. When actually now the new deal is even if Greenland votes for independence, the US gets to keep what's going on there regardless of Greenland's status. It's also now permanent. It's forever. There's no time limit on it whatsoever. The US gets to expand military bases and from now on Denmark gets informed about kind of movements between military bases and their expansion, but it doesn't get to veto them. So the US basically has freedom to do whatever it wants pretty much militarily, and it gets the veto on anybody else doing anything apart from NATO, which of course is going to guide.

And at the same time, if anybody else wants to invest in Greenland, in the minerals, in the oil, which may well be there, et cetera, et cetera, US gets veto rights. So it gets the first dibs on all the economic goodies there, and it gets to refuse anybody else, whether it's China or Russia, you name it. So that's a significant deterioration in Danish and Greenland sovereignty. The military angle is now with the US.

Now Denmark can operate under that, and I think Denmark does much better. And again, we don't know if this was deliberately achieved via the US spelling out the fact that there was a very bad outcome for Denmark and for Greenland and for Europe if this didn't happen, or it pointed to other vectors, like for example, No, we may not do something here. We may do something there or there or there, which matters to you because the US has multiple pressure points or coercion points, if you will. But the long and the short of it is that it's got this fantastic, and it really is strategically fantastic defense deal now where it can put anti-missile defenses across Greenland, which are critically important. If you look at the world as a 2-dimensional map, which if you do, to be honest, you really shouldn't be a geostrategist. It's sitting there in the middle between Europe, the US, and right next to Canada too, of course, which is currently elbows up against the US.

But if you get any missiles, ICBMs fired at the US, they're going to come over the North Pole and Greenland is in the way of where they will be fired from a lot of countries that the US would worry about. So it's an extremely important territory for the US to hold. It's also a bottle stopper in the neck of a bottle, which runs along the Northern Passage. So in other words, if Russia or China or anybody else want to send ships via the Arctic waters as the weather gets warmer and as possible more and more of the year, it's Greenland and Iceland, which just voted not to join the EU, which are really, really important to blocking anything coming through.

Then of course you have all the minerals which may or may not be there and potentially even oil. So it is geostrategically important. And that leaves the US with pretty much everything it wanted, Short of Denmark paying for the US military base. Short of that, it gets to control strategically Greenland while Denmark pays for the schools, the roads, the electricity, the healthcare, et cetera, et cetera. So that really does change things.

Erik Townsend: Michael, hang on a second because as you said yourself, just 3 months ago, there was this massive call for solidarity among European leaders, whether it's Macron or whoever else, they're all up on a stage saying, Hell no, we are not going to allow the United States to bully Denmark around. Greenland belongs to Denmark. Europe is going to come together. We're standing against this. We'll never tolerate it. It was a big public thing. It was in public debate. It was in public discussion.

And then it went quiet and we started instead threatening Zelensky to not do something that he did the exact opposite with no explanation. We couldn't— that became the public discussion. And then, oh, by the way, there's a press release that The US got a much better deal that's permanent forever that it never even bargained for before. It's been escalated in the US favor while at the same time dropping out of public debate. The European leaders kind of stopped talking about it as if someone told them to stop talking about it. I don't get it.

Michael Every: Well, again, welcome to the world of geostrategy because between you, me, and the listeners, I heard that rumor about 5 weeks ago or 6 weeks ago that that was going to be the outcome. And I mentioned it to people that, okay, that's what I'm hearing. And of course that seemed ridiculous because they were still listening to the echoes of those previous headlines. But all I can say is, and I'm not attempting to insult anybody or tweak anyone's nose here, and certainly not to you, but I'm just saying, if one now recognizes what I said a couple of times already in this chat, which is you have to understand what's really going on geopolitically and geoeconomically to understand What market paradigms are going to look like.

If you, even as a central bank, you need to understand what's going on with wars, et cetera. You can't get there by looking at your Bloomberg screen or looking at your chart of what Eurodollar is doing, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And just reading the New York Times or the Washington Post headlines, or maybe even the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal headlines. That's not going to do it. There's an enormous amount of research and work and connections and logic and dot joining and projecting and what if and what then and second and third order thinking across disciplines in geography you have to do to try and actually predict these things.

I'm not trying to big myself up. Everyone else in the profession does it too, but it's not just GDP and CPI plus headlines. So yeah, you are perfectly summarizing there in your consternation how one can trade something one way or think it's going to be one way, And then be completely blindsided by what happens next.

What China wants and the Trump-Xi summit

Erik Townsend: Let's imagine then that we are sitting with Xi Jinping and his senior staff in a secret Chinese strategy meeting, and Xi Jinping says to all of his lieutenants, okay, look, what do we want? What does China want out of this whole geopolitical conflict situation, and how do we get it? What should our tactics and strategy be? How does that conversation go?

Michael Every: First of all, those conversations are happening all the time, right? But from the Chinese perspective, it's really pretty clear they don't like this. They win fantastically well from the status quo without war. They can do okay during a war because they've really heavily armored their economy by preparing for exactly these kind of events. So they can't be easily coerced, but they can coerce others and they have multiple redundancies and stockpiles, et cetera. So Absolute kudos to them. But they do on aggregate do better without war in the Middle East, of course. And they do on aggregate better without war between Russia and Ukraine, but they don't want Russia to lose. So on the Russia-Ukraine war, that's very, very clear that they want it to stop, but they don't want Russia to lose. And in the Middle East, they would like it to stop again, but they don't want Iran to lose.

So that of course then is rather awkward because they don't want to too aggressively back either of them. Otherwise, the geopolitical side-taking is accelerated, even if that's already happening.

So the best you can then do is start developing again, more multiple redundancies, more fallback options. And I think that they are reassessing and we will see that reassessment both from the Chinese side and from the American side when Trump and Xi have the pageantry of their meeting together. And we'll see what does or doesn't come out of it. But one interesting tell on that is that from what we see from a Bloomberg headline, because yes, you do still get news from Bloomberg and from ordinary sources. It's not all about secret messages being sent, that China proposed to Trump apparently ahead of this particular summit that the trade truce that they have now where tariffs are somewhat lower on Chinese goods and rare earths are supposed to be flowing be extended to the end of Trump's term.

And allegedly the US side said, well, we're only prepared to consider 3 to 6 months. Now, why would the US say that? Why would they not sign immediately? Great, we'll keep things stable. for the next 2 and a bit years, particularly when you've got all the instability in the Middle East. That suggests they believe they have some card that's going to be in their hand in the next 3 to 6 months, which again gets very complex and lots of dot joining and lots of hypothesizing, looking at what's going on Russia-Ukraine, what's going on in the Middle East, et cetera, et cetera.

Lots of other charts and data points I could bring into that, but it again feeds back to what you were saying, which is what the hell is going on? And that really is the key question. And it's not as simple as people see on many levels. And in some more fundamental levels, it actually is.

Stablecoin statecraft update: CLARITY Act, DFC and SWORD

Erik Townsend: I think we can leave that on a point of agreement that you and I agree that there's more to this than meets the eye. And we're not the ones who know all of the secret pieces of this, but there's a lot going on here. And I look forward to continuing to have you back on the show to keep talking this through and figuring it out. We've got only a little bit of time left, so I want to come to a final topic, which is Your stablecoin statecraft theory that you've shared with our listeners in previous interviews, anyone who doesn't know what I'm talking about, definitely put Michael's name, Michael Every, into the search box at MacroVoices.com. You'll see our previous interviews where that was discussed in quite a bit of detail, but I'd like to get an update because we had the CLARITY Act and then our mutual friend Izzy Kaminska reported on some of the DFCs.

Give us the rundown on what's new on the stablecoin statecraft front.

Michael Every: Sure. So the CLARITY Act failed and is now stalled in Congress. And that means that the adrenaline shot that stablecoins, dollar stablecoins would have gotten from a very, very clear legal framework, particularly setting the law on what you can have in terms of interest, where you can't have interest, but you could have rewards, which would be very, very similar. If that had gone through, I think that would've been a very, very key market development and a very key statecraft development because the US would've used them strategically to try and gain extra leverage within the global financial system.

And I still believe it will. And when I say that, that's because while the CLARITY Act got quite a few headlines, our mutual friend Izabella, as you said, has brilliantly picked up that Under USAID, which has of course been significantly restructured under Rubio, you had the DFC, which is a development finance corporation.

And that traditionally used to do certain financing of certain things in different countries, always, trust me, with a geopolitical aim, even if it was hidden with a different sticker on top. And they now have a new acronym operating within them, a new department called SWORD, S-W-O-R-D.

And what they do is make strategic lending or money drops around the world to strengthen supply chains and US national security. And they are going to be doing it in stablecoins. So effectively, suddenly lumps of millions or tens, maybe even hundreds of millions of stablecoins can be injected or inserted into different points, which either need stress or lubrication in the global economy to make sure certain groups of people or corporations or countries suddenly want to do things that need to be done. And of course, as we know about stablecoins, they are untraceable to a degree. They're untaxable.

They don't sit in your bank account. They sit on an app in your phone. And yet they are completely fungible within the US economy, or they will be In the near future.

So that's a really interesting statecraft mechanism, which tells me one really important thing. The US is deadly serious about this. And just because Congress doesn't approve it doesn't mean it isn't going to happen. It's just going to happen via another mechanism, and it's going to be a more surreptitious cloak-and-dagger one or a smoke-filled room than it is the traditional banking system to begin with.

Format change and bonus session announcement

Erik Townsend: Well, Michael, as always, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. We're definitely going to get you back and talk more about this. So your assignment between now and then figure it all out and know all the answers to what's really going on behind the scenes.

Michael Every: To be honest, I do have a few things I'd like to throw into the pot, but I don't think now's the right time. So we'll keep that one for next time.

Erik Townsend: Michael, it's funny that you mentioned that because Patrick Ceresna and I just got off a call before this recording where we agreed to announce a new format because we're getting a lot of feedback from people when I cut the guest off and say, look, we're out of time. We get barraged with emails saying, why did you cut him off? It was great. Here's our decision. We're going to keep MacroVoices feature interviews targeting 45 to 50 minutes. That's always been our production standard for the very busy people in our audience. But for those of you who want to go deeper, let's just do it. Michael, if you're game, I say let's do another hour on this or however long you want to go on because holy cow, we haven't talked about the South China Sea. We haven't talked about North Korea. We haven't talked about Taiwan. We haven't talked about so many angles. And frankly, we haven't filled in all of these blanks.

So listeners, please bear with us. I did not know when we started taping tonight's interview, I should say today's interview, it's evening where I am. I didn't know we were going to do this, so give us a couple days. We might be a day or two behind the Thursday podcast, but we're going to give you more Michael Every, and we'd really appreciate your feedback on whether or not you like that format because it does require more production cost and effort. We're only going to do it if listeners tell us on X that they really like it. So Give us a day or two and expect us to give you another bonus session with Michael Every going deep on some of the topics that we didn't have time for tonight.

Michael Every: I'm up for it. Sounds great. Cometh the extra hour of recording, cometh the man.

Michael Every on Rabobank and where to follow him

Erik Townsend: All right. We'll save that for next time. And before I let you go, tell us a little bit more about what you do at Rabobank or Rabobank. How do you pronounce Rabobank? And what services are on offer? How can people find out more about your work?

Michael Every: So I say Rabo, the Dutch say Rabo, and we are a major bank in the Netherlands. We are the world's leading food and agri and a major energy transition bank. And my role within them, as you said at the beginning, is global strategist. And within that, I look cross-asset, cross-geography, cross-disciplinary to try and understand what are the bigger picture themes that are emerging and which are as we've said, very often hidden by the common headline or the easy-to-look-at data point, and that could have really serious impact for CEOs, CFOs, and financial clients and agricultural clients in terms of diesel prices, for example, down the line. And for those who are Rabobank or Rabobank clients already, please go to Rabobank Knowledge and everything that my team and myself does is there. If you're not, Please, you can find some of my work on LinkedIn. You can also find my handle on X where I discuss these things with like-minded people, which is @themichaelevery, all one word.

And of course, look for me on excellent podcasts like this one where we discuss these things in depth in a way that I think very few do. So thank you for giving me the space.

Market Desk: where's the trade (USO bull call spread)

Erik Townsend: It's my pleasure and I look forward to our next conversation. And of course, now it's time to bring Patrick and Massil in for our MacroVoices Market Desk. Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. Coming out of Michael Every's interview, low oil prices don't necessarily mean that geopolitical risk has disappeared. His concern is that another disruption to pipelines or export routes could quickly reverse the latest relief move. So this week I wanted to position for renewed crude oil strength, but with a defined premium budget. The options backdrop makes this even more interesting. The Oil Volatility Index has retreated down toward the low end of its recent range. Now, that doesn't mean there isn't a risk premium. It's just well below the panic levels earlier this year. Now, for this trade, I'm using the United States Oil Fund, ticker USO, which has a reference price of $148.30. I'm looking at the January 15th, 2027 expiration, giving us about 113 days for this thesis to develop. The structure is a bull call spread between the $150 to $180 strikes. Think of it as buying upside participation capped at $180. Now, the $180 level is roughly equal to the spot price of crude heading to about $120 a barrel.

This spread would involve buying a $150 call for about $15.50 and selling the $180 call for about $7.25. That's $8.25 net debit for a $30-wide spread, giving you close to a 3-to-1 risk-reward ratio. The trade-off is that the upside is capped and the timing still matters. If the USO finishes at or below $150, the loss is limited to the premium outlaid.

Now, we've defined the capital at risk and given the trade time beyond the next geopolitical headline. So the objective is straightforward. Capital-efficient upside exposure to renewed oil rally with the downside limited to the premium committed. That's where's the trade.

Erik Townsend: Patrick analyzes and trades the markets every day over at Big Picture Trading. MacroVoices listeners can sign up for a free 2-week trial at BigPictureTrading.com. Now back to Patrick and Massil.

Bonds: 10-year above 5% and rate-hike odds

Massil Beguenane: All right, let's turn to the big picture macro backdrop here, Patrick, because oil has significantly pulled back from last week's high. Yet the 10-year Treasury yield has ripped back above 5%, and now it's reached its highest level since 2007. Now, if it's not oil that bonds are responding to, what does it mean for all the other asset classes?

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, this is super interesting because over the last few weeks, the narrative was oil's ripping higher, putting pressure on inflation expectations and causing the bond markets to reprice higher yields. But yet in the last week, We've seen almost a $10 drop in crude oil off of its highs, and yet here we have yields continuing to rip. So let's focus on what's happening in the yields. The most interesting thing is how Fed funds futures are repricing odds of a hike in October. We're now at close to 70% probability of a rate hike occurring here in October. But what's amazing is that we have over a 50% chance that there's going to be 2 back-to-back rate hikes, both the October and December meetings being currently priced in. Now, accompanied by this is this technical breakout in the 10-year yield, which has decisively beat the 5% level, and now we're trading around 510 basis points, the highest we've seen since 2007.

And the 30-year yield is now north of 540 basis points, and the 10-year real yield is around 2.7%. So the bond markets are suddenly causing all sorts of stress as the hurdle rate in equities is actually rising. So what does this mean from a transmission perspective? This is higher mortgage rates, tighter financial conditions, and a stronger dollar. And all of these things are going to pressure the higher valuation hurdle for equities. Well, the key thing here is not that the rates got up to these levels, but what is actually is the rate of change, the speed of which yields are rising. What we are literally seeing is bond markets are almost accelerating their to the downside is yields are rocketing, which is usually when we see some form of attempt to basically calm these markets down. Will there be some attempt to stabilize this, or do bonds have another full level lower to go?

This is probably the single most important thing to watch because it's going to impact the pricing of almost every other asset we're going to be talking about.

Equities: narrow breadth, S&P 500 and cheap VIX

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, that's definitely the key there because when you turn to equities, I mean, the picture looks very different depending on where you look. The Nasdaq and the mega-cap AI leaders just broke out while the rest of the market, looking at market breadth, looks increasingly weak, especially when you look at the financial names or the small caps. Now, do you think that concentration represents durable leadership, or is it just masking a much more fragile market than what it looks like on the surface?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, this is certainly a fascinating moment on the charts because technically, if you just look at the S&P 500 index, it looks so bullish. It was a flagging formation over the last month that held the 50-day moving average. Previous highs acted as support. A beautiful breakout candle retesting the highs. Even this pullback over the last few days is still above Fibonacci retracement zone. So on the surface, if you just judged the S&P 500 purely by technical analysis metrics, it's a beautiful bull trend. And if it breaks to 52-week highs here, this could easily head to 8,000 to 8,200 on the upside. But that's not what you see under the surface. And this is the most fascinating part of these charts. When you're looking actually at the same S&P 500, but looking at it from an equal weight perspective, the equal weight index during this last week when the markets upticked actually never rallied. And in fact, as we record, this is breaking to a lower low from last week.

And so the equal weight index is actually selling. The Russell 2000, Full sell signals right across the board and is selling. Sectors like the financial index are breaking to lower lows. You— when we look at the breadth of the market, we are looking at this moment where the number of stocks above their 50-day moving average is sitting at 28%.

That basically means 72% of stocks are actually trending downwards below their 50-day moving average in this basket. And so, When you look at it, there's like 5 mega-cap stocks that are literally carrying this index just because of their market cap weighting. And so, this really creates an interesting moment because the question becomes, well, do we see, let's say, the pressure on yields be alleviated and suddenly a relief rally allows breadth to widen, and suddenly that widening allows the S&P 500 to be bullish and push to 8,000 or 8,200? Or will we see that the broader part of the market continues to deteriorate? And then when inevitably these mega-cap names can't do the work anymore, they'll join the selling and we're in the midst of some sort of 10% correction going into the midterms. Now, which one's my bias? Well, I think a lot of it is back to what we just talked about on yields.

If we have a scenario where these yields continue to press and let's say the 10-year is heading to 5.25 or 5.50 on the upside, it may just be enough to break the ability for the bulls to hold the line here and could be the ultimate catalyst for a correction.

And so right now, that certainly is in the driver's seat, but this divergence is certainly the focal point. The one last thing I wanted to touch on here, Mass, is I wanted to talk about the volatility index. And what I find fascinating is no matter how you paint the vulnerability of the market here, we have a volatility index that's right now sitting around in the 15 handle on the 30-day VIX. But what's fascinating to me is about the 3-month VIX, which is actually going out to the end of December. So when you're looking at 3-month volatility, which encompasses the elections, the next jobs numbers, the entire next earnings cycle in October. All of these things are captured in that volatility index. It's trading at its year lows. In other words, right now, the cost of insuring is about as cheap as it's been all year. And there is no rush or worry in these markets to pay a premium to buy that downside insurance.

And I find that the most fascinating part is You know, you can actually buy reasonable insurance in your portfolios. You can stay long, but use this low and cheap volatility to dampen any potential downside risks.

US dollar breakout and the euro

Massil Beguenane: Yeah. And when we say this bond move is showing everywhere, I mean, it's showing everywhere. Look at the huge move we saw in the dollar index, the DXY now breaking $101. This was highlighted in every major currency pair too. I mean, whether you look at the euro, the sterling, all losing major supports. So really my question is, is this simply the rate differential trade reasserting itself? Or are we seeing the start of a much broader dollar move that could reprice all currencies across the board?

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, I've heard a lot of people talk about this being the differentials of rates and the fact that rates in the US are rising. But when you compare that to current repricing of interest rates in Europe or in Canada or anywhere else, the short-term interest rates are rocketing everywhere in the world. And so the rate differentials are actually not really diverging in any big way. That doesn't seem to be the catalyst. And so to me, the interesting thought is, is this starting to now show some sort of funding stresses, which is also obviously evident in these bond markets? You know, US dollar is still the petrodollar and world reserve currency and settlement of almost all global trade. And so you have a scenario where this US dollar rally may be indicating something more one way or another. The correction that we saw through the month of August that potentially was like a wet blanket putting the US dollar back in its trade range, well, that ended abruptly.

And this breakout here has us now back towards 52-week highs and clearly breaking out of what was almost an 18-month trade range in between the 97 to 100 handles. And so, If the US dollar here breaks to 52-week highs and that's accompanied by further stresses in the rates markets, this has to be an immediate disruptor on risk assets and continues to be the focal point here. What I want to really highlight here is that the cross-currency that's most evident in terms of the weakness is the euro. Obviously, the pound sterling and even Canadian dollar have all weakened. Actually, almost all the cross-currencies have weakened here. But it is most evident in the euro, and the euro is the largest component in the dollar index crosses in the DXY basket. And so the euro here trading back down to its recent lows is the most vulnerable to break.

And, you know, if the euro is destined to head down to this, let's say, 108 to 110 level on the downside, that would certainly put the dollar at the forefront of the conversation and certainly a player on the field for the way that risk assets are being priced.

Crude oil: pullback or headline pause?

Massil Beguenane: Okay, let's turn to crude oil because the market right now is talking about a potential diesel export ban, but whether that happens or not remains to be seen. But the 2 big news that hit the tape this week is one, Saudi export capacity recovering, and 2, the hopes for US-Iran diplomacy returning during this UN General Assembly.

Now, does this pullback in crude oil prices represent a genuine improvement in the physical supply picture, or do you think it's just yet again another headline-driven pause in the market? where disruption risk remains really, really high.

Patrick Ceresna: It's the latter. And right now, we had, obviously crude oil had an extraordinary run from basically $80 a barrel up to like $105 a barrel in a span of 2 weeks. It clearly overshot on the upside, and there was lots of room for it to do some reversion. But here we are approaching a 50% retracement, a 50-day moving average. which is a very typical ebb and flow correction, no different than what we saw in early August. And the bottom line is that the geopolitical situation is still highly suspect. We just heard it from Michael Every. And there's lots of room for this to continue to be at a very tight oil market. And the only way to deal with the substantially depleted global inventories is to allow some sort of demand destruction to happen. The question is, is that are we going to see a spike higher in oil that is going to clear the $100 hurdle with a velocity? Like, can we see $110 or $120 barrel of oil?

I think it's completely on the table in light of the current situation. And this, I think, is probably the number one thing to watch because if oil did this, and that's an if, obviously we don't know for sure, but if oil was to make a move back to year highs, it would certainly act further disruptions to rate markets, making very difficult to stabilize the bond markets. And if all these come into the intermarkets altogether, then you create an environment that is going to be very challenging for risk assets. And so watching whether oil starts to break out off this $90 level is certainly one of the more important things going into next week.

Gold: false start or consolidation

Massil Beguenane: Talk about gold because it's been comparatively quiet. And really the story there is that it's being squeezed between a stronger dollar from the sharp pricing yields On one side, but there's also persistent geopolitical and inflation hedging on the other. Is this pullback still the same consolidation we've seen the last few months, or are these macro headwinds beginning to threaten the larger bull structure?

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's just rewind here for a moment and talk about that breakout in gold that happened in early August. And it was all around that period where Bessent announced that the Treasury was going to intervene in the long end of the curve. And many saw that as a signal that the Treasury Secretary blinked and that this was an inflection point in the rates markets. That immediately signals the natural response mechanism, which is that gold rallies. And that's an environment that could transition into an easing period where they stabilize the bond markets and gold would have a clean bull market in there. Since then, and especially in the post-Jackson Hole period, and especially in this period of the last 2 weeks where the rates market did this huge repricing of interest rate expectations, this pushed real yields higher, pushed the US dollar higher, and all of the things that gold bulls would have needed to see as confirmation that the next leg of the bull market has started, never manifested.

And so the question now is, was this a false start on gold? And we are on a knife's edge. Like, we're slightly below the 50-day moving average here, but still holding Fibonacci zones. But if we have a scenario where the DXY breaks to fresh new highs, yields continue to press higher, and gold sustains below the 50-day moving average, at some point traders will admit that this was not breakout that we were looking for, and that pushes forward when the next bull cycle will be, maybe to late 4th quarter or maybe the 1st quarter of next year. Now, I'm not already pivoting to that, but we are on a knife's edge here. And if we don't see an intermarket stabilization in dollar and rates markets, then this could be a false start on the gold rally. And that's going to be certainly the thing to watch in the next week.

Copper: crowded longs and resilient price

Massil Beguenane: Now, Pat, I also want to go back to the beginning of this month where we saw Copper's positioning when looking at the Commitment of Traders report being almost crowded on the bullish side. And we, during that time, we also saw a sharp downside reversal that looked capable of flushing out some of the market's heavy speculative positioning, but buyers returned almost immediately to save the price, driving it back towards 52-week highs where they are now. What do you make of this resilience we're seeing in the price?

Patrick Ceresna: I absolutely love watching what's happening here in these copper markets. It's super interesting because exactly like you were saying, we've seen that the bulls are all in. It's not only a consensus view from sentiment, but positioning-wise, traders have gone all in on this bullish copper positioning. Now, just because everyone is long to, you know, the 100th percentile doesn't necessarily mean that the contrarian trade is the right one. And when we had that little tariff announcement, it spurred a quick 7% correction in copper prices, asking the question whether they were shaking out any copper bulls And that we were seeing some sort of reversal that could have ended this trend. But the bulls came in right away and bought that dip and traded right back to 52-week highs. And when you see that strong of a recovery that quickly, it really continues to show signs that there's ample bulls still on the sidelines ready to put money to work on dips.

At this stage, even in spite of the crowding, I want to respect this prevailing bull trend for now. There's different measurements showing targets up to $7.75 on the upside. And so long as dips continue to be bought the way we just saw the week ago, then you have to respect that the bulls remain in control of the copper market.

Uranium: price holds, equities tired

Patrick Ceresna: Now, I wanted to also pivot here for a moment to just have a quick comment on what's happening in the uranium markets. So when looking at that uranium market, the U3O8 actually remains relatively elevated and very close to the $90 level on the upside. And when you're looking at things like the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust, they're relatively stable and looks like the actual uranium prices are doing just fine. But when you're looking actually at uranium equities, they seem a little more tired and a little more heavy. We had a very decisive August bull breakout on the upside, the same time as gold broke out, but That dissipated quickly.

Now remember, we talked about how the breadth of the market is so narrow. Very few markets are working, and this is an example of a market that just is not taking any flow. All rallies are fading, generally distributed. And the question really is, is this really the window from which a uranium bull phase has begun? So when using something like the URA, which is the global uranium ETF, we are basically at a level that if We see any breakdown below $40, that leaves a distribution cycle in play that obviously could be double bottom retesting its July low, or we could even see $35 on the downside on the short term. Overall, I'm trying to be optimistic about the fact that we've already seen such a prolonged and extended correction and that some sort of bull cycle could begin, but at least from a price action perspective, The accumulation cycle clearly has not seen the starting gun get fired.

And so let's see how it stabilizes here. Well, what I'd love to just see is that uranium stocks don't make lower lows and create a solid basing formation that ends up being an accumulation cycle that leads to at least a bullish scenario somewhere in the 4th quarter.

Positioning Pulse: yen COT swing

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick. Now let's turn to this week's Positioning Pulse because we want to talk the Japanese yen, which was the standout asset in the 10-Minute Traders Report. And I really encourage listeners to visit that cotssignal.com page and click on the yen, and you'll see that in just 2 weeks, large speculators swung from roughly 92,000 contracts net short to more than 120,000 contracts net long. Now, whether you look at any position in horizon, the 1-year or 3-year or 5-year lookback, you'll see that we swung from almost an oversold level to an overbought level in a matter of weeks. We're now sitting at the 100th percentile. If you looked at that 1-year, for example, Now, I do have to mention that this positioning we currently see in the report was calculated before the Bank of Japan's rate hike, where the yen quickly reversed. Now, do you think traders are now crowded onto the wrong side of the move because of this?

Patrick Ceresna: Now, Massil, I feel like that we have to really emphasize how extraordinary this flip was by large speculators because we saw almost 110,000 contracts swing in the net positioning in just one It was an extraordinary event. And just to give it context, we've seen years like in 2022 and '23 where the entire year you didn't see 110,000 contract repositioning. So this, for this to happen in one week, some very big traders did a very strong repositioning. Now, like you were saying, this was a snapshot of positioning back on September 15th. And what's amazing is that after we've seen us hit 1-year 100th percentile long positioning and approaching close to a 5-year net positioning high.

All of this happened along the highs near the 65 handle on yen futures. And since then, we've seen about a 200-pip drop in the yen in the span of the last week, just driven by this huge US dollar rally. This to me is very interesting. Did all of these traders just get caught and are they going to get squeezed out? There's a lot of reasons why technically it looked like the yen was turning the corner. It was above its 50-week moving average in more than a year and a half. It was a legitimate pivot in the trend, and yet now we the US dollar broadly rallying against all cross-currencies in what is maybe described as some sort of funding stresses that are emergent. The question is, is the US dollar rally going to now be a disruptor in this yen bull thesis?

A lot of crosscurrents here and a lot of positioning pivots. This is one of the more fascinating things that's going on. Certainly, the one thing to watch on the COT signal is just to see how this plays out here and then over the next few weeks. Just a reminder, when we're looking at these Commitment of Traders reports, it's not a crystal ball or a forecast. It's a crowding map that shows where traders are committed and where the price could make the crowd vulnerable. And this is what makes this chart so super interesting. Well, that's where we're going to give it a wrap. Thank you everyone for joining us. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. See you next week.

Outro and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: And a reminder, as a MacroVoices listener, you're entitled to a 2-week free trial of Big Picture Trading, where you can watch Patrick analyze and trade the markets live every single day at BigPictureTrading.com. No credit card is required to sign up, and there's nothing to cancel. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices. We'll see you next week. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

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